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DATE: November 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 68 Bogus share capital: In the case of credit as share capital by corporate entity, whose existence is shown by its registration with Registrar of companies and its filing of tax returns, adverse conclusion is not justified merely because its directors are not produced personally before the AO by the assessee. The AO has to demonstrate with specific evidence that the assessee has in reality obtained accommodation entries by showing cash deposits linked to the investors

Section 68 casts the initial burden of proof on the assesse to show prima facie and to explain the nature and source of credit found in its books. When the statute places the burden of proof in income tax cases on the tax payer, it is understood to be only the initial burden. When the tax payer explains the credit by providing evidence of identity, confirmation and credit worthiness, the burden shifts on the revenue to show that the explanation is not satisfactory or incorrect. In the case of credit as share capital by corporate entity, whose existence is shown by its registration with Registrar of companies and its filing of tax returns, adverse conclusion is not justified merely because its directors are not produced personally before the assessing officer by the tax payer

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DATE: August 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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An additional ground with respect to additional evidence is admissable. The approach of the Tribunal in matters where the revenue seeks to fasten liability should be different, The Tribunal is the last fact-finding authority and the assessee has no other avenue to raise its grievances so far as facts are concerned. Ultimately if it is discovered that assessee is not liable to tax the revenue cannot have grievances Ultratech Cement vs. ACIT (2017) 81 TM.com 72 (Bom) distinguished

The Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in Ultratech Cement Ltd. vs. ACIT (2017) 81 Taxmann.com 72 (Bom) while dealing with the additional ground of appeal related to the claim of deduction u/s 80IA which was not claimed by the assessee while filing the return of income…After considering, the submission of revenue, we are of the view that approach in such matters should be different, when the revenue seeks to fasten liability before the Tribunal. The reasons are that the Tribunal is the last fact-finding authority and the assessee has no other avenue to raise its grievances so far as facts are concerned. In case, on the facts and in the law, ultimately if it is discovered that assessee is not liable to tax, the revenue cannot have grievances

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DATE: August 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01 to 2008-09
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S. 43(1) Explanation 10: The law laid down in PJ Chemicals 210 ITR 830 (SC) that only a subsidy or grant given to offset the cost of an asset can be reduced from the "actual cost" of the asset and not a general subsidy continues to hold good even after the insertion of Explanation 10 to s. 43(1). A subsidy/ grant from a foreign sovereign Country does not fall within Expl 10 because the foreign Country is not a "person" as defined in s. 2(31)

We have also gone through the provisions of Section 43(1) as well as Explanation 10 thereof. We noted that Section 43(1) defines the actual cost to mean the actual cost of the assets of the assessee reduced by that portion of the cost thereof, if any, as has been met directly or indirectly by other person or authority. In the impugned case, we noted that what the ICICI has financed by way of conditional grant to the assessee is the amount received from USA under the project grant agreement for the Program for Acceleration of Commercial Energy Research. Now the question arises whether USA can be regarded to be a person or authority. In our view, this provision cannot be read without Explanation 10. From the reading of the said explanation, it is explicitly clear that if a portion of a cost of an asset acquired by the assessee has been met directly or indirectly by Central Government or State Government or any authority established under any law or by any other person in the form of a subsidy or a grant or reimbursement, said subsidy grant or reimbursement as is relatable to the asset shall be reduced out of the actual cost of the assessee to the assessee. USA is a sovereign and cannot be Central Government or State Government or any authority established by any law in India

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 54F: U/s 161, a trust which is for the sole benefit of an individual, has to be assessed as an “individual” and not as an “AOP”. Consequently, a trust is eligible for s. 54F deduction

The issue is as to whether the assessee trust, which is for the sole benefit of an individual, will be entitled to deduction u/s. 54F or not, when its status is that of A.O.P. As per Section 54F the benefits of this section is available to individual or Hindu undivided family (HUF). Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Mrs. Amy F. Cama vs. CIT 237 ITR 82 has elaborately considered the same issue. The jurisdictional High Court was dealing with assessee trust’s claim for deduction for purchase price of the flat from capital gain as per Section 54 of the Act. The Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court has held that the assessee trust was entitled for the same. The Hon’ble Court had expounded that Section 161 of the I.T Act, 1961, makes a representative assessee subject to the same duties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the income was received by him beneficially. The fiction is created as it was never the object or intention of the Act to charge tax upon persons other than the beneficial owner of the income. Whatever benefits the beneficiary will get in the said assessment must be made available to the trustee while assessing him under section 161

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DATE: April 26, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 54/ 54F: There is no requirement that the investment in the new residential house should be situated in India prior to the amendment by the Finance (Nos.2) Act, 2014 w.e.f. 01/04/2015

A similar situation, though in the context of section 54F of the Act, has been considered by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Smt.Leena J. Shah (supra); notably, so far as the impugned issue is concerned, the requirement of sections 54F & 54F of the Act is pari-materia, inter-alia, requiring the assessee to make investment in a new residential house in order to avail the exemption on the capital gains earned. As per the Hon’ble High Court, prior to the amendment the only stipulation was to invest in a new residential property and that there was no scope for importing the requirement of making such investment in a residential property located in India

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DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 271(1)(c) penalty proceedings are “quasi-criminal” and ought to comply with the principles of natural justice. The non-striking of the irrelevant portion in the show-cause notice means that the AO is not firm about the charge against the assessee and the assessee is not made aware as to which of the two limbs of s. 271(1)(c) he has to respond. The fact that the assessment order is clear about the charge against the assessee is irrelevant (Samson Perinchery (Bom) followed, Kaushalya 216 ITR 660 (Bom) distinguished)

Apart from the aforesaid discussion, we may also refer to the one more seminal feature of this case which would demonstrate the importance of non-striking off of irrelevant clause in the notice by the Assessing Officer. As noted earlier, in the assessment order dated 10.12.2010 the Assessing Officer records that the penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act are to be initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. However, in the notice issued u/s 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) of the Act of even date, both the limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act are reproduced in the proforma notice and the irrelevant clause has not been struck-off. Quite clearly, the observation of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order and non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice clearly brings out the diffidence on the part of Assessing Officer and there is no clear and crystallised charge being conveyed to the assessee u/s 271(1)(c), which has to be met by him. As noted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N. Shroff (supra), the quasi-criminal proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act ought to comply with the principles of natural justice, and in the present case, considering the observations of the Assessing Officer in the assessment order alongside his action of non-striking off of the irrelevant clause in the notice shows that the charge being made against the assessee qua Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act is not firm and, therefore, the proceedings suffer from non-compliance with principles of natural justice inasmuch as the Assessing Officer is himself unsure and assessee is not made aware as to which of the two limbs of Sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act he has to respond

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DATE: March 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 68 bogus gains from penny stocks: If the AO relies upon the statement of a third party to make the addition, he is duty bound to provide a copy of the statement to the assessee and afford the opportunity of cross-examination. Failure to do so vitiates the assessment proceedings. A transaction evidenced by payment/receipt of share transaction value through banking channels, transfer of shares in and from the D-mat account, etc cannot be treated as a bogus transaction so as to attract s. 68

It is also very strange that the FAA, being a judicial authority, has held that non providing opportunity of cross examination would not vitiate the assessment proceedings. If the AO/assessee wants to rely upon the statements of someone it is their duty to prove the truthfulness of such statements. Filing of affidavits/cross examination of the person making assertion can be means of verifying the genuineness of the statements. There can be other means also. But, the basic principles remain the same-person relying upon statement of someone has to prove it and especially when it is challenged by another party

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DATE: June 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 37(1): Expenditure incurred by a director in engaging lawyers to defend himself against cases filed for violation of the law by the Company of which he is a director is not personal expenditure but is allowable as business expenditure

Mr. Nimesh Kampani has been mentioned as one of the accused among several others, for non-payment of these fixed deposits by Nagarjuna Finance Limited. The Andhra Pradesh Government had since filed suit against directors of Nagarjuna Finance Limited including Mr. Kampani. To defend himself, Mr. Kampani has appointed various advocates to represent his case before various courts viz, District Court, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court of India. As the expenditure is incurred to protect his business interest the same is required to be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act. Accordingly we direct the A.O. to allow legal expenses of Rs.40,72,750/-

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DATE: May 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 254(1): The Tribunal cannot consider new material or information which comes to the possession of the AO after passing the assessment order. The appellate procedure is designed to adjudicate matters that were originally framed in the assessment order and new material cannot be considered

Under the scheme of the Act, the order passed by the assessing officer is being contested by the assessee before Ld CIT(A) and thereafter, by both the parties before the Tribunal, if they feel aggrieved by the order passed by Ld CIT(A). After passing the assessment order, the assessing officer becomes functus officio and hence, if any material or information comes to the knowledge of the AO subsequently, then the assessing officer is required to follow the course of action provided under the Act and the Income tax Act does not provide for modification of the order that has already been passed. The appellate procedure has been designed to adjudicate the matters that were originally framed in the assessment order

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 40(a)(ia): Payments by a CA firm to foreign professional entities for services rendered abroad is not taxable under Articles 12 and 15 of the India-USA DTAA. The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vii) to tax services rendered outside India does not apply in the context of a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the hands of the payer

Ostensibly, the requirement of rendering services in India in order to attract section 9(1)(vii) of the Act was removed by insertion of Explanation by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1/4/1976. This has been understood by the Revenue to say that inspite of the services having been rendered by the recipients outside India, the same is taxable in India by applying the aforesaid amendment. In our view, such retrospective amendment would be determinative of the tax liability in the hands of the recipients of income. So however, in the present case, what is held against the assessee is the failure to deduct tax at source at the time of payment of such income. Ostensibly, dehors the aforesaid amendment, the impugned income was not subject to tax deduction at source in India as per the prevailing legal position. Taxability of a sum in the hands of recipient, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment would not expose the assessee-payer to an impossible situation of requiring deduction of tax at source on the date of payment. Therefore, on this count also the assessee cannot be held to be in default in not deducting tax at source so as to trigger the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act

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