Search Results For: S. S. Godara (JM)


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DATE: February 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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S. 10(38) Bogus capital gains from penny stocks: As the detailed explanation of the assessee does not sufficiently discharge the onus on proving the source of impugned deposits, the impugned addition should be restricted to 30% only with a rider that same shall not be treated as a precedent in any other assessment year

It emerges that from a perusal of these case files that although the assessee has produced her documentary evidence before the lower authorities about the impugned sums to be in the nature of income derived from the sales of shares, the fact remains that her detailed explanation tendered in the course of assessment till date does not sufficiently discharg her onus on proving the source of impugned deposits

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DATE: February 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 54: The expression “cost of the residential house so purchased” in s. 54 is not confined to the cost of civil construction but includes furniture and fixtures if they are an integral part of the purchase. The fact that the assessee did not make the claim is no reason to deny the claim if he is otherwise entitled to it (Scope of Srinivas R Desai 155 TTJ 743 (Ahd) expanded)

The expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” and it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. There are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well

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DATE: January 23, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 24, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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Transfer Pricing: Important law explained on whether termination of Option rights under an agreement can be treated as a "deemed international transaction" under section 92B(2) of the Act read with Rule 10B (4) in the light of the judgements in Vodafone's own cases of the Supreme Court (341 ITR 1) and the Bombay High Court (385 ITR 169).

When we interpose the aforesaid statutory definition in Section 92C(1), we find that the expression ‘international transaction’ means “an arrangement, understanding or action in concert etc between two or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-residents, in the nature of purchase, sale or lease of tangible or intangible property, or provision of services, or lending or borrowing money, or any other an arrangement, understanding or action in concert having a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises ……..”. Therefore, in order to ascertain whether a particular transaction or not is an international transaction or not, the necessary preconditions which are to be satisfied are (a) that it is in the nature “an arrangement, understanding or action in concert etc”; (b) that it is between two or more associated enterprises, either or both of whom are non-residents; and (c) that it has a bearing on the profits, income, losses or assets of such enterprises

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DATE: February 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 143(3): Loose papers which do not have full details are "dumb documents" and have no evidentiary value. The fact that the assessee sold goods at a concession does not mean that that the difference between sale value and market value can be assessed as income. The onus is on the AO to make inquiries from the buyers and bring incriminating evidence on record to show that the assessee sold flats at a higher rate

The AO has no power to disturb the sale price shown except in three cases. The first is under Section 145 of the Act. Where the sale of properties is part of the business of the assessee, the Assessing Officer, if he is of the opinion that the accounts are not correct and complete, may proceed to reject the books of accounts and thereafter make a best judgment assessment of the income in the manner prescribed by Section 144. The second is the case where Section 50C of the Act is invoked on the basis of the prices fixed by the Stamp Valuation Authorities of the State Government. That section, it is pointed out, however, applies only in the computation of capital gains and cannot be availed by the Revenue where the profits of the business are to be computed

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 92A Transfer Pricing: Important law explained on meaning of expression "associated enterprise". The mere fact that an enterprise has de facto participation in the capital, management or control over the other enterprise does not make the two enterprises "associated enterprises" so as to subject their transactions to the rigors of transfer pricing law

If a form of participation in management, capital or control is not recognized by Section 92A(2), even if it ends up in de facto or even de jure participation in management, capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise, it does not result in the related enterprises being treated as ‘associated enterprises’. Section 92A(1) and (2), in that sense, are required to be read together, even though Section 92A(2) does provide several deeming fictions which prima facie stretch the basic rule in Section 92A(1) quite considerably on the basis of, what appears to be, manner of participation in “control” of the other enterprise. What is thus clear that as long as the provisions of one of the clauses in Section 92A(2) are not satisfied, even if an enterprise has a de facto participation capital, management or control over the other enterprises, the two enterprises cannot be said to be associated enterprises

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 9(1): Important law explained as to the taxability of export sale commission payments received by non-resident agents and the obligation of the assessee to deduct TDS thereon in the context of s. 9(1)(i)/ 9(1)(vii) of the Act and relevant provisions of the DTAA

In the light of the above legal position, what we need to decide at the outset is whether the amounts paid by the assessee to the non-resident agents could be termed as “consideration for the rendering of any managerial, technical and consultancy services”. As we do so, it is useful to bear in mind the fact that even going by the stand of the Assessing Officer, at best services rendered by the nonresident to the agent included technical services but it is for this reason that the amounts paid to these agents, on account of commission on exports, should be treated as fees for technical services. Even proceeding on the assumption that these non-resident agents did render the technical services, which, as we will see a little later, an incorrect assumption anyway, what is important to appreciate is that the amounts paid by the assessee to these agents constituted consideration for the orders secured by the agents and not the services alleged rendered by the agents. The event triggering crystallization of liability of the assessee, under the commission agency agreement, is the event of securing orders and not the rendition of alleged technical services. In a situation in which the agent does not render any of the services but secures the business anyway, the agent is entitled to his commission which is computed in terms of a percentage of the value of the order

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 9(1)(vi)/ 9(1)(vii): Important law explained on whether payment for use of equipment can be assessed as "royalty" and whether payment for rendering of services can be assessed as "fees for technical services" in the context of s. 9(1)(vi) and 9(1)(vii) and Article 12 of the India-Canada DTAA

Article 12(4) provides that, “The term “fees for technical included services” as used in this Article means payments of any kind to any person in consideration for services of a managerial, technical or consultancy nature (including the provision of such services through technical or other personnel) if such services : (a) are ancillary and subsidiary to the application or enjoyment of the right, property or information for which a payment described in paragraph 3 is received ; or (b) make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes, which enables the person acquiring the services to apply the technology contained therein”. In order to invoke article 12(4)(a) it is necessary that such services should “make available” technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes or consist of the development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design The services provided by BT Canada were simply management support or consultancy services which did not involve any transfer of technology. It is not even the case of the Assessing Officer that the services were such that the recipient of service was enabled to perform these services on its own without any further recourse to the service provider. It is in this context that we have to examine the scope of expression ‘make available’

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DATE: November 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Interplay between Article 9 of the DTAA and Transfer Pricing law in the Act explained. While Article 9 is an enabling provision, the TP mechanism under the domestic law is the machinery provision. There is no occasion to read Article 9 as confined to enabling ALP adjustment in respect of only domestic entities. The mere fact that the OECD Commentary etc give examples related to economic double taxation situations does not imply that the Article 9 (1) cannot be applied to other situations

Once it is not in dispute that the arms length standards are, therefore, to be applied in computation of taxable profits, as is specific mandate of article 9, it is only axiomatic that the manner in which arm’s length standards are to be applied is something which has not been defined by the treaties and the mechanism provided under the domestic law, therefore, must hold good. Article 9(1) does not, and cannot, provide the basis of the ALP adjustments as tax treaties restrict application of domestic law of taxation rather than create independent rights of taxation. Article 9(1) is thus, in a way, an enabling provision, and the TP mechanism under the domestic law is the machinery provision. The provisions of article 9(1) permit ALP adjustment in all situations in which the arm’s length standards require higher profits in the hands of any “one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued” to be “included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. The provisions are clear and unambiguous. There is no occasion to read this provision as confined to enabling ALP adjustment in respect of only domestic entities

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DATE: May 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 56(2)(vii)/ 145A: Interest awarded on compensation for personal disability does not have the character of "income" and cannot be taxed. CBDT requested to issue instructions to mitigate hardship of accident victims

Clearly, unless a receipt is not an income, there is no occasion for the provisions of Section 56(1) or 56(2) coming into play. Section 56 does not decide what is an income. What it holds is that if there is an income, which is not taxable under any of the heads under Section 14, i.e item A to E, it is taxable under the head ‘income from other sources’. The receipt being in the nature of income is a condition precedent for Section 56 coming into play, and not vice versa. To suggest that since an item is listed under section 56(2), even without there being anything to show that it is of income nature, it can be brought to tax is like putting the cart before the horse. The very approach of the authorities below is devoid of legally sustainable merits. The authorities below were thus completely in error in bringing the interest awarded by Hon’ble Supreme Court to tax

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DATE: January 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 154: Pedantic stand of AO in refusing to rectify a mistake on the ground that the assessee is responsible for it is appalling and makes a mockery of the assessment proceedings. A sense of fair play by the field officers towards the taxpayers is not an act of benevolence by the field officers but it is call of duty in a socially accountable governance

A lot of emphasis is placed on the fact that the mistake was committed by the assessee himself which has resulted in the error creeping in the assessment order as well. Instead of being apologetic about the complete non application of mind to the facts and making a mockery of the scrutiny assessment proceeding itself, the Assessing Officer has justified the mistake on record on the ground that it is attributed to the assessee. The income tax proceedings are not adversarial proceedings. As to who is responsible for the mistake is not material for the purpose of proceedings under section 154; what is material is that there is a mistake- a mistake which is clear, glaring and which is incapable of two views being taken. The fact that mistake has occurred is beyond doubt. The fact that it is attributed to the error of the assessee does not obliterate the fact of mistake or legal remedies for a mistake having crept in. It is only elementary that the income liable to be taxed has to be worked out in accordance with the law as in force. In this process, it is not open to the Revenue authorities to take advantage of mistakes committed by the assessee. Tax cannot be levied on an assessee at a higher amount or at a higher rate merely because the assessee, under a mistaken belief or due to an error, offered the income for taxation at that amount or that rate. It can only be levied when it is authorised by the law, as is the mandate of Art. 265 of the Constitution of India. A sense of fairplay by the field officers towards the taxpayers is not an act of benevolence by the field officers but it is call of duty in a socially accountable governance