S. 147/ 148: Writ Petition challenging lack of jurisdiction to issue s. 148 notice on the ground that it is based on ‘change of opinion’ & preconditions of s. 147 are not satisfied is maintainable

The argument, based on JCIT vs. Kalanithi Maran, that this Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner should be left to avail of the statutory remedies available under the Act is not acceptable. The decision of the Madras High Court in Kalanithi Maran proceeded on the basis that the dispute urged before it were with regard to adjudicatory facts and not with regard to jurisdictional facts as raised in this petition. The Madras High Court itself points out that that when an assessment sought to be reopened by an Officer who is not competent to do so or where on the face of it would appear that the reopening is barred by limitation or lacks inherent jurisdiction, the court would certainly entertain a challenge to the reopening notice in its writ jurisdiction. The Madras High Court itself drew a distinction between the adjudicating facts and jurisdictional facts. It was in the above context that challenges to the reopening notice u/s 147 and 148 of the Act was not interfered with by the Madras High Court as the challenge before it appears to have been with regard to adjudicating facts as contrasted with the jurisdictional facts raised in this case

S. 80-IB: If the undertaking satisfies the conditions for eligibility in the initial year, it must get deduction for 10 years & non-compliance in a subsequent year is irrelevant

There is no indication in s. 80-IB that the conditions stipulated therein has to be fulfilled by the assessee in all the 10 years. When once the benefit of 10 years, commencing from the initial year, is granted, if the undertaking satisfy all these conditions initially, the undertaking is entitled to the benefit of 10 consecutive years. The argument that, in the course of 10 years, if the growth of the industry is fast and it acquires machinery and the total value of the machinery exceeds Rs.1 crore, it ceases to have the said benefit, do not follow from any of the provisions. It is true that there is no express provision indicating either way, what would be the position if the small scale industry ceases to be a small scale industry during the said period of 10 years. Because of that ambiguity, a need for interpretation arises. If we keep in mind the object of the Legislature providing for these incentives and when a period of 10 years is prescribed, that is the period, probably, which is required for any industry to stabilize itself. During that period the industry not only manufactures products, it generates employment and it adds to the wealth of the country. Merely because an industry stabilizes early, makes profits, makes future investment in the said business, and it goes out of the definition of the small scale industry, the benefit u/s 80IB cannot be denied. If such a literal interpretation is placed on the said provion, it would run counter to the very object of granting incentives. It would kill the industry. Therefore keeping in mind the object with which these provisions are enacted, keeping in mind the industrial growth which is required to be achieved, if two interpretations are possible, the courts have to lean in favour of extending the benefit of deduction to an assessee who has availed the opportunity given to him under law and has grown in his business. Therefore we are of the view, if a small scale industry, in the course of 10 years, stabilizes early, makes further investments in the business and it results in it’s going outside the purview of the definition of a small scale industry, that should not come in the way of its claiming benefit u/s 80IB for 10 consecutive years, from the initial assessment year

S. 153A: No addition can be made in respect of an unabated assessment which has become final if no incriminating material is found during the search

(iii) Once it is held that the assessment finalized on 29.12.2000 has attained finality, then the deduction allowed u/s 80HHC would attain finality. In such a case, the AO, while passing the independent assessment order u/s 153A could not have disturbed the assessment order which has attained finality, unless the materials gathered in the course of the proceedings u/s 153A establish that the reliefs granted under the finalized assessment were contrary to the facts unearthed during the course of s. 153 A proceedings. In the present case, there is nothing on record to suggest that any material was unearthed during the search or during the s. 153A proceedings which would show that the relief u/s 80HHC was erroneous. In such a case, the AO, while passing the assessment order u/s 153A could not have disturbed the assessment order finalised on 29.12.2000 relating to s. 80HHC deduction and consequently the CIT could not have invoked jurisdiction u/s 263

S. 153A: AO is required to assess the “total income” and is not confined only to income which was unearthed during search. Law laid down in All Cargo Global Logistics disapproved

The Tribunal has proceeded on the assumption by virtue of the judgment of the Special Bench in All Cargo Global, the scope of enquiry u/s 153A is to be confined only to the undisclosed income unearthed during search and if there is any other income which is not the subject matter of search, the same cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, the revisional authority can exercise the power u/s 263. In the entire scheme of s. 153A of the Act, there is no prohibition for the assessing authority to take note of such income. On the contrary, it is expressly provided u/s 153A of the Act that the AO shall assess or reassess the “total income” of six assessment years which means the said total income includes income which was returned in the earlier return, the income which was unearthed during search and income which is not the subject matter of aforesaid two income. If the CIT has come across any income that the assessing authority has not taken note of while passing the earlier order, the said material can be furnished to the assessing authority and the assessing authority shall take note of the said income also in determining the total income of the assessee when the earlier proceedings are reopened and that income also shall become the subject matter of said proceedings. In that view of the matter the reasoning given by the Tribunal is not justified. The CIT did not have jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings u/s 263 of the Act (Anil Kumar Bhatia 352 ITR 493 (Del) referred)

S. 23(1)(a): Entire law on determination of “annual value” explained

(i) We are not in agreement with the department that the municipal rateable value cannot be accepted as a bonafide rental value of the property and it must be discarded straightway in all cases. There cannot be a blanket rejection of the same. If that is taken to be a safe guide, then, to discard it there must be cogent and reliable material;

(ii) The market rate in the locality is an approved method for determining the fair rental value but it is only when the AO is convinced that the case before him is suspicious, determination by the parties is doubtful that he can resort to enquire about the prevailing rate in the locality. The municipal rateable value may not be binding on the AO but that is only in cases of afore referred nature. It is definitely a safe guide;

Interim order passed that non-advocates cannot appear before VAT authorities or advertise services regarding filing of returns/ arguing

As an interim measure, we direct the respondents that no person whosoever, may be permitted to advertise in the Newspaper or any leaflet, inviting assesses for the purpose of filing of return or arguing before the authority under the VAT Act. Any person, who is not a registered advocate, shall not be permitted to appear before the Authority under the VAT Act

Statutory body like the ITAT is expected to show consistency. Change in constitution of Bench does not mean diametrically opposite views can be taken

It is really surprising that the Tribunal having once held that the petitioner has a prima facie case while disposing of its stay petition, has taken diametrically opposite view when it later dismissed the stay petition. Moreover, when the stay petition was already dismissed, which stay petition was again dismissed, is not clear. Notwithstanding change of composition of the bench, a certain amount of consistency is expected in the working of a statutory Tribunal like the ITAT. The learned senior counsel is right when he argues that if the Tribunal had formed an opinion, albeit tentatively, in the matter, it should have heard and decided the appeal itself. Having regard to the fact that already when the Tribunal had earlier observed that petitioner had an arguable case, this Court deems it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition directing the Tribunal to finally hear and decide the appeal