S. 43B covers only the sums payable by way of contribution by the assessee as an employer, i.e., the employer’s contribution to the PF and ESI funds. It does not cover the employees contribution. While the employer’s contribution is allowable u/s 37(1), the employees’ contribution collected by the employer is deemed to be his income u/s 2(24)(x) and is allowable as a deduction u/s 36(1)(va) only if it is paid to the relevant fund by the due date as prescribed in the relevant legislation. Even if one assumes that s. 43B(b) applies to s. 36(1)(va) payments, a deduction would not be admissible because the s. 36(1)(va) payments are not ‘otherwise allowable’ if they are paid beyond the “due date”. The decisions in Vinay Cement 213 CTR (SC) 268 & Alom Extrusions 319 ITR 306 (SC) are not an authority on the point that employees’ contributions are also covered by s. 43B. Though in AIMIL 321 ITR 508 (Del) it was held that employees’ contribution to EPF and ESI funds are covered by s. 43B, it cannot be followed because (i) the Court moved on the premise that employees’ contribution is subject to clause (b) of s. 43B and did not notice the condition in s. 36(1)(va), (ii) the decision by the tribunal, which was approved by the High Court in AIMIL was rendered without considering the decision of the Special Bench in ITC Ltd & (iii) it is inconsistent with Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari 298 ITR 149 (Bom). Accordingly, AIMIL cannot be followed and the deductibility of employees’ contribution has to be seen only with reference to s. 36(1)(va) (together with grace period) (Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals (included in file) & ITC Ltd 112 ITD 57 (Kol)(SB) followed)

The AO has not brought on record anything which proves that there is any expenditure incurred towards earning of dividend income. The AO has not examined the accounts of the assessee and there is no satisfaction recorded by the AO about the correctness of the claim of the assessee and without the same he invoked Rule 8D. While rejecting the claim of the assessee with regard to expenditure or no expenditure, as the case may be, in relation to exempted income, the AO has to indicate cogent reasons for the same. The AO has not considered the claim of the assessee and straight away embarked upon computing disallowance under Rule 8D of the Rules on presuming the average value of investment at ½% of the total value. This is not permissible (J. K. Investors (Bombay) followed)

In All Cargo Global Logistics 137 ITD 287 (Mum)(SB), the Special Bench held that in a case where the assessment has abated the AO can make additions in the assessment, even if no incriminating material has been found. However, in a case where the assessment has not abated, an assessment u/s 153A can be made only on the basis of incriminating material (i.e. books of account & other documents found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property disclosed during the course of search). On facts, as the assessment was completed u/s 143(1) and the time limit for issue of s. 143(2) notice had expired on the date of search, there was no assessment pending and there was no question of abatement. Therefore, the addition could be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search. As the addition u/s 153A was made on the information/material available in the return of income (i.e. the information regarding the gift was available in the return of income as capital account had been credited by the assessee by the amount of gift) and not on the basis of any incriminating material found during the search, the AO had no jurisdiction to make the addition u/s 153A

The view taken by the Tribunal and the High Court in Clifford Chance was that if Article 15 of the India-UK Treaty is not applicable because the stay of the partner exceeded 90 days, then the taxability of the income would be determined by s. 9(1)(i) of the Act. It was held that for determination of income u/s 9(1)(i), the territorial nexus doctrine plays an important part and if the income arises out of operations in more than one jurisdiction, it would not be correct to contend that the entire income accrues or arises in each of the jurisdictions. The High Court applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of s. 9(1)(i) that if all the operations are not carried out in the taxable territories, the profits and gains of business deemed to accrue in India through and from business connection in India shall be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in the taxable territories. Accordingly, the view expressed in Linklaters LLP that the judgment of the Bombay High Court is based on the premise of s. 9(1)(vii) and that the said premise no longer holds good in view of the retrospective amendment is not correct. The law laid down by the High Court continues to be good law

The assessee’s argument that it does not have a PE under Article 5(1) cannot be accepted because its employees frequently visited the premises of CIS to provide supervision, direction and control over the operations of CIS and such employees had a fixed place of business at their disposal. CIS was practically the projection of assessee’s business in India and carried out its business under the control and guidance of the assessee and without assuming any significant risk in relation to such functions. Besides the assessee has also provided certain hardware and software assets on free of cost basis to CIS. However, it does not constitute a dependent agent PE in terms of Article 5(4) and 5(5) of the DTAA