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DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 32 requires that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. The Department’s argument that the assessee is not the “owner” of the vehicles is not acceptable because the lease agreement specifically provided that the assessee was the exclusive owner of the vehicle at all points of time and that it was empowered to repossess the vehicle (and not merely recover money) if the lessee committed a default. At the conclusion of the lease period, the lessee was obliged to return the vehicle to the assessee. Also, the assessee had the right of inspection of the vehicle at all times. As the assessee has a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. The fact that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1% of the original cost of the vehicle does not make a difference. Also the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act deems the lessee to be the “owner” has no relevance

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DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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For a receipt to be exempt on the principles of Mutuality, three conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that there must be a complete identity between the contributors and participators. The second is that the actions of the participators and contributors must be in furtherance of the mandate of the association. The third is that there must be no scope of profiteering by the contributors from a fund made by them which could only be expended or returned to themselves. On facts, though the interest was earned from banks which were corporate members of the club, it was not exempt on the ground of mutuality because (i) the arrangement lacks a complete identity between the contributors and participators. With the funds of the club, member banks engaged in commercial operations with third parties outside of the mutuality, rupturing the ‘privity of mutuality’, and consequently, violating the one to one identity between the contributors and participators, (ii) the surplus funds were not used in furtherance of the object of the club but were taken out of mutuality when the member banks placed the same at the disposal of third parties, thus, initiating an independent contract between the bank and the clients of the bank, a third party, not privy to the mutuality & (iii) The Banks generated revenue by paying a lower rate of interest to the assessee-club and loaning the funds to third parties. The interest accrued on the surplus deposited by the club like in the case of any other deposit made by an account holder with the bank. A façade of a club cannot be constructed over commercial transactions to avoid liability to tax. Such setups cannot be permitted to claim double benefit of mutuality

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DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 158B(b) defines the expression “undisclosed income” to mean that income “which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act”. The only way of disclosing income on the part of an assessee is through filing of a return and therefore an “undisclosed income” signifies income not stated in the return filed. It cannot be said that payment of Advance Tax by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income. There can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of Advance Tax in construing intention of disclosure of income. This depends on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of Advance Tax is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income because it is a case where income has clearly not been disclosed. The possibility of the intention to disclose does not arise since the opportunity of disclosure has lapsed. If search is conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income by filing a return still persists. In such a case, payment of Advance Tax may be a material fact for construing whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered show income earned by him, he has paid Advance Tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income vis-à-vis date of search. Also, because Advance Tax is based on estimated income, it cannot result in the disclosure of the total income assessable and chargeable
to tax. The proposition that payment of Advance Tax is tantamount to disclosure of income would be contrary to the very purpose of filing of return. On facts, as the assessee had not filed the ROI by the date of search and the due date had lapsed, the income found was “undisclosed” even though advance-tax thereon had been paid. Similarly, as TDS is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant FY, it does not amount to disclosure of income, nor does it indicate the intention to disclose income if the ROI is not filed

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The intent and purport of Circular No. 4 of 2007 dated 15.06.2007 is to demonstrate that a tax payer could have two portfolios, namely, an investment portfolio and a trading portfolio. In other words, the assessee could own shares for the purposes of investment and/or for the purposes of trading. In the former case whenever the shares are sold and gains are made the gains would be capital gains and not profits of any business venture. In the latter case any gains would amount to profits in business. This has been made clear by the CBDT circular in the remaining portion of the circular itself. On facts, the finding of the CIT(A) & Tribunal that the short term capital gains and long term capital gains were out of the investment account and were not related to the trading account does not call for any interference

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DATE: January 12, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The assessee’s argument, with regard to the sale of shares in AITPL, that the TPO was bound by the CCI guidelines on valuation of shares is also not acceptable because the CCI guidelines were issued for a totally different purpose and cannot be transported into a pricing methodology prescribed for fixing ALP. Instead, the Discounted Cash Flow method for valuation is an accepted international methodology for valuing enterprises and for determining the value of the holding of an investor. Investors are interested in ascertaining the present value of their investments, considering the future earning potential of the underlying asset. Ascertaining the net present value of future earnings is more appropriate where market value of an investment is not readily ascertainable by conventional methods

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DATE: January 10, 2013 (Date of publication)
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Though the assessee trust issued a receipt in March 2002 when it received the cheque dated 22.4.2002, it was clearly stated in its record that the amount of donation was receivable in future and it was shown as donation receivable in the balance sheet as on 31.3.2002. Also Apollo Tyres Ltd did not avail any advantage of the said donation during the FY 2001-2002. When a post-dated cheque is issued, it will have to be presumed that the amount was paid on the date on which the cheque was given to the assessee and, therefore, it cannot be said that any undue favour was done by the assessee to Apollo Tyres Ltd. A cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment (Ogale Glass Works 25 ITR 529 (SC) followed)

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DATE: January 8, 2013 (Date of publication)
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U/s 275(1)(a), the AO cannot pass an order imposing penalty u/s 271(1)(c) if the relevant assessment is subject matter of appeal before the CIT(A). The same analogy will apply where the CIT(A) initiates penalty and the first appeal is pending before the Tribunal. Accordingly, the assessee’s request that the penalty proceedings should be stayed till the disposal of appeal by the Tribunal is not unreasonable. If the CIT(A) is allowed to proceed with the penalty proceedings, prejudice will be caused to the assessee as it will have to face multiplicity of proceedings. In case the assessee succeeds in the quantum appeal, the penalty order passed by the CIT(A) will have no legs to stand while if the assessee fails in the quantum appeal, the CIT(A) will get ample time of six months to dispose of the penalty proceedings. Therefore, to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and harassment to the assessee, the CIT(A) is directed to keep the penalty proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of quantum appeal by the Tribunal (CIT vs. Wander (Bom) referred)

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DATE: January 6, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 147 permits an assessment to be reopened if there is “reason to believe“. It makes no distinction between an order u/s 143(3) or an Intimation u/s 143(1). Accordingly, it is not permissible to adopt different standards while interpreting the words “reason to believe” vis-à-vis s. 143(1) and s. 143(3). The department’s argument that the same rigorous standards which are applicable in the interpretation of the expression when it is applied to the reopening of a s. 143(3) assessment cannot apply to a s. 143(1) Intimation is not acceptable because it would place an assessee whose return is processed u/s 143(1) in a more vulnerable position than an assessee in whose case there is a full-fledged s. scrutiny assessment u/s 143(3). Whether the return is put to scrutiny or is accepted without demur is not a matter which is within the control of assessee. An interpretation which makes a distinction between the meaning and content of the expression “reason to believe” between a case where a s. 143(3) assessment is made and one where an Intimation u/s 143(1) is made may lead to unintended mischief, be discriminatory & lead to absurd results. In Kelvinator 320 ITR 561 (SC) it was held that the term “reason to believe” means that there is “tangible material” and not merely a “change of opinion” and this principle will apply even to s. 143(1) Intimations. On facts, the AO reached the belief that there was escapement of income “on going through the ROI” filed by the assessee. This is nothing but a review of the earlier proceedings and an abuse of power by the AO. There is no whisper in the reasons recorded of any tangible material which came to the possession of the AO subsequent to the issue of the Intimation. It reflects an arbitrary exercise of the power conferred u/s 147 (Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers 291 ITR 500 (SC) distinguished)

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DATE: January 5, 2013 (Date of publication)
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There is nothing to suggest that the assessee acted in a manner such as to lead to the conclusion that she had concealed the particulars of her income or had furnished inaccurate particulars of income. As the amount of Rs.30,63,310 was shown by her in the return, it cannot be said that there was any concealment. As the amount was correctly mentioned, there is also nothing inaccurate in the particulars furnished by her. The only error that seems to have been committed was that it was not shown as a capital (sic) receipt. But as soon as this was pointed out, the error was accepted and the amount was surrendered to tax. This is not a fit case for imposition of penalty

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 1, 2013 (Date of publication)
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In GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC) it was held that the AO is bound to furnish the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment within a reasonable time so that the assessee can file its objections thereto. Even as per the rules of natural justice, the assessee is entitled to know the basis on which the AO has formed an opinion that income has escaped assessment. There is no justifiable reason for the AO to deprive the assessee of the recorded reasons. If the reasons are not furnished to the assessee during the assessment proceedings, then the subsequent furnishing of the reasons after completion of assessment proceedings serves no purpose and amounts to the assessee being denied its right to raise objections to the validity of the reopening proceedings. A reassessment order passed without furnishing the recorded reasons is not sustainable in law. The furnishing of reasons after completion of assessment does not make good the defect/invalidity with which the initiation of proceedings u/s 147/148 is tainted (K V Venkataswamy Reddy (Bang) (attached), Tata International Ltd (ITAT Bom) & Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd 340 ITR 66 (Bom) (SLP dismissed) followed)