Click Here To Subscribe To Our Free Newsletter

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 1, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

In principle, though the scope of “income” in s. 2(24) is very wide, a capital receipt is not chargeable to tax as income unless there is a specific provision to that effect. As the residential flat owned by the assessee in the society’s building was a capital asset in the hands of the assessee, the compensation was a capital receipt. The department’s argument that the cash compensation was a “share in profits earned by the developer” is not acceptable because it proceeds on the fallacy that the nature of payment in the hands of the payer determines the nature in the hands of the recipient. However, as the said receipt reduced the cost of acquisition of the new flat, it had to be taken into when computing the gains from a transfer thereof in the future

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 31, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

Under Rule 10D (4) the information and documents should as far as possible be contemporaneous and should exists latest by the ‘specified date’ specified in s. 92F (4) i.e. the due date for filing the ROI. There is no cut-off date upto which only the information available in public domain can be taken into consideration by the TPO while making the transfer pricing adjustments and arriving at the ALP. The assessee’s argument that s.92D and Rule 10D is defeated if the TPO takes the data which is available in the public domain after the specified date is not acceptable

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 31, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

U/s 226 (6) the AO has the discretion not to treat the assessee as being in default during the pendency of the appeal. The AO has to normally use this discretion in favour of assessee particularly when high pitched assessments are made and the demand of tax is several times the declared tax liability in the spirit of Instruction No.95 dated 21.08.1969 and grant stay. The mandate of Parliament in s. 220 (6) is that the AO should normally wait for the fate of the appeal filed by the assessee. Therefore, the discretion conferred by s. 220(6) of not treating the assessee in default should ordinarily be exercised in favour of assessee unless there are overriding and overwhelming reasons to reject the assessee’s stay application. The application cannot normally be rejected by merely describing it to be against the interest of Revenue if recovery is not made, if tax demanded is twice or more of the declared tax liability. The very purpose of filing of appeal, which provides an effective remedy to the assessee, is likely to be frustrated, if such a discretion was always to be exercised in favour of revenue rather than assessee

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 26, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The service of notice u/s 143(2) within the statutory time limit is mandatory and is not an inconsequential procedural requirement. Omission to issue notice u/s 143(2) is not curable and the requirement cannot be dispensed with. S. 143(2) is applicable to proceedings u/s 147 & 148. While the Proviso to s. 148 protects and grants liberty to the Revenue to serve notice u/s 143(2) before passing of the assessment order for returns furnished on or before 1.10.2005, in respect of returns filed pursuant to notice u/s 148 after 1.10.2005, it is mandatory to serve notice u/s 143(2) within the stipulated time limit (Hotel Blue Moon 321 ITR 362 (SC) referred)

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

Though, prima facie, the Rule appears to be a correct notification supposedly issued in public interest in line with the rules and practice clamping ban on the legal practice by the retired judges of High Court in the courts where they remain posted as permanent judge and the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court, however, it appears to be offensive in two respects; namely, that the retired members have been completely barred from practice before the Tribunal, and secondly, that the aforesaid rule 13E has been interpreted to apply retrospectively in the judgment rendered in the case of Concept Creations vs. ACIT 120 ITD 19 (Delhi) (Special Bench) by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, beyond its pale of competence as it has the jurisdiction to decide only the matters relating to tax appeals as contained in the Income Tax Act vide Sections 253 and 254 thereof

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 21, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The fact that by virtue of the Explanation to s. 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction u/s 80IA does not mean that an assessment can be reopened beyond 4 years without there being any failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts (Sadbhav Engineering 333 ITR 483(Guj) followed)

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The High Court’s finding that, applying the “nature and character of the transaction” test, the transfer of the CGP share was not adequate in itself to achieve the object of consummating the transaction between HTIL and VIH and that there was a transfer of other “rights and entitlements” which were “capital assets” is not correct because the transaction was one of “share sale” and not an “asset sale”. It had to be viewed from a commercial and realistic perspective. As it was not a case of sale of assets on itemized basis, the entire structure, as it existed, ought to have been looked at holistically. A transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel cannot be broken up into separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. The sum of US$ 11.08 bn was paid for the “entire package” and it was not permissible to split the payment and consider a part of it towards individual items (Mugneeram Bangur 57 ITR 299 (SC) followed)

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court which held the field when the return was filed, the claim was patently disallowable. The claim was also not discernible on the face of the record and the details of expenses had to be gone into in order to decipher the claim. The argument that the assessee does not have expertise in taxation matters and so it relied on expert opinion is not acceptable because the opinion was not furnished for accounting purposes. An accountant’s view is not really material for deciding the deductibility or otherwise of an expenditure. The assessee knew about the problem at the time of filing of return, but still made the claim. Not only this, the claim was pursued even up to the level of the CIT (A) in gross disregard for the decision of the Supreme Court, which the assessee came to know at least after receiving the assessment order. Therefore, the claim was not only wrong but also false and it was persisted with for some time. The fact that the assessee did not even seek explanation from the tax auditor or the CA gave the impression that the whole thing was a sham.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

Though the assessee owned the unaccounted transactions only after search action, when an assessee admits his mistake and that he has committed a wrong and offers the additional income to tax, it cannot be said that his statement is false or not bona fide. Neither the CIT (A) nor the Tribunal were completely clear about the exact amount of concealment and there was no conclusive evidence as some additions had been deleted. S. 271(1)(c) gives discretion to the AO to exonerate the assessee from levy of penalty even in case where the assessee has concealed the income or furnished incorrect particulars of income. Penalty should not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. The AO has to exercise his discretion judiciously. If an assessee files a revised return though at a later stage or discloses true income, penalty need not be levied. No doubt, merely offering additional income will not automatically protect the assessee from levy of penalty but in a given case where the assessee came forward with additional income though after detection because he was not in a position to explain the seized material properly and expresses remorse in his conduct un-hesitantly, the AO has to exercise the discretion in favour of such assessee as otherwise the expression ‘may’ in s. 271(1)(c) becomes redundant. In a case of admitted income, concealment penalty is not automatic. The discretion vested in the AO should be used not to levy penalty. On facts, the case was most befitting to exercise such discretion because there was divergent opinion while deleting or sustaining the addition and there was no conclusive proof that the assessee concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee’s offer was to avoid litigation. If the AO had clinching evidence of concealment, he should not have accepted the assessee’s offer and should have proceeded on the basis of material on record (VIP Industries 112 TTJ 289, Siddharth Enterprises 184 TM 460 (P&H) & Reliance Petro Products 322 ITR 158 (SC) followed)

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2012 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

S. 80IB(10) allows deduction to an undertaking engaged in the business of developing and constructing housing projects. There is no requirement that the land must be owned by the assessee seeking the deduction. Under the development agreement, the assessee had undertaken the development of housing project at its own risk and cost. The land owner had accepted the full price of the land and had no responsibility. The entire risk of investment and expenditure was that of the assessee. Resultantly, profit and loss also accrued to the assessee alone. The assessee had total and complete control over the land and could put the land to the agreed use. It had full authority and responsibility to develop the housing project by not only putting up the construction but by carrying out various other activities including enrolling members, accepting members, carrying out modifications engaging professional agencies and so on. The risk element was entirely that of the assessee. The assessee was a “developer” in common parlance as well as legal parlance and could not be regarded as only a “works contractor”. The Explanation to s. 80IB inserted w.r.e.f 1.4.2001 has no application as the project is not a “works contract”. Further, as the assessee was, in part performance of the agreement to sell the land, given possession and had also carried out the construction work for development of the housing project, it had to be deemed to be the “owner” u/s 2(47)(v) r.w.s. 53A of the TOP Act even though formal title had not passed (Faqir Chand Gulati vs. Uppal Agencies (2008) 10 SCC 345 distinguished)

Read more ›