S. 194-I defines “rent” to include any payment, by whatever name called, under any lease, agreement or arrangement “for the use of” any machinery or plant. For a payment to be construed as “rent”, it is a condition precedent that the payer should have some control over the asset. There is a distinction between the use of an asset and the benefit derived from an asset. In a transaction of hire/ leasing, the possession of the goods and its effective control is given to the customer and the customer has the freedom and choice of how to use the asset. On the other hand, if the customer entrusts to the assessee the work of achieving a certain desired result and that involves the use of goods belonging to the owner, the control of the asset remains with the owner and there is no “use” by the customer (Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) followed)

The department’s argument that the assessee has hired helicopter/air craft/vehicle is not correct because these were not hired on a periodic basis or on day-to-day basis. Instead, the transport services provided by the transporters were availed of. The assessee paid charges on the basis of flying hours, cost of landing charges and refuelling charges, etc. The crew, fuel, maintenance operation licences, etc. were all under the control of the service providers and not under the control of the assessee. If the assessee does not enjoy control over the vehicles and if the running and maintenance expenditure is borne by the transport service providers, the contract is not one for the “hiring” but is merely for availing transportation services. Payment for transportation services is not covered by s. 194-I (Accenture Services 44 SOT 290 (Mum), Tata AIG 43 SOT 215 (Mum) and Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority followed)

The argument that the AO was bound to follow the jurisdictional High Court’s order in Shirke Construction 246 ITR 429 till it was overruled is not acceptable because the AO, being part of the revenue machinery, should follow judicial decisions as long as he can do so without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the revenue. If the AO does not raise demands on issues which have been decided in favour of the assessee by the jurisdictional High Court, even though the department is in appeal against the same, the interests of the revenue will be prejudiced and remain unprotected. While the AO is bound by the higher judicial authorities and has to loyally execute the directions contained in those orders, he is not prevented from taking the same stand, as he took in those assessments though he cannot collect the demand

S. 153A requires the AO to make the assessment afresh and compute the “total income” in respect of each of the relevant six assessment years. There is no inhibition on the jurisdiction of the AO on the including of new income and likewise there is no restriction on the assessee to claim any deduction which was not allowed in the original assessment. The determination of total income u/s 153A has to be done afresh without any reference to what was done in the original assessment. The fact that there was an addition in the original assessment does not preclude the assessee from contesting it in the s. 153A proceedings. As it is a fresh exercise of framing assessment of “total income”, the assessee is not estopped from arguing about the merits of his case qua the additions made in the original assessment. Debarring the assessee from making a claim about the deductibility of any item, which was earlier disallowed, counters the very concept of fresh assessment of total income (Sun Engineering Works 198 ITR 297 (SC) & Goetze (India) Ltd 284 ITR 323 (SC) distinguished)