The scheme of settlement does not contemplate revision of the income so disclosed in the application. If an assessee is permitted to revise his disclosure, in essence, he would be making a fresh application in relation to the same case by withdrawing the earlier application. S. 245C (3) prohibits the withdrawal of an application. An assessee cannot be permitted to resile from his stand at any stage during the proceedings. By revising the application, the applicant would be achieving something indirectly what he cannot otherwise achieve directly and in the process rendering s. 245 (3) otiose and meaningless. As there is no stipulation for revision of an application filed u/s 245C(1), the natural corollary is that determination of income by the Settlement Commission has necessarily to be with reference to the income disclosed in the application
There is a distinction between the subject matter of a tax and the standard by which the amount of tax is measured. The subject matter of tax is capital gains and the manner in which it should be computed is provided by s. 50C. S. 50C is only a measure of tax and not the subject matter of tax. The valuation rule of the Stamp Act is for the purpose of computation of income. It is only a standard of measure for imposing tax. (Principle laid down in A. Sanyasi Rao 219 ITR 330 (SC) followed)
The Act allows a deduction in respect of crystallized liabilities. While as per commercial principles of policy of prudence, all anticipated liabilities have to be accounted for, as per the Act only “accrued” liabilities are allowable. While anticipated liabilities which are contingent in nature are not allowable, an anticipated liability coupled with a present obligation can be said to be a crystallized liability. A contingent liability depends purely on the happening or not happening of an event whereas if an event has already taken place, such as the entering into the contract and undertaking of an obligation to meet the liability, and only consequential effect of the same is to be determined, then, the liability is not a contingent liability (Woodward Governor 312 ITR 254 (SC) & Bharat Earth Movers 245 ITR 428 (SC) followed, Principles of law on accrual of income & loss summarized)
On the larger issue of whether criticism of a judicial body amount to contempt, fair criticism of the system of administration of justice or functioning of institutions or authorities entrusted with the task of deciding rights of the parties gives an opportunity to the operators of the system/institution to remedy the wrong and also bring about improvements. Such criticism cannot be castigated as an attempt to scandalize or lower the authority of the Court or other judicial institutions or as an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice except when such criticism is ill motivated or is construed as a deliberate attempt to run down the institution or an individual Judge is targeted for extraneous reasons. Ordinarily, the Court would not use the power to punish for contempt for curbing the right of freedom of speech and expression, which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Only when the criticism of judicial institutions transgresses all limits of decency and fairness or there is total lack of objectivity or there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the institution then the Court would use this power
Rule 8D r.w. S. 14A (2) is not arbitrary or unreasonable but can be applied only if assessee’s method not satisfactory. Rule 8D is not retrospective and applies from AY 2008-09. For earlier years, disallowance has to be worked out on “reasonable basis” u/s 14A (1)
Deduction of interest u/s 36(1)(iii) on borrowed funds utilized for the acquisition of shares is admissible only if shares are held as stock in trade and the assessee is engaged in trading in shares. So far as acquisition of shares in the form of investment is concerned and where the only benefit derived is dividend income which is not assessable under the Act, disallowance u/s 14A is squarely attracted
Unless malafides are writ large on the conduct of the party, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. In the legal arena, an attempt should always be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather than to throw it on such technicalities. Apart from the above, the appellant would not have gained in any manner whatsoever, by not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It is also worth noticing that delay was also not that huge, which could not have been condoned, without putting the respondents to harm or prejudice. It is the duty of the Court to see to it that justice should be done between the parties
While Explanation 2 to s. 147 deems income to have escaped assessment if excessive deduction is allowed, the reopening of an assessment u/s 147 has serious ramifications because the AO is empowered to reassess income even in respect of issues not set out in the notice. Therefore, if the power to rectify an order u/s 154(1) is adequate to meet a mistake or error in the order of assessment, the AO must take recourse to that power as opposed to the wider power to reopen the assessment. If the error can be rectified u/s 154, it would be arbitrary for the AO to reopen the entire assessment u/s 147. Further, the error in the order was not attributable to a fault or omission on the part of the assessee and the assessee cannot be penalized for a fault of the AO
The effect of the judgements in Tata Consultancy Services vs. State of AP 271 ITR 401 (SC), Samsung Electronics Co 94 ITD 91 (Bang), Motorola Inc 95 ITD 269 (SB) & Dassault Systems 229 CTR 105 (AAR) is that the primary condition for coming within the definition of ‘royalty’ is that the payment must be received as consideration for the use of or right to use any copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work etc. A ‘right to use the copyright’ is totally different from the ‘right to use the programme embedded in a CD’. In acquiring a ready made off-the-shelf computer programme, no right was granted to the assessee to utilize the copyright of the computer programme. The assessee had merely purchased a copy of the copyrighted article, namely, a computer programme which is called ‘software’. Computer software when put into a media and sold becomes goods like any other audio cassette or painting on canvas or book. Accordingly, the amount paid by the assessee towards purchase of the software cannot be treated as payment of “royalty” so as to be taxable in India under Article 12 of the DTAA and the assessee was not liable to deduct tax at source.
Under the first proviso to s. 147 where an assessment has been made u/s 143(3), the assessment cannot be reopened after expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless if income has escaped assessment by reason of failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment. In the present case, there was no failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of the material facts. The argument that in view of the retrospective amendment of section 80IB, it is deemed that the petitioner has failed to disclose the correct facts is not acceptable. The question whether there is a failure to disclose all material facts is a matter of fact and there can be no deemed failure as contended by the department. Consequently, in the absence of any failure on the part of the assessee to make a full & true disclosure of material facts, the initiation of proceedings u/s 147 was vitiated and could not be sustained.