Month: January 2013

Archive for January, 2013


CIT vs. MAK Data Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

When the AO called upon the assessee to produce evidence as to the nature and source of the amount received as share capital, the creditworthiness of the applicants and the genuineness of the transactions the assessee simply folded up and surrendered the sum of Rs. 40.74 lakhs by merely stating that it wanted to “buy peace“. In the absence of any explanation in respect of the surrendered income, the first part of clause (A) of Explanation 1 to s. 271(1)(c) is attracted because the nature and source of the amount surrendered are facts material to the computation of total income. The absence of any explanation regarding the receipt of the money, which is in the exclusive knowledge of the assessee leads to an adverse inference against the assessee and is statutorily considered as amounting to concealment of income under the first part of clause (A) of the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) and penalty has to be levied

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Satya Nand Munjal vs. CGT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The fundamental question is whether there was in fact a gift of 14,000 bonus shares made by the assessee to the transferee. The answer to this question lies in s. 4(1)(c) of the Gift-tax Act which provides that “where there is a release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment of any debt, contract or other actionable claim or of any interest in property by any person, the value of the release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment to the extent to which it has not been found to the satisfaction of the AO to have been bona fide, shall be deemed to be a gift made by the person responsible for the release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment“. On facts, the assessee had made a valid revocable gift of 6000 equity shares in the company on 20.2.1982 to the transferee. The only event that took place in AY 1989-90 was the revocation of the gift by the assessee on 15.6.1988. The question whether the revocation of the gift of the original shares in AY 1989-90 constitutes a gift of the bonus shares that were allotted to the transferee on 29.09.1982 and 31.05.1986 requires to be answered in the light of s.4(1)(c). The question of applicability of Escorts Farms has to be decided after a finding is reached on the applicability of the first part of s. 4(1)(c) (matter remanded).

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

L.G.Electronics India Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi Special Bench)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

L.G. Electronics Inc, a Korean company, set up a wholly owned subsidiary in India (the assessee) to which it provided technical assistance. The assessee agreed to pay royalty at the rate of 1% as consideration for the use of technical know how etc. The Korean company also permitted the assessee to use its brand name and trade marks to products manufactured in India on a royalty-free basis. The AO, TPO & DRP held that as the Advertising, Marketing and Promotion (“AMP expenses”) expenses incurred by the assessee were 3.85% of its sales and such percentage was higher than the expenses incurred by comparable companies (Videocon & Whirlpool), the assessee was promoting the LG brand owned by its foreign AE and hence should have been adequately compensated by the foreign AE. Applying the Bright Line Test, it was held that the expenses up to 1.39% of the sales should be considered as having been incurred for the assessee‘s own business and the remaining part which is in excess of such percentage on brand promotion of the foreign AE. The excess, after adding a markup of 13%, was computed at Rs. 182 crores. On appeal by the assessee, the Special Bench had to consider the following issues: (i) whether the TPO had jurisdiction to process an international transaction in the absence of any reference made to him by the AO? (ii) whether in the absence of any verbal or written agreement between the assessee and the AE for promoting the brand, there can be said to be a “transaction“? (iii) whether a distinction can be made between the “economic ownership” and “legal ownership” of a brand and the expenses for the former cannot be treated as being for the benefit of the owner? (iv) whether such a “transaction“, if any, can be treated as an “international transaction“? (v) whether the “Bright Line Test” which is a part of U. S. legislation can be applied for making the transfer pricing adjustment? (vi) whether as the entire AMP expenses were deductible u/s 37(1) despite benefit to the brand owner, a transfer pricing adjustment so as to disallow the said expenditure could be made? (vii) what are the factors to be considered while choosing the comparable cases & determining the cost/value of the international transaction of AMP expenses? (viii) whether, if as per TNMM, the assessee’s profit is found to be as good as the comparables, a separate adjustment for AMP expenses can still be made? (ix) whether the verdict in Maruti Suzuki 328 ITR 210 (Del) has been over-ruled/ merged into the order of the Supreme Court so as to cease to have binding effect?

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

ITO vs. Prem Rattan Gupta (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

S. 50C applies only to the transfer of “land or building” and not to the transfer of all “immovable property“. Accordingly, though FSI and TDR is “immovable property” as held in Chedda Housing Development vs. Babijan Shekh Farid 2007 (3) MLJ 402 (Bom), it is not “land or building” and so cannot be the subject matter of s. 50C. The property acquired for development (in lieu of which the FSI/TDR was granted) also cannot be considered even though the property continues to stand in the assessee’s name in the property records. The property should be valued by the DVO net of the land transferred to the Developer by the assessee after considering the acquisition made by the Govt & the Municipal Corporation and also excluding the value of TDR or additional FSI included in the consideration shown in the Development Agreement

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Irfan Abdul Kader Fazlani vs. ACIT (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 22, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

S. 50C applies only to the transfer of a “capital asset, being land or building or both”, “assessed” by any authority of a State Government for stamp duty purposes. The expression “transfer” has to be a direct transfer as defined u/s 2(47) which does not include the tax planning adopted by the assessee. S. 50C is a deeming provisions and has to be interpreted strictly in accordance with the spirit of the provision. On facts, the subject matter of transfer is shares in a company and not land or building or both. The assessee did not have full ownership on the flats which are owned by the company. The transfer of shares was never a part of the assessment of the Stamp duty Authorities of the State Government. Also, the company was deriving income which was taxable under the head ‘income from property’ for more than a decade. Consequently, the action of the AO & CIT(A) to invoke s. 50C to the tax planning adopted by the assessee is not proper and does not have the sanction of the provisions of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Vodafone West Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 17, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The assessee is seeking extension of stay beyond 365 days. The assessee argued that on similar facts the matter is pending before the Supreme Court in case of Idea Cellular Ltd and Bharti Cellular Ltd wherein ad interim order had been passed. In CIT vs. Ronuk Industries Ltd 333 ITR 99 (Bom) & Tata Communications Ltd 138 TTJ 257 (Mum) (SB) it has been held that the Tribunal has power to extend the period of stay beyond 365 days under the Third Proviso to s. 254(2A) even if the delay in disposing off the appeal is not attributable to the assessee as there may be several other reasons for not disposing of the appeal by the ITAT. In Qualcomm Incorporated (ITAT Del) it was held that as there was a cleavage of opinion between the Bombay High Court and the Karnataka High Court and there was no decision of the jurisdictional High Court on the issue, the view favourable to the assessee has to be adopted. Consequently, the stay has to be extended subject to certain conditions

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

I. C. D. S. Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

S. 32 requires that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. The Department’s argument that the assessee is not the “owner” of the vehicles is not acceptable because the lease agreement specifically provided that the assessee was the exclusive owner of the vehicle at all points of time and that it was empowered to repossess the vehicle (and not merely recover money) if the lessee committed a default. At the conclusion of the lease period, the lessee was obliged to return the vehicle to the assessee. Also, the assessee had the right of inspection of the vehicle at all times. As the assessee has a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. The fact that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1% of the original cost of the vehicle does not make a difference. Also the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act deems the lessee to be the “owner” has no relevance

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

M/s Bangalore Club vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

For a receipt to be exempt on the principles of Mutuality, three conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that there must be a complete identity between the contributors and participators. The second is that the actions of the participators and contributors must be in furtherance of the mandate of the association. The third is that there must be no scope of profiteering by the contributors from a fund made by them which could only be expended or returned to themselves. On facts, though the interest was earned from banks which were corporate members of the club, it was not exempt on the ground of mutuality because (i) the arrangement lacks a complete identity between the contributors and participators. With the funds of the club, member banks engaged in commercial operations with third parties outside of the mutuality, rupturing the ‘privity of mutuality’, and consequently, violating the one to one identity between the contributors and participators, (ii) the surplus funds were not used in furtherance of the object of the club but were taken out of mutuality when the member banks placed the same at the disposal of third parties, thus, initiating an independent contract between the bank and the clients of the bank, a third party, not privy to the mutuality & (iii) The Banks generated revenue by paying a lower rate of interest to the assessee-club and loaning the funds to third parties. The interest accrued on the surplus deposited by the club like in the case of any other deposit made by an account holder with the bank. A façade of a club cannot be constructed over commercial transactions to avoid liability to tax. Such setups cannot be permitted to claim double benefit of mutuality

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

ACIT vs. M/s A. R. Enterprises (Supreme Court)

COURT:
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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

S. 158B(b) defines the expression “undisclosed income” to mean that income “which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act”. The only way of disclosing income on the part of an assessee is through filing of a return and therefore an “undisclosed income” signifies income not stated in the return filed. It cannot be said that payment of Advance Tax by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income. There can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of Advance Tax in construing intention of disclosure of income. This depends on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of Advance Tax is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income because it is a case where income has clearly not been disclosed. The possibility of the intention to disclose does not arise since the opportunity of disclosure has lapsed. If search is conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income by filing a return still persists. In such a case, payment of Advance Tax may be a material fact for construing whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered show income earned by him, he has paid Advance Tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income vis-à-vis date of search. Also, because Advance Tax is based on estimated income, it cannot result in the disclosure of the total income assessable and chargeable
to tax. The proposition that payment of Advance Tax is tantamount to disclosure of income would be contrary to the very purpose of filing of return. On facts, as the assessee had not filed the ROI by the date of search and the due date had lapsed, the income found was “undisclosed” even though advance-tax thereon had been paid. Similarly, as TDS is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant FY, it does not amount to disclosure of income, nor does it indicate the intention to disclose income if the ROI is not filed

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Avinash Jain (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2013 (Date of publication)
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FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

The intent and purport of Circular No. 4 of 2007 dated 15.06.2007 is to demonstrate that a tax payer could have two portfolios, namely, an investment portfolio and a trading portfolio. In other words, the assessee could own shares for the purposes of investment and/or for the purposes of trading. In the former case whenever the shares are sold and gains are made the gains would be capital gains and not profits of any business venture. In the latter case any gains would amount to profits in business. This has been made clear by the CBDT circular in the remaining portion of the circular itself. On facts, the finding of the CIT(A) & Tribunal that the short term capital gains and long term capital gains were out of the investment account and were not related to the trading account does not call for any interference

Posted in All Judgements, High Court
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