A debenture, when issued, is a loan. The fact that it is convertible does not militate against it being a loan. In accordance with India Cement 60 ITR 52 (SC), expenditure on a loan is always revenue in nature even if the loan is taken for capital purposes. Consequently, the expenditure on convertible debentures is admissible as revenue expenditure.

The fixing of the cut-off date u/s 245 D (4A) (1), the abatement of proceedings u/s 245HA (1)(iv) & the making available of confidential information u/s 245HA (3) for no fault of the applicant are ultra vires the Constitution. In order to save these provisions from being struck down as being unconstitutional, they will have to be read down as applying only to cases where the Settlement Commission is unable to pass an order on or before 31.3.2008 for any reason attributable on the part of the applicant. The expression “reasons attributable” should be reasonably construed. If in the writ petition, the applicant has urged that it was not responsible for the non-disposal of the application and the same is not denied by the revenue, the circumstance should be considered in favour of the applicant;

It could not be the intention of the legislature that the benefit of s. 10 (10C) should be restricted in the case of employees who retired before 1.4.2004 only to the sum actually received while employees who retired subsequently will get the benefit also in respect of amounts payable in subsequent financial years. Accordingly, the amendment is was clarificatory and curative in nature and applies even to employees who retired prior to 1.4.2004 and received VRS in installments.

The Income-tax Act is a special law. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. The scheme of the Income-tax Act supports the conclusion that the time limit prescribed u/s 260A to file an appeal before the High Court is absolute and unextendable by court u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and the limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. Since the appeals were filed beyond the prescribed period of 120 days they had to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

The Revenue’s submission that prima facie satisfaction of the AO need not be reflected at the stage of initiation is not acceptable. The presence of prima facie satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceedings was and remains a jurisdictional fact which cannot be wished away even post amendment. If an interpretation such as the one proposed by the Revenue is accepted then s. 271 (1B) will fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution as it will then be impregnated with the vice of arbitrariness. The AO would then be in a position to pick a case for initiation of penalty merely because there is an addition or disallowance without arriving at a prima facie satisfaction with respect to infraction of s. 271 (1)(c).

The effect of Vinod Solanki vs. UOI (233) ELT 157 (S.C.) is that in criminal or quasi criminal proceedings, a person accused of commission of offence under FERA has not to prove to the hilt that confession has been obtained from him by inducement or threat by the person in authority. However, when confession had been retracted, the Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances and other relevant factors to come to conclusion whether the confession was voluntary and was not obtained by any inducement, threat or force. At the same time, mere retraction of the confession may not be sufficient to make confessional statement irrelevant for the purpose of quasi criminal proceedings and the Court is obligated to take into consideration the pros and cons of confession and retraction made by the accused.