Category: High Court

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DATE: January 13, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: AY 2019-20
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Extension of due date for filing ROI: (i) The CBDT has vide order dated 11.01.2021 decided not to grant further extension of time. The Court cannot go into the issues which weighed with the CBDT in taking the decision and substitute the same with its own view. Interference by the Court, at this point of time, in matters relating to the Revenue may have far reaching implications. It may upset the entire functioning of the Government and may lead to undesirable results. (ii) However, the CBDT may consider issuing an appropriate circular taking a lenient view as regards the consequences of late filing of the Tax Audit Reports as provided u/s 271B of the Act. We leave it to the better discretion of the CBDT.

It is the case of the CBDT that it has declined to exercise its power under Section 119 of the Act as the conditions for exercise of such power do not exist. It is the case of the Revenue that the issue of hardship was dealt with considerably at the relevant point of time and that is the reason why three times the time limit came to be extended. The Board has now thought fit in the interest of the Revenue not to extend the time period any further. There are so many vital issues which the Revenue needs to keep in mind before taking such decision. The question is whether this Court should go into all such issues which weighed with the CBDT in taking a particular decision one way or the other and substitute the same with that of this Court on the ground that if the time limit is not extended, then the people at large would be put immense hardships? Interference at the end of this Court, at this point of time, in the matters relating to the Revenue may have far reaching implications. This Court may find it very easy to issue a writ of mandamus, as prayed for, saying that if the time limit has been extended in the past on three occasions, then why not for one last time upto 31st March 2021. However, such a line of reasoning or approach may upset the entire functioning of the Government and may lead to undesirable results.

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DATE: January 8, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 9, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Though the CBDT has extended the due dates for filing the ITR & TAR to 10.01.2021 & 15.02.2021 due to the Covid-19 pandemic situation, it should look into the question of further extension bearing in mind that the time period for the officials of the tax department has been extended upto 31.03.2021. Some extension deserves to be considered in accordance with law.

We are of the view that the respondent No.1 – Union of India, Ministry of Finance should immediately look into the issue, more particularly, the representation dated 12th October 2020 at Annexure : I of the paper book (page 108) and take an appropriate decision at the earliest in accordance with law. We, accordingly, direct the respondent No.1 to do so. While taking an appropriate decision, the Union shall bear in mind the observations made by this High Court in the two above noted judgements, more particularly, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Vaghjibhai S. Bishnoi (supra) that the powers given to the CBDT are beneficial in nature to be exercised for proper administration of fiscal law so that undue hardship may not be caused to the taxpayers. The purpose is of just, proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and the public interest. One additional aspect needs to be kept in mind before taking any appropriate decision that the time period for the officials of the tax department has been extended upto 31st March 2021 having regard to the current covid19 pandemic situation. If that be so, then some extension deserves to be considered in accordance with law. Let an appropriate decision be taken by 12th January 2021.

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DATE: September 15, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Interpretation of statutes & DTAAs: The substitution of a provision results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by new provision. When a new rule in place of an old rule is substituted, the old one is never intended to keep alive and the substitution has the effect of deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative. Though Notification dated 18.07.2005 (which substitutes paragraph 12 of Article 12 of the DTAA to provide for levy of tax on the royalties or fees for technical services at a rate not exceeding 10%) issued u/s 90 came into force with effect from 01.08.2005, it applies to the entire fiscal year

Before proceeding further, we may advert to well settled rules of Interpretation with regard to taxing statutes. The substitution of a provision results in repeal of earlier provision and its replacement by new provision. [See: U.P.SUGAR MILLS ASSN. VS. STATE OF U.P.’, (2002) 2 SCC 645]. The aforesaid principle of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in WEST UP SUGAR MILS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF UP (2012) 2 SCC 773 and by this Court in GOVARDHAN M V. STATE OF KARNATAKA (2013) 1 KarLJ 497. When a new rule in place of an old rule is substituted, the old one is never intended to keep alive and the substitution has the effect of deleting the old rule and making the new rule operative.

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DATE: October 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 31, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Cash Credits: The Revenue can examine the source of the source. Merely pointing out to a source and the source admitting that it has made the payments is not sufficient to discharge the burden placed on the assessees by s. 68. Otherwise, it would be sufficient for assessees to simply persuade some credit-less person to own up having made such huge payments and thereby evade payment of tax on the specious plea that the Revenue can always recover the tax from such credit-less source. The explanation has to be plausible and backed by reliable evidence. 'Fantastic or unacceptable' explanations are not acceptable (All imp verdicts on s. 68 referred)

If the ITAT were to have considered the aforesaid circumstances, which, according to us, the ITAT was duty-bound to, we are quite sure that the ITAT would not have, nevertheless, found the so-called explanation of the assessees acceptable or in compliance with the provisions of Section 68 of the said Act. Rather we are inclined to believe, that the ITAT too, would have found the so-called explanation of the assessees too fantastic to deserve any acceptance. In Mussadilal Ram Bharose 1987(2) SCC 39, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cautioned against acceptance of any ‘fantastic’ or ‘unacceptable’ explanations in tax matters

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DATE: February 3, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: (i) The OECD guidelines recognise that barring exceptional cases, the tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for them. The examination of a controlled transaction should ordinarily be based on the transaction as it has been actually undertaken and structured by the associated enterprises. The guidelines discourage restructuring of legitimate business transactions (ii) The finding by the Tribunal regarding the adoption of TNMM as the Most Appropriate Method of arriving at ALP cannot be termed as perverse or contrary to the evidence on record. Difference of opinion as to the appropriateness of one or the other method cannot be gone into in a s. 260A appeal

The significance of the aforesaid guidelines lies in the fact that they recognise that barring exceptional cases, the tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for them and the examination of a controlled transaction should ordinarily be based on the transaction as it has been actually undertaken and structured by the associated enterprises. It is of further significance that the guidelines discourage restructuring of legitimate business transactions. The reason for characterisation of such restructuring as an arbitrary exercise, as given in the guidelines, is that it has the potential to create double taxation if the other tax administration does not share the same view as to how the transaction should be structured.

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DATE: March 11, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 13, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 147 Reopening for bogus capital gains from penny stocks: The Dept's argument that though the assessee disclosed details of the transactions pertaining to purchase and sale of shares, it did not disclose the real colour / true character of the transactions and, therefore, did not make a full and true disclosure of all material facts which was also overlooked by the AO, is not correct. The assessee disclosed the primary facts to the AO & also explained the queries put by the AO. It cannot be said that the assessee did not disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment

In para 3.4 of the affidavit in reply it is stated that though the Petitioner had furnished details relating to purchase and sale of shares of Mittal Securities Ltd., (now Scan Steels Ltd.,), but that did not amount to full and true disclosure of all material facts unless true and real facts are disclosed before the Assessing Officer. Assessing Officer had not discussed in the assessment order about the genuineness or camouflage nature of the transactions of purchase and sale of shares of Mittal Securities Ltd. by the Petitioner

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DATE: January 29, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 69C Bogus Purchases: (i) The onus is on the revenue to prove that the income really belongs to the assessee (ii) The assessee has filed copies of purchase/ sale invoices, challan cum tax invoices, stock ledger showing entry/exit of materials purchased, bank statements to show payment for purchases were made through banking channels, etc., to establish genuineness of purchases (iii) The AO has not brought on record any material evidence to show that the purchases were bogus (iv) Mere reliance by the AO on information obtained from Sales Tax Department or statements of persons made before the Sales Tax Department is not sufficient to treat the purchases as bogus (v) If the AO doubts the genuineness of the purchases, he has to do further enquiries and give an opportunity to the assessee to examine/cross-examine the parties vis-a-vis the statements made by them before the Sales Tax Department. Without causing such further enquiries in respect of the purchases, it is not open to the AO to make addition u/s 69C

The AO did not doubt the sales and stock records maintained by the assessee. By submitting confirmation letters, copies of invoices, bank statement, payment order, payment by account payee cheques etc., assessee had proved that sale and purchases had taken place. By highlighting the fact that all the payments against the purchases were made through banking channel by way of account payee cheques, the source of expenditure was fully established by the assessee beyond any doubt. During appellate proceedings the assessee had furnished complete quantitative details of the items of goods purchased during the year under consideration and their corresponding sales.

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DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 26, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1984-85
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CITATION:
S. 28(iv): The Dept's argument that the waiver of a loan constitutes an operational subsidy which is taxable is not correct. There is a fundamental difference between “loan” and “subsidy” & the two concepts cannot be equated. While “loan” is a borrowing of money required to be repaid back with interest; “subsidy” is not required to be repaid back being a grant. Such grant is given as part of a public policy by the state in furtherance of public interest. Therefore, even if a “loan” is written off or waived, which can be for various reasons, it cannot partake the character of a “subsidy”. The waiver of a loan cannot be brought to tax u/s 28(iv) of the Act

Conceptually, “loan” and “subsidy” are two different concepts. As per the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Indian Edition, the term “loan” has been explained as a thing that is borrowed, especially a sum of money that is expected to be paid back with interest; the action of lending. Black’s Law Dictionary, Eight Edition, describes “loan” as an act of lending; a grant of something for temporary use; a thing lent for the borrower’s temporary use, especially a sum of money lent at interest; to lend, especially money. In Supreme Court on Words and Phrases, it is stated that “loan” necessarily supposes a return of the money loaned; in order to be a loan, the advance must be recoverable; “loan” is an advance in cash which includes any transaction which in substance amounts to such advance

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DATE: February 11, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02, 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 36(1)(vii)/ 36(2): Write-off of inter corporate deposits and advances given for purchase of vehicles or plant and machinery is allowable as a bad debt. There is no requirement under the Act that the bad debt has to accrue out of income under the same head i.e 'income from business or profession' to be eligible for deduction. All that is required is that the debt in question must be written off by the assessee in its books of accounts as irrecoverable

It is a settled position in law that after 1.4.1989, it is not necessary for the assessee to establish or prove that the debt has in fact become irrecoverable but it would be sufficient if the bad debt is written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee. This is because, as held by this Court, decision to treat a debt as a bad debt is a commercial or business decision of the assessee. Recording of a debt as a bad debt in his books of accounts by the assessee prima facie establishes that it is a bad debt. If the Assessing Officer disputes that the onus would be on him to prove otherwise

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DATE: June 12, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 22, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96
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S. 45/ 147: Capital gains are chargeable to tax when individual flats are sold and not when the land is transferred to the co-operative society formed by the flat purchasers. The flat purchasers, by purchasing the flats, had certainly acquired a right or interest in the proportionate share of the land but its realisation is deferred till formation of the co-operative society by the owners of the flats and eventual transfer of the entire property to the co-operative society

According to the Assessing Officer, assessee had erred in offering to tax ‘capital gains’ in the year when the individual flats were sold whereas such ‘capital gains’ could be assessed to tax only when the land is trasferred to the co-operative society formed by the flat purchasers. If the assessee had offered to tax as ‘capital gains’ in the assessment years under consideration which should have been offered to tax in the subsequent years, it is beyond comprehension as to how a belief can be formed that income chargeable to tax for the assessment year under consideration had escaped assessment. That apart, the flat purchasers by purchasing the flats had certainly acquired a right or interest in the proportionate share of the land but its realisation is deferred till formation of the co-operative society by the owners of the flats and eventual transfer of the entire property to the co-operative society