Search Results For: J.D. Mistri


COURT:
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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(viia) cannot apply to a foreign company as Rule 11U(b)(ii) (prior to 01.04.2019) which defines "balance sheet‟ was not applicable to a foreign company. If the computation provisions cannot apply, the charging section cannot apply. The amendment to Rule 11U with effect from 1.4.19 is prospective in nature (B. C. Srinivasa Shetty 128 ITR 294 (SC), Palai Central Bank Ltd (1985) 1 SCC 45 followed)

We hold that since the shares of a foreign company were acquired by the assessee company in the instant case, the ld AO ought to have relied on the balance sheet as audited by the auditor appointed under the Indian Companies Act. In the instant case, the ld AO had relied on the balance sheet of KNP Industries Pte Ltd, Singapore, which is prepared in accordance with Singapore Companies Act, which fact is not in dispute before us. Admittedly, the case of the assessee falls squarely on clause (ii) of the definition of “Balance Sheet‟ as defined in Rule 11U of the Rules supra. Hence it is mandatory to draw a balance sheet as on the valuation date i.e. 10.2.2015 /11.2.2015 (being the date of purchase of shares by the assessee company) and that the said balance sheet should have been audited by an auditor appointed under section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence it could be safely concluded that the ld AO had applied the valuation method on a different date which is not in accordance with law and that since the computation mechanism provided in Rule 11UA of the Rules is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, the provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the Act also could not be invoked

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DATE: August 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 2(7A)/ 120(4): Though, by virtue of the retrospective amendment to s. 2(7A), the Addl CIT is an "Assessing Officer", he can act as such only if there is a notification issued by the CBDT u/s 120(4)(b) or if there is an order u/s 127 transferring jurisdiction from the DCIT to the Addl CIT. In the absence of either, the assessment order is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed as null and void. The fact that the assessee co-operated is irrelevant because there is no estoppel. The argument of the Dept that as the order is passed by a higher officer, there is no prejudice to the assessee is not acceptable. The matter also cannot be remanded back (All imp judgements referred)

In view of the legal discussion made above and facts of the case, it is clear that impugned assessment order has been passed without authority of law in as much as Revenue has not been able to demonstrate that the Additional Commissioner of Income tax who had passed the assessment order had valid authority to perform and exercise the powers and functions of an Assessing Officer of the assessee and to pass the impugned assessment order. Under these circumstances, we have no other option but to hold the same as nullity and, therefore, the impugned assessment order is quashed having been passed with out authority of law

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DATE: June 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: Even in a case where the return is accepted u/s 143(1) without scrutiny, the fundamental requirement of income chargeable to tax having escaped assessment must be satisfied. Mere non-disclosure of receipt would not automatically imply escapement of income chargeable to tax from assessment. There has to be something beyond an unintentional oversight or error on the part of the assessee in not disclosing such receipt in the return of income. In other words, even after non-disclosure, if the documents on record conclusively establish that the receipt did not give rise to any taxable income, it would not be open for the AO to reopen the assessment referring only to the non disclosure of the receipt in the return of income. The attempt of further verification would amount to rowing inquiry

Despite such difference in the scheme between a return which is accepted under section 143(1) of the Act as compared to a return of which scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Act is framed, the basic requirement of section 147 of the Act that the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to 3 (2013) 356 ITR 481 (Guj) OS WP 1230-19.doc tax has escaped assessment is not done away with. Section 147 of the Act permits the Assessing Officer to assess, reassess the income or recompute the loss or depreciation if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. This power to reopen assessment is available in either case, namely, while a return has been either accepted under section 143(1) of the Act or a scrutiny assessment has been framed under section 143(3) of the Act. A common requirement in both of cases is that the Assessing Officer should have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

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DATE: February 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 8, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty': The insertions of Explanations 5 & 6 to s. 9(1)(vi) by the Finance Act 2015 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1976, even if declaratory and clarificatory of the law, will not apply to the DTAAs. The DTAAs are a bilateral agreement between two Countries and cannot be overridden by a unilateral legislative amendment by one Country (New Skies Satellite BV 382 ITR 114 (Del) & Siemens AG 310 ITR 320 (Bom) followed)

India’s change in position to the OECD Commentary cannot be a fact that influences the interpretation of the words defining royalty as they stand today. The only manner in which such change in position can be relevant is if such change is incorporated into the agreement itself and not otherwise. A change in executive position cannot bring about a unilateral legislative amendment into treaty concluded between two sovereign states. It is fallacious to assume that any change made to domestic law to rectify a situation of mistaken interpretation can spontaneously further their case in an international treaty.

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: Merely because the investment was considerably large and several corporate structures were either created or came into play in routing the investment in the assessee through a Mauritius entity would not be sufficient to brand the transaction as colourable device. The assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of source (PCIT Vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) referred)

As is well known in the context of Section 68 of the Act, the basic duty would be on the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction, credit worthiness of the investor and the source of funds. Equally well settled principle through series of judgments is that the Department cannot insist on the assessee establishing source of the source.

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DATE: March 15, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 92C(1) Transfer Pricing: Even if the assessee does not report the specified transaction & the AO has no occasion to notice it, the TPO has no jurisdiction to suo moto determine the ALP. He has to call for a reference from the AO. Alternate remedy is not a bar if the action is without jurisdiction & can be severed from the rest

Learned counsel for the Revenue is correct in pointing out that in the present case, the assessee did not report such transaction at all and therefore, the Assessing Officer had no occasion to notice such transaction as specified domestic transaction. His reference, therefore, was necessarily confined to the reported transactions. The TPO noticed this anomaly, he proceeded to determine the arm’s length price after full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even in such a situation, the statute does not permit the TPO to assume the jurisdiction to determine the arm’s length price of a specified domestic transaction not reported to him

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DATE: February 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/148: If the AO is of the opinion that the issue requires verification, it tantamounts to fishing or roving inquiry. He is not permitted to reopen merely because in the later year, he took a different view on the basis of similar material. Even if the question of taxing interest income under the DTAA was not in the mind of the AO when he passed the assessment, he cannot reopen if there is no failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts

If during the assessment of the later assessment year, the Assessing officer collects or chances upon new material which may have bearing on the assessment of the assessee, and in case where the assessment is sought to be reopened beyond four years, he can also establish lack of true and full disclosures on the part of the assessee, it may be open for him to reopen assessment of the earlier year. However, merely because in the later year, the Assessing Officer takes a different view on the basis of similar material, which may have been collected during such process, would not permit him to reopen the assessment

COURT:
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DATE: December 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 92BA(i)/ 40A(2)(b) Domestic Transfer Pricing: Entire law on what constitutes "Specified Domestic Transactions” explained. The Dept's contention that a shareholder has beneficial interest in the assets of the company is contrary to all canons of Company law

We cannot, and the law does not permit us, to hold that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of 22.64% of the shares in the Petitioner by clubbing the share holding of HDFC Investments Ltd. with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. If we were to do this, we would be effectively holding that HDFC Ltd., being a shareholder of HDFC Investments Ltd., is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This, in law, is clearly impermissible because a shareholder of a company can never have any beneficial interest in the assets (movable or immovable) of that company. In the present case, if we were to accept the contention of the Revenue, it would mean that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This would be contrary to all canons of Company Law. It is well settled that a shareholder of a company can never be construed either the legal or beneficial owner of the properties and assets of the company in which it holds the shares. This being the position in law, we find that the Revenue is incorrect in trying to club the shareholding of HDFC Investments Ltd. in the Petitioner along with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. in the Petitioner, to cross the threshold of 20% as required in explanation (a) to section 40A(2)(b). We are supported in the view that we take by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1955) 27 ITR 1].

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DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): We are at a loss to understand why the ITAT has not communicated a date of hearing of the Miscellaneous Application (MA). The ITAT should give priority to the hearing of MAs. It should assign specific dates of hearing and inform parties well in advance. The ITAT should set right the lapses and put its house in order. None should be compelled to move the High Court and seek an out of turn hearing

We have already indicated in our earlier orders and directions that the Tribunal should inform parties well in advance by assigning specific dates of hearing on these Miscellaneous Applications. They should be taken in the order in which they have been instituted/filed. None should be compelled to move this Court and seek an out of turn hearing