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DATE: April 6, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 24, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: AY 2019-20
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CITATION:
S. 245 Adjustment of Refund: The Dept has not complied with the requirements of s. 245 of the Act. It is difficult to appreciate the stand of the Dept that the order passed by the high court would not cover/operate over the matters and orders passed by the ITAT, Union of India being not a party to the matter. Such a justification from and the approach of, the authorities is difficult to be approved of which is not in fitness of stature, especially of the state department, which is supposed to act like a model litigant (All imp judgements on s. 245 referred)

Although the respondents purport to contend that proper procedure had been followed, record does not bear that there had been any communication made to the petitioner as to its submissions being not acceptable before or at the time of making the adjustment. Decisions in the cases of “A. N. Shaikh”, “Hindustan Unilever Ltd.,” and “Milestone Real Estate Fund” (supra) relied on, on behalf of the petitioner have not been met with by the respondents nor it is the case of the respondents that any other course could be adopted for adjustment of refund. There is stark absence of material showing compliance of requirements viz: application of mind to contentions on behalf of the petitioner, reasoned order and its communication to the assessee. The facts and circumstances lend lot of substance to submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner that there is absence of compliance of requirements under section 245 of the Act, coupled with observations of high court in the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioners

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DATE: April 9, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 24, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
Article 226/ s. 147: (i) A Writ Petition can be filed in the Bombay High Court against an order passed in Delhi if the assessee is based in Mumbai. The litigant has the right to go to ‘a Court’ where part of cause of action arises. (ii) A s. 148 notice & s. 147 reassessment order passed against an amalgamated (non-existing) company is without jurisdiction. The defect cannot be treated as procedural defect. Mere participation of the assessee in the assessment proceedings is of no effect as there is no estoppel against law. Such a defect cannot be cured by invoking section 292B (All imp judgements referred)

The consequence of approved scheme of amalgamation was that amalgamating company had ceased to exist and on its ceasing to exist, it cannot be regarded as a person against whom assessment proceeding can be initiated. In said case before notice under Section 143(2) of the Act was issued on 26.9.2013, the scheme of amalgamation had been approved by the high court with effect from 1.4.2012. It has been observed that assessment order passed for the assessment year 2012-13 in the name of non-existing entity is a substantive illegality and would not be procedural violation of Section 292 (b) of the Act. The Supreme Court in its aforesaid decision, has quoted an extract from its decision in Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. Vs. CIT8. The Supreme Court has also referred to decision of Delhi high court in the case of CIT Vs. Spice Enfotainment Ltd.9and observed that in its decision Delhi high court had held that assessment order passed against non-existing company would be void. Such defect cannot be treated as procedural defect and mere participation of appellant would be of no effect as there is no estoppel against law. Such a defect cannot be cured by invoking provisions under section 292B

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DATE: April 29, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2017-18
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CITATION:
Grant of refund u/s 143(1): Till AY 2016-17, if a scrutiny notice u/s 143(2) is issued, the return is not required to be processed u/s 143(1) for grant of refund to the assessee. From AY 2017-18 & onwards, a different regime is prescribed by Parliament. S. 241-A requires separate recording of satisfaction on part of the AO that having regard to the issue of notice u/s 143(2), the grant of refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue. The withholding of refund requires the previous approval of the PCIT with reasons to be recorded in writing.

In the premises, we hold that in respect of Assessment Years ending on 31st March 2017 or before, if a notice was issued in conformity with the requirements stated in sub-section (2) of Section 143 of the Act, it shall not be necessary to process the refund under subsection (1) of Section 143 of the Act and that the requirement to process the return shall stand overridden. However, insofar as returns filed in respect of assessment year commencing on or after the 1st April, 2017, a different regime has been contemplated by the Parliament. Section 241-A of the Act requires a separate recording of satisfaction on part of the Assessing Officer that having regard to the fact that a notice has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 143, the grant of refund is likely to adversely affect the revenue; whereafter, with the previous approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the refund can be withheld.

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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(viia) cannot apply to a foreign company as Rule 11U(b)(ii) (prior to 01.04.2019) which defines "balance sheet‟ was not applicable to a foreign company. If the computation provisions cannot apply, the charging section cannot apply. The amendment to Rule 11U with effect from 1.4.19 is prospective in nature (B. C. Srinivasa Shetty 128 ITR 294 (SC), Palai Central Bank Ltd (1985) 1 SCC 45 followed)

We hold that since the shares of a foreign company were acquired by the assessee company in the instant case, the ld AO ought to have relied on the balance sheet as audited by the auditor appointed under the Indian Companies Act. In the instant case, the ld AO had relied on the balance sheet of KNP Industries Pte Ltd, Singapore, which is prepared in accordance with Singapore Companies Act, which fact is not in dispute before us. Admittedly, the case of the assessee falls squarely on clause (ii) of the definition of “Balance Sheet‟ as defined in Rule 11U of the Rules supra. Hence it is mandatory to draw a balance sheet as on the valuation date i.e. 10.2.2015 /11.2.2015 (being the date of purchase of shares by the assessee company) and that the said balance sheet should have been audited by an auditor appointed under section 224 of the Companies Act, 1956. Hence it could be safely concluded that the ld AO had applied the valuation method on a different date which is not in accordance with law and that since the computation mechanism provided in Rule 11UA of the Rules is not applicable to the facts of the instant case, the provisions of section 56(2)(viia) of the Act also could not be invoked

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DATE: August 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 2(7A)/ 120(4): Though, by virtue of the retrospective amendment to s. 2(7A), the Addl CIT is an "Assessing Officer", he can act as such only if there is a notification issued by the CBDT u/s 120(4)(b) or if there is an order u/s 127 transferring jurisdiction from the DCIT to the Addl CIT. In the absence of either, the assessment order is without jurisdiction and has to be quashed as null and void. The fact that the assessee co-operated is irrelevant because there is no estoppel. The argument of the Dept that as the order is passed by a higher officer, there is no prejudice to the assessee is not acceptable. The matter also cannot be remanded back (All imp judgements referred)

In view of the legal discussion made above and facts of the case, it is clear that impugned assessment order has been passed without authority of law in as much as Revenue has not been able to demonstrate that the Additional Commissioner of Income tax who had passed the assessment order had valid authority to perform and exercise the powers and functions of an Assessing Officer of the assessee and to pass the impugned assessment order. Under these circumstances, we have no other option but to hold the same as nullity and, therefore, the impugned assessment order is quashed having been passed with out authority of law

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DATE: June 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: Even in a case where the return is accepted u/s 143(1) without scrutiny, the fundamental requirement of income chargeable to tax having escaped assessment must be satisfied. Mere non-disclosure of receipt would not automatically imply escapement of income chargeable to tax from assessment. There has to be something beyond an unintentional oversight or error on the part of the assessee in not disclosing such receipt in the return of income. In other words, even after non-disclosure, if the documents on record conclusively establish that the receipt did not give rise to any taxable income, it would not be open for the AO to reopen the assessment referring only to the non disclosure of the receipt in the return of income. The attempt of further verification would amount to rowing inquiry

Despite such difference in the scheme between a return which is accepted under section 143(1) of the Act as compared to a return of which scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) of the Act is framed, the basic requirement of section 147 of the Act that the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income chargeable to 3 (2013) 356 ITR 481 (Guj) OS WP 1230-19.doc tax has escaped assessment is not done away with. Section 147 of the Act permits the Assessing Officer to assess, reassess the income or recompute the loss or depreciation if he has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year. This power to reopen assessment is available in either case, namely, while a return has been either accepted under section 143(1) of the Act or a scrutiny assessment has been framed under section 143(3) of the Act. A common requirement in both of cases is that the Assessing Officer should have reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment

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DATE: February 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 8, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty': The insertions of Explanations 5 & 6 to s. 9(1)(vi) by the Finance Act 2015 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1976, even if declaratory and clarificatory of the law, will not apply to the DTAAs. The DTAAs are a bilateral agreement between two Countries and cannot be overridden by a unilateral legislative amendment by one Country (New Skies Satellite BV 382 ITR 114 (Del) & Siemens AG 310 ITR 320 (Bom) followed)

India’s change in position to the OECD Commentary cannot be a fact that influences the interpretation of the words defining royalty as they stand today. The only manner in which such change in position can be relevant is if such change is incorporated into the agreement itself and not otherwise. A change in executive position cannot bring about a unilateral legislative amendment into treaty concluded between two sovereign states. It is fallacious to assume that any change made to domestic law to rectify a situation of mistaken interpretation can spontaneously further their case in an international treaty.

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COURT:
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GENRE:
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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: Merely because the investment was considerably large and several corporate structures were either created or came into play in routing the investment in the assessee through a Mauritius entity would not be sufficient to brand the transaction as colourable device. The assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of source (PCIT Vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) referred)

As is well known in the context of Section 68 of the Act, the basic duty would be on the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction, credit worthiness of the investor and the source of funds. Equally well settled principle through series of judgments is that the Department cannot insist on the assessee establishing source of the source.

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COURT:
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DATE: March 15, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 92C(1) Transfer Pricing: Even if the assessee does not report the specified transaction & the AO has no occasion to notice it, the TPO has no jurisdiction to suo moto determine the ALP. He has to call for a reference from the AO. Alternate remedy is not a bar if the action is without jurisdiction & can be severed from the rest

Learned counsel for the Revenue is correct in pointing out that in the present case, the assessee did not report such transaction at all and therefore, the Assessing Officer had no occasion to notice such transaction as specified domestic transaction. His reference, therefore, was necessarily confined to the reported transactions. The TPO noticed this anomaly, he proceeded to determine the arm’s length price after full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Even in such a situation, the statute does not permit the TPO to assume the jurisdiction to determine the arm’s length price of a specified domestic transaction not reported to him

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