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COURT:
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DATE: July 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 221: A reading of s. 221 conjointly with the definition of “tax” in s. 2(43) leads to the irresistible conclusion that the phraseology “tax in arrears” in s. 221 would not take within its realm the interest component. The AO can impose penalty for default in making the payment of tax, but the same shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. Tax in arrears would not include the interest payable u/s 220(2) of the Act

Reading Section 221 in its entirety, it is abundantly clear that the aspect of default in payment of tax and the amount of interest payable are treated as distinct and separate components. The section categorically and specifically states that when an Assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making payment of tax, he shall in addition to the amount of arrears and the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220, be liable, to pay penalty, however the amount of penalty does not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The terminology “default in making a payment of tax and amount of interest payable” are considered to be separate for imposition of penalty and penalty is to be levied on account of default in making a payment of tax. However, the total amount of penalty shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The said penalty for non payment of the tax is in addition to the levy of interest under SubSection 2 of Section 220. Under no principle of interpretation, the arrears of tax as laid down in the said Section would include the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220. The amount of penalty will have to be restricted on the arrears of tax, which would not include the interest component charged under Section 220(2) of the Act

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DATE: June 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing ALP of foreign advances: If the advances are made to a AE situated abroad, the LIBOR rate has to considered to determine the Arms Length interest and not the interest rate in India (SBI PLR). This would be reasonable and proper in applying commercial principles

Advances were made to the company situated abroad. The LIBOR rate naturally will be considered to determine the Arms Length interest, the same would be reasonable and proper in applying the commercial principle. The Tribunal has directed the appropriate rate would be LIBOR plus 2% instead of LIBOR plus 3% applied by the TPO

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DATE: June 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 69C/ 153C: An admission of the assessee which is retracted cannot be the basis of addition. The allegations made by the authorities have to be supported by actual cash passing hands. The addition cannot be sustained in the absence of material which would conclusively show that huge amounts revealed from the seized documents are transferred from one side to another and if the Revenue did not bring on record a single statement of the vendors of the land in different villages and if none of the sellers has been examined to substantiate the claim of the Revenue that extra cash has actually changed hands

After reproducing Section 69C and adverting to the fact that Dilip Dherai has retracted his statement, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that merely on the strength of the alleged admission in the statement of Dilip Dherai, the additions could not have been made. The concurrent findings of fact would demonstrate that the essential ingredients of Section 69C of the IT Act enabling the additions were not satisfied. This is not a case of ‘no explanation’. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the allegations made by the authorities are not supported by actual cash passing hands. The entire decision is based on the seized documents and no material has been referred which would conclusively show that huge amounts revealed from the seized documents are transferred from one side to another. In that regard, the Tribunal found that the Revenue did not bring on record a single statement of the vendors of the land in different villages. None of the sellers has been examined to substantiate the claim of the Revenue that extra cash has actually changed hands

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DATE: June 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
Capital Gains: While a family arrangement/settlement does not amount to a "transfer" u/s 2(47) as it only recognizes "pre-existing rights" between the parties, the same applies only to members of the families and not to transfers made by corporate entities. The corporate veil can never be lifted at the instance of the company itself because that would amount to its denying its own corporate existence. The fact that the Company is wholly owned by the members of the family is irrelevant

There is no dispute before us that a family arrangement/settlement would not amount to a transfer. So far as the members of Mohota family are concerned, who are parties to the family settlement, any transfer inter se between them on account of family settlement would not result in a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Capital gain tax under the Act. However, in the present case, we are not concerned with the members of Mohota family who were parties to the family settlement, but with transfer of share done by the Company incorporated under the Companies Act having separate/independent corporate existence, perpetual succession and common seal. This Company is independent and distinct from it’s members

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DATE: June 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 92C +/- 5%: The contention that there is an error because mere mathematical calculation shows that the arm's length purchase price as worked out by the TPO falls beyond (+)/(-) 5% range and consequently falls outside the scope of the second proviso to s. 92C(2) cannot be considered if it was not raised before the CIT(A) & ITAT

Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT is correct in directing the Assessing Officer to allow benefit of +/5% to the assessee without considering Explanation (2A) to Section 92C(2) inserted by Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 1.4.2002, whereby deduction of 5% earlier being allowed by appellate authorities has been explicitly prohibited w.e.f. 1.4.2002 and therefore, the ITAT ought not to have issued such directions to the A.O. as are in contravention of the provisions of the statute

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DATE: March 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Valid service of notice: Law explained on whether sending a notice by RPAD and its return by the postal authorities with the remark "addressee refused to accept" amounts to a valid service or not

When it was sent by R.P.A.D. to the address, it was returned by the postal authorities with the remark, that the addressee refused to accept the packet. That is why it is returned. Thus, the presumption that when the addressee whose address is set out on the envelope had an occasion to notice and peruse the packet, meant for him, but he refuses to accept it, then, that is deemed to be served. The addressee in this case is correctly described. There is no dispute about his identity. Even his address is correct. It is at that address the packet is carried and by the concerned postal authority. The duly authorised person carrying the packet reached the address. On noticing the addressee, he serves it, but the addressee after having perused the packet refused to accept it. It is in these circumstances, the postal remark that the concerned person has refused to accept; hence, returned to the sender denotes good and valid service.

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DATE: March 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Service of notice by Whatsapp: The purpose of service is put the other party to notice and to give him a copy of the papers. The mode is irrelevant. The rules and procedure are not so ancient or rigid that only antiquated methods of service through a bailiff or by beat of drum is acceptable. E-Mail & Whatsapp are not formally approved but if service is shown to be effected and is acknowledged it cannot be said that the Defendants had ‘no notice’. Defendants who avoid and evade service by regular modes cannot be permitted to take advantage of that evasion

It cannot be that our rules and procedure are either so ancient or so rigid (or both) that without some antiquated formal service mode through a bailiff or even by beat of drum or pattaki, a party cannot be said to have been ‘properly’ served. The purpose of service is put the other party to notice and to give him a copy of the papers. The mode is surely irrelevant. We have not formally approved of email and other modes as acceptable simply because there are inherent limitation to proving service. Where an alternative mode is used, however, and service is shown to be effected, and is acknowledged, then surely it cannot be suggested that the Defendants had ‘no notice’. To say that is untrue; they may not have had service by registered post or through the bailiff, but they most certainly had notice. They had copies of the papers. They were told of the next date. A copy of the previous order was sent to them. Defendants who avoid and evade service by regular modes cannot be permitted to take advantage of that evasion

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
An additional ground (relating to claim u/s 80-IA) cannot be permitted to be raised if the necessary evidence that the assessee is entitled to the claim is not on record. The fact that claim has been allowed by the AO in a subsequent year and that there is no reason why the claim should not be allowed in the present year is irrelevant. Also, the assessee must satisfy the appellate authority that the ground now raised was bona fide and the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons

We note that it is an undisputed position before us that for the subject assessment year, the appellant assessee had not claimed benefit of Section 80IA of the Act in respect of its Jetty / Port either before the Assessing Officer or before the CIT(A). A claim for benefit under Section 80IA of the Act can only be made if the infrastructure facility such as Jetty / Port is, among other things, being run on the basis of an agreement for either developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility. The sine qua non provided in SubSection (7) of Section 80IA of the Act is the furnishing along with its Return of Income, a report of audited accounts in Form 10CCB as required under Rule 18BBB(3) of the Act. The Form 10CCB which is required to be filed along with Return of Income has various details to be filled in, including the initial assessment year from which the deduction is being claimed, the nature of the activity carried out with regard to the infrastructure facility, namely, whether it is for developing or developing and operating or for developing, operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It is only on examination of those details as submitted by the auditor in Form 10CCB that the claim of deduction can be considered. It is undisputed that for the subject assessment year, no Form 10CCB has been filed by the appellant assessee. Therefore, there is no evidence on record for subject assessment year to allow the claim. The submission of Mr.Agrawal for the appellant that primary evidence in the form of jetty is on record is not acceptable. Mere ownership or existence of jetty is not evidence of eligibility to the benefit of Section 80IA of the Act, which is admittedly conditional upon satisfaction of certain requirements as provided therein

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DATE: March 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital/ premium: The proviso to s. 68 (which creates an obligation on the issuing Co to explain the source of share capital & premium) has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 01.04.2013 and does not have retrospective effect. Prior thereto, as per Lovely Exports 317 ITR 218 (SC), if the AO regards the share premium as bogus, he has to assess the shareholders but cannot assess the same as the issuing company's unexplained cash credit

The proviso to Section 68 of the Act has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 1st April, 2013. Thus it would be effective only from the Assessment Year 2013-14 onwards and not for the subject Assessment Year. In fact, before the Tribunal, it was not even the case of the Revenue that Section 68 of the Act as in force during the subject years has to be read/understood as though the proviso added subsequently effective only from 1st April, 2013 was its normal meaning. The Parliament did not introduce to proviso to Section 68 of the Act with retrospective effect nor does the proviso so introduced states that it was introduced “for removal of doubts” or that it is “declaratory”. Therefore it is not open to give it retrospective effect, by proceeding on the basis that the addition of the proviso to Section 68 of the Act is immaterial and does not change the interpretation of Section 68 of the Act both before and after the adding of the proviso

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DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
(i) Additional Evidence: Ordinarily an application seeking admission of additional evidence under Rules 18 and 29 of ITAT Rules requires an order to be passed. If the ITAT rejects the application, reasons thereof have to be stated.

(ii) S. 54F: The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. Humayun Suleman Merchant vs. CCIT is not per incuriam

In the fact situation at hand we are afraid the assessee can derive no benefit from the provisions of circular No.672 dated 16th December, 1993 inasmuch as the scheme contemplated in paragraph 2 of circular No.471 is not available to the appellant. The appellant has to obtain the allotment letter from the developer under the provision of Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA) and not from the co-operative society. The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. In the present case, however, it is not in dispute that the agreement for sale was entered into only on 24th November, 2008 beyond the period of three years from the date of surrender of tenancy which was 13th September, 2005. Moreover, the developer had no approval for construction of the 9th floor of Wing ‘C’, wherein the assessee had booked three flats and such approval was received by the builders only on 7th September, 2010. Thus, according to us there is no question of assessee establishing the title over the property which was not been approved for construction at the material time

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