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DATE: March 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 147 Reopening of Bogus share capital: Though the reopening is based on information supplied by the investigation wing, the reasons do not specify that the investment was non-genuine. The AO cannot reopen to investigate into the source of genuineness and creditworthiness of the investors as it falls within the realm of fishing enquiries which is wholly impermissible in law

The reasons do not specify that the information supplied to the Assessing Officer by the Investigation Wing, suggested that such investment was non­ genuine. In this context, Assessing Officer refers to the requirement of verifying the genuineness of investor and requirement of further investigation. These observations would not further the case of the Revenue, these being no information with the Assessing Officer, prima facie, indicating that the investments were not genuine. The investigation into the source of genuineness and creditworthiness of the investor company would fall within the relam of fishing enquiries, which is wholly impermissible in law in the context of the re­opening of the assessment

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DATE: September 18, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Transfer Pricing: The categorical finding of fact by the ITAT that a comparable (Motilal Oswal) is engaged in a qualitatively different and diversified business than that of the assessee cannot be challenged as a substantial question of law as the finding is not perverse or vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the record

We are in full agreement with the findings given by the ITAT. In fact, looking to the facts as narrated by the ITAT in the impugned order, we would have no hesitation in holding that by comparing Motilal Oswal Investments Advisory Pvt. Ltd. to the assessee company (for the purposes of determining the ALP) would be like comparing apples and oranges. This being the case, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the ITAT excluding Motilal Oswal Investments Advisory Pvt. Ltd. from the final list of comparables which would give rise to any substantial question of law

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DATE: June 15, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 147: The computation of income is the basic document for making the s. 143(3) assessment. If there is a disclosure in the computation, it leads to the prima facie necessary inference that there is application of mind by the AO. The fact that the AO did not raise specific queries & is silent in the assessment order does not mean there is no application of mind (Techspan 404 ITR 10(SC) followed, other contra judgements distinguished)

There was also no reason in the present facts for the Assessing Officer to ask any queries in respect of this claim of the petitioner, as the basic document viz. computation of income at note 21 (Assessment Year 2013-14) and note 22 (Assessment Year 2014-15) thereof explained the basis of the claim being made to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Thus, it must necessarily be inferred that the Assessing Officer has applied his mind at the time of passing an assessment order to this particular claim made in the basic document viz. computation of the income by not disallowing it in proceedings under Section 143(3) of the Act as he was satisfied with the basis of the claim as indicated in that very document. Therefore, where he accepts the claim made, the occasion to ask questions on it will not arise nor does it have to be indicated in the order passed in the regular assessment proceedings. Thus, issuing the impugned notices on the above ground would, prima-facie, amount to a change of opinion

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DATE: March 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: Entire law on whether the TPO can sit in judgement over the business model of the assessee and determine the ALP of the transactions with AEs at Nil explained in the context of judgements in Kodak India 288 CTR 46 (Bom), Lever India Exports 292 CTR 393 (Bom), Cushman and Wakefield 233 TAXMAN 250 (Del), R.A.K. Ceramics 293 CTR 361 (AP) & Delloite Consulting 137 ITD 21 (Mum)

Now, coming to the issue of transfer pricing adjustment made by TPO on account of services availed by the assessee from its associated enterprises and taking the value of said international transactions at Nil. In the first instance, we hold that TPO cannot sit in the judgment of business module of assessee and its intention to avail or not to avail any services from its associated enterprises. The role of TPO is to determine the arm’s length price of international transactions undertaken by the assessee and whether the same is at arm’s length price when compared with similar transactions undertaken by external entities or internal comparables

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DATE: December 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 32/ 43(6): The slump price paid to acquire a business has to be bifurcated between tangible and intangible assets for purposes of allowing depreciation. If the allocation is done in a systematic manner by an independent valuer and there is no fallacy, the AO is bound by the allocation. If an asset forms part of the block of assets and depreciation is allowed, it loses its identity and depreciation cannot be denied in a later year

The learned Departmental Representative for the Revenue also was of the view that no part of slump price is to be attributed to the know-how, patents and trademarks, since the same has not been acquired by the assessee. Even if we accept the said stand of learned Departmental Representative for the Revenue, ultimately after the slump price has been attributed first to the value of tangible assets, then the balance is to be attributed to intangible assets and once the same is done and whether it is under the umbrella of know-how, trademarks, patents or goodwill, it makes no difference since all these are covered under the umbrella of intangible assets, which are eligible for claim of depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) of the Act. The goodwill is also an intangible asset eligible for said depreciation as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Smifs Securities Ltd. (2012) 348 ITR 302 (SC)

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DATE: October 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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Royalty u/s 9(1)(vi) & Article 12: The Google Adwords advertisement module is not merely an agreement to provide advertisement space but is an agreement for facilitating the display and publishing of an advertisement to the targeted customer using Google's patented algorithm, tools and software. Google Adwords uses data regarding the age, gender, region, language, taste habits, food habits, etc of the customer so as to maximize the impression and conversion to the ads of the advertisers. Consequently, the payments to Google Ireland are taxable as "royalty" and the assessee ought to have deducted TDS thereon u/s 195

If we look into the advertisement module of Adword program stated herein above, then we will come to an irresistible conclusion that it is not merely an agreement to provide the advertisement space but is an agreement for facilitating the display and publishing of an advertisement to the targeted customer. If we look into the submission made by the learned AR, it is clear that the advertiser, selects some key words and on the basis of key words, the advertisement is displayed on the website or along with the search result as and when the customer selects the key words relatable to the advertisement. The module as suggested does not merely work by providing the space in the Google search engine, but it works only with the help of various patented tools and software. As we have analyzed detailed functioning of Adword program, it is clear that with the help of the search tool/software / data base, the Google is able to identify the targeted consumer/person as per the requirement of the advertiser

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DATE: October 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 2(22)(e): Any payment by a closely-held company by way of advance or loan to a concern in which a substantial shareholder is a member holding a substantial interest is deemed to be “dividend” on the presumption that the loans or advances would ultimately be made available to the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. However, the legal fiction in s. 2(22)(e) does not extend to, or broaden the concept of, a “shareholder”

U/s 2(22)(e), any payment by a closely-held company by way of advance or loan to a concern in which a substantial shareholder is a member holding a substantial interest is deemed to be “dividend” on the presumption that the loans or advances would ultimately be made available to the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. The legal fiction in s. 2(22)(e) enlarges the definition of dividend but does not extend to, or broaden the concept of, a “shareholder”. As the assessee was not a shareholder of the paying company, the “dividend” was not assessable in its hands

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98 to 2000-01
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA contains substantive and procedural provisions for computation of special deduction. Any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has to be rejected. The claim for 100% deduction, without taking into consideration depreciation, is anathema to the scheme u/s 80-IA of the Act which is linked to profits. If the contention of the assessees is accepted, it would allow them to inflate the profits linked incentives provided u/s 80-IA of the Act which cannot be permitted

It may be stated at the cost of the repetition that judgment in Mahendra Mills was rendered while construing the provisions of Section 32 of the Act, as it existed at the relevant time, whereas we are concerned with the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Act. Marked distinction between the two Chapters, as already held by this Court in the judgments noted above, is that not only Section 80-IA is a code by itself, it contains the provision for special deduction which is linked to profits. In contrast, Chapter IV of the Act, which allows depreciation under Section 32 of the Act is linked to investment. This Court has also made it clear that Section 80-IA of the Act not only contains substantive but procedural provisions for computation of special deduction. Thus, any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has to be rejected. The assessees/appellants want 100% deduction, without taking into consideration depreciation which they want to utilise in the subsequent years. This would be anathema to the scheme under Section 80-IA of the Act which is linked to profits and if the contention of the assessees is accepted, it would allow them to inflate the profits linked incentives provided under Section 80-IA of the Act which cannot be permitted

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DATE: March 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital/ premium: The proviso to s. 68 (which creates an obligation on the issuing Co to explain the source of share capital & premium) has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 01.04.2013 and does not have retrospective effect. Prior thereto, as per Lovely Exports 317 ITR 218 (SC), if the AO regards the share premium as bogus, he has to assess the shareholders but cannot assess the same as the issuing company's unexplained cash credit

The proviso to Section 68 of the Act has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 1st April, 2013. Thus it would be effective only from the Assessment Year 2013-14 onwards and not for the subject Assessment Year. In fact, before the Tribunal, it was not even the case of the Revenue that Section 68 of the Act as in force during the subject years has to be read/understood as though the proviso added subsequently effective only from 1st April, 2013 was its normal meaning. The Parliament did not introduce to proviso to Section 68 of the Act with retrospective effect nor does the proviso so introduced states that it was introduced “for removal of doubts” or that it is “declaratory”. Therefore it is not open to give it retrospective effect, by proceeding on the basis that the addition of the proviso to Section 68 of the Act is immaterial and does not change the interpretation of Section 68 of the Act both before and after the adding of the proviso

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DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(i): The capital gains arising on transfer by a foreign company of shares in another foreign company holding assets in India is liable to tax in India. The argument that the transfer is a mere re-organisation of assets within the group and that there is no “real income” is not acceptable. The argument that the India-UK DTAA should be given a “static” interpretation and that the retrospective amendment to s. 9 by the Finance Act 2012 should be ignored is also not acceptable. Where the DTAA provides that the income shall be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provision of the domestic law, the said domestic law has to be the amended law

Coming to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of DIT Vs. New Skies Satellite BV wherein the Hon’ble High court has held that in relation to applicability of Article 3(2) of the relevant DTAAs, that it can apply only to terms not defined in the DTAA. Since the relevant DTAAs in the case before them defined ‘royalty’, Article 3(2) could not be applied. For terms which are defined under the DTAA, there is no need to refer to the laws in force in the Contracting States, especially to deduce the meaning of the definition under the DTAA. Further, the court has held that neither act of parliament supply or alter the boundaries of DTAA or supply redundancy to any part of its. Similarly, according to us, the provisions of DTAA where it simply provides that particular income would be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provisions of domestic laws, such article in DTAA also cannot the limit the boundaries of domestic tax laws. In view of this, we do not find any force in the argument of the assessee and dismiss ground No. 3.12 of the appeal

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