Search Results For: Domestic Tax


Atlas Copco (India) Limited vs. DCIT (ITAT Pune)

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 201(1) TDS: The time limit specified in s. 201(3) & (4) for passing orders does not apply to cases where payments are made to non-residents. In cases of payments made to non-residents, an order passed after one year from the end of the FY in which the proceedings were initiated is void ab initio and liable to be quashed

In our considered opinion, where the payments are made to the entities/persons other than the persons specified in sub-section (3), the limitation period of one year from the end of financial year in which the proceedings u/s. 201 were initiated, as laid down by the Special Bench of Tribunal and affirmed by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court would apply. In the instant case, since, the order u/s. 201 has been passed much after the elapse of one year period from the end of financial year in which proceedings u/s. 201 were initiated, the order u/s. 201 in the impugned assessment years is void-ab-initio and hence, is liable to be quashed

PCIT vs. Chain House International (P) Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Premium: No reason to interfere. SLP dismissed. High Court held there is no limitation on the amount of premium that can be charged. The AO cannot question the transaction merely because he thinks the investor could have managed by paying a lesser amount as share premium. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors to decide the premium and it is the wisdom of the shareholder whether they want to subscribe to shares at such a premium or not. S. 68 does not apply as the funds were received through banking channels and the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the investors was established

Issuing the share at a premium was a commercial decision. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors of a company to decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of shareholder whether they want to subscribe the shares at such a premium or not. This was a mutual decision between both the companies. In day to day market, unless and until, the rates is fixed by any Govt. Authority or unless there is any restriction on the amount of share premium under any law, the price of the shares is decided on the mutual understanding of the parties concerned. Once the genuineness, creditworthiness and identity are established, the revenue should not justifiably claim to put itself in the armchair of a businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and assume the role of ascertaining how much is a reasonable premium having regard to the circumstances of the case

PCIT vs. Nokia India Pvt. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 147 Reopening: High Court should decide (i) validity of s. 148 notice where assessment is made u/s 143(1) & not u/s 143(3), (ii) whether notice can be said to be based on change of opinion if there is no foundation to form any such opinion, (iii) Whether requirements of s. 148 are satisfied, namely, that it contains the facts constituting the "reasons to believe" and furnishes the necessary details for assessing the escaped income and (iv) whether finding recorded by ITAT on merits is legally sustainable

The objections raised by the respondent (assessee) to the notice contending inter alia that since the impugned notice was based on “change of the opinion” and hence bad in law was upheld by the ITAT resulting in allowing the respondent’s appeal and further by dismissing the Revenue’s appeal by the High Court. The Revenue has felt aggrieved by the order of the High Court dismissing their appeal in limine and has filed the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court

CIT vs. Ram Kishan Dass (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 142(2C) Special Audit/ Interpretation of statutes: The AO who has fixed the time in the first instance must necessarily, as an incident of the authority to fix time, be entitled to suo moto extend time without an application by the assessee. The amendment by FA 2008 was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. There exists a presumption of retrospective application in regard to amendments which are of a procedural nature

The issue as to whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. The Court would have due regard to (i) the general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what power that the legislature contemplated

PCIT vs. Bajaj Finance Limited (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

PCIT vs. Oil Industry Development Board (Supreme Court)

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DATE: February 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: In the absence of any exempt income, disallowance u/s 14A & Rule 8D of the Act of any amount is not permissible (Essar Teleholdings 401 ITR 445 (SC) followed, Cheminvest 378 ITR 33 (Del) approved)

In view of the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. through its Manager [401 ITR 445 (SC)] (2018) 3 SCC 253, we see no reason to entertain this special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

Khoday Distilleries Ltd vs. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Kharkhane Ltd (Supreme Court) (Larger Bench)

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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Articles 136, 141: Entire law on legal effect of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by a speaking/ non-speaking order explained. If the dismissal is by a speaking order & reasons are given, the same is a declaration of law which is binding under Article 141. The findings are also binding by way of judicial discipline. However, this does not mean that the order of the lower court has merged in the dismissal order of the Supreme Court

If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties

Milestone Real Estate Fund vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

PCIT vs. Make My Trip India Pvt Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: March 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 194H TDS: Payment gateway charges paid to a bank for swiping credit cards are in the nature of fees for banking services and not "commission" or "brokerage". Accordingly, no TDS is deductible from the said charges u/s 194H and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made (JDS Apparels 370 ITR 454 (Del) followed)

The bank in question is not concerned with buying or selling of goods or even with the reason and cause as to why the card was swiped. It is not bothered or concerned with the quality, price, nature, quantum etc. of the goods bought/sold. The bank merely provides banking services in the form of payment and subsequently collects the payment. The amount punched in the swiping machine is credited to the account of the retailer by the acquiring bank, i.e. HDFC in this case, after retaining a small portion of the same as their charges. The banking services cannot be covered and treated as services rendered by an agent for the principal during the course of buying or selling of goods as the banker does not render any service in the nature of agency.

ITO vs. Devendra J Kothari (ITAT Ahmedabad)

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DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2)/ 271(1)(c): Though the High Court faulted the Tribunal's decision of reducing the penalty as a "way to bypass the minimum limit" and the Tribunal was in error in granting the relief, the same does not constitute a "mistake apparent from the record" so as to enable the Tribunal to revisit its decision

The observations of Hon’ble High Court, disapproving the conclusions, are based on the proposition that the conclusion of the Tribunal was a way to bypass the minimum limit. That is, with respect, a wholly a highly subjective observation and all a matter of perception. The other way of looking at the conclusions of the Tribunal could possibly be, and that’s how we looked at it, that the explanation of the assessee was partly accepted and, as regards the element of income on which explanation was not accepted, the penalty was still one hundred percent of tax sought to be evaded. It was stated to be accepted past history of the case, as pleaded before the Tribunal, that all the cash deposits were not of income nature but in the nature of business receipts and that only income embedded therein could be brought to tax. Wrongly though, as we have learnt the hard way, we were in error in following the same path for the purpose of evaluating explanation extended before the Tribunal during the hearing, but then this was not altogether devoid of any basis or rationale. The rationale or basis of our approach has turned out to be incorrect but it clearly did exist. In any event, it was not something which was incapable of two opinions

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