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COURT:
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DATE: July 29, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 30, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
(i) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia), 40A(3) etc are intended to enforce due compliance of the requirement of other provisions of the Act and to ensure proper collection of tax as also transparency in dealings. The interest of a bonafide assessee who had made the deduction as required and had paid the same to the revenue is safeguarded. No question about prejudice or hardship arises (ii) Payment made for hiring vehicles for the business of transportation of goods attracts TDS u/s 194C, (iii) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) is not limited to the amount outstanding ("payable") but also to expenses that had already been incurred and "paid" by the assessee, (iv) Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) as introduced by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 w.e.f. 01.04.2005 is applicable to AY 2005-2006, (v) Benefit of amendment made in the year 2014 to s. 40(a)(ia) is not available

We may in the passing observe that the assessee-appellant was either labouring under the mistaken impression that he was not required to deduct TDS or under the mistaken belief that the methodology of splitting a single payment into parts below Rs. 20,000/- would provide him escape from the rigour of the provisions of the Act providing for disallowance. In either event, the appellant had not been a bonafide assessee who had made the deduction and deposited it subsequently. Obviously, the appellant could not have derived the benefits that were otherwise available by the curative amendments of 2008 and 2010. Having defaulted at every stage, the attempt on the part of assessee-appellant to seek some succor in the amendment of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 could only be rejected as entirely baseless, rather preposterous

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DATE: June 18, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 20, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): The amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2015, which restricts the disallowance for failure to deduct TDS to 30% of the expenditure instead of 100%, is curative in nature and should be applied retrospectively

We find that Finance (No.2) Act has made amendment to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act w.e.f. 01.04.2015. Various benches of the Tribunals including the Delhi Benches of the Tribunal, have held the amendment made by Finance (No 2) Act to be curative in nature. We further finds the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of R.H. International Vs. ITO (supra) has held that disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia) of the Act be restricted to 30% of the expenses paid as against 100% because amended provision is curative in nature and the provisions should be applied retrospectively

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DATE: March 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 194H TDS: Payment gateway charges paid to a bank for swiping credit cards are in the nature of fees for banking services and not "commission" or "brokerage". Accordingly, no TDS is deductible from the said charges u/s 194H and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made (JDS Apparels 370 ITR 454 (Del) followed)

The bank in question is not concerned with buying or selling of goods or even with the reason and cause as to why the card was swiped. It is not bothered or concerned with the quality, price, nature, quantum etc. of the goods bought/sold. The bank merely provides banking services in the form of payment and subsequently collects the payment. The amount punched in the swiping machine is credited to the account of the retailer by the acquiring bank, i.e. HDFC in this case, after retaining a small portion of the same as their charges. The banking services cannot be covered and treated as services rendered by an agent for the principal during the course of buying or selling of goods as the banker does not render any service in the nature of agency.

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DATE: January 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 17, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): The second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) is beneficial to the assessee and is declaratory and curative in nature. Accordingly, it must be given retrospective effect

Various Courts, however, have seen this proviso as beneficial to the assessee and curative in nature. The leading judgment on this point was of the Division Bench of Delhi Court in the case of CIT Vs. Ansal Land Mark Township P Ltd [2015] 377 ITR 635 (Delhi). The Court held that Section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty and insertion of second proviso is declaratory and curative in nature and would have retrospective effect form 1.4.2005 i.e the date from the main proviso 40(a)(ia) itself was inserted

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DATE: August 13, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 194-H TDS: The law in Idea Cellular 325 ITR 148 (Del) that there is a principal-agent relationship between the telecom company and the dealers does not mean that a similar relationship can be inferred between the dealers and the sub-dealers. The incentive paid by the dealers to sub-dealers cannot be equated with commission as stipulated u/s194H and so there is no requirement for deducting TDS

There is no agency agreement between the assessee and his dealers/sub-dealers. The agency relationship between the assessee and the cellular operators cannot be inferred or presumed in the transaction between the assessee and his sub-dealers. The reason being the SIM cards, vouchers belonged to the cellular operators/cellular entities and these cellular operators/telecom entities ensure that payment is received in respect of those prepaid vouchers and SIM cards which are sold to the subscribers and unsold SIM cards are returned back to them and even if such SIM cards are returned, then these cellular/telecom entities are required to be made payment against them and the SIM card stocked with the distributors are the property of service provider, i.e., the telecom/cellular entities

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): The amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f 01.04.2010 to provide that all TDS made during the previous year can be deposited with the Government by the due date of filing the return of income should be interpreted liberally and equitably and applied retrospectively from the date when s. 40(a)(ia) was inserted i.e., with effect from the AY 2005-2006 so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. The amendment is curative in nature and should be given retrospective operation as if the amended provision existed even at the time of its insertion

Hence, in light of the forgoing discussion and the binding effect of the judgment given in Allied Moters 224 ITR 677(SC), we are of the view that the amended provision of Sec 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act should be interpreted liberally and equitable and applies retrospectively from the date when Section 40(a)(ia) was inserted i.e., with effect from the Assessment Year 2005-2006 so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. As the developments with regard to the Section recorded above shows that the amendment was curative in nature, it should be given retrospective operation as if the amended provision existed even at the time of its insertion. Since the assessee has filed its returns on 01.08.2005 i.e., in accordance with the due date under the provisions of Section 139 IT Act, hence, is allowed to claim the benefit of the amendment made by Finance Act, 2010 to the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act.

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DATE: September 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
40(a)(ia)/40(ba) Disallowance of reimbursement of salary for non-deduction of TDS: Displeasure and unhappiness expressed at the manner in which the Tribunal approached the matter insofar as the applicability of s. 40(ba) is concerned. Tribunal cautioned that it should not use abbreviations in the order without indicating what the terms stand for as it causes confusion

Apart from that, the Tribunal’s order is confusing. In the impugned order, the Tribunal does not indicate what it means by AOP. It does not indicate as to what it means by TAS for both sides tell us that it is identical to TDS, namely, Tax Deducted at Source. We are unhappy with the abbreviations and short forms in the Tribunal’s order. We do not see who is reluctant, either one who dictates or one who takes down the same, but such abbreviations and shortcuts increase burden on the higher Courts. We would caution the Tribunal that hereafter it should indicate somewhere in the order as to what the abbreviations used by it stand for

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): S. 194C read with s. 200 are mandatory provisions. The disallowance stipulated in s. 40(a)(ia) for failure to deduct TDS u/s 194C is one of the consequences for the default. Accordingly, though there is a difference between “paid” and “payable”, s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid. The contrary interpretation that s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to cases where amounts are “payable” will result in defaulters going scot free

It is clear that Section 40(a)(ia) deals with the nature of default and the consequences thereof. Default is relatable to Chapter XVIIB (in the instant case Sections 194C and 200, which provisions are in the aforesaid Chapter). When the entire scheme of obligation to deduct the tax at source and paying it over to the Central Government is read holistically, it cannot be held that the word ‘payable’ occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) refers to only those cases where the amount is yet to be paid and does not cover the cases where the amount is actually paid. If the provision is interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant herein, then even when it is found that a person, like the appellant, has violated the provisions of Chapter XVIIB (or specifically Sections 194C and 200 in the instant case), he would still go scot free, without suffering the consequences of such monetary default in spite of specific provisions laying down these consequences

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DATE: June 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): When there are conflicting judgements of non-jurisdiction High Courts, the Tribunal is not permitted to choose based on its perception of what the correct law is because it will amount to sitting in judgement over the High Courts’ views. Instead, it has to follow the view which is in favour of the assessee even if it believes that this view is not the correct law. Second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by FA 2013 should be treated as retrospectively applicable from 1st April 2005

It will be wholly inappropriate for us to choose views of one of the High Courts based on our perceptions about reasonableness of the respective viewpoints, as such an exercise will de facto amount to sitting in judgment over the views of the High Courts something diametrically opposed to the very basic principles of hierarchical judicial system. We have to, with our highest respect of both the Hon’ble High Courts, adopt an objective criterion for deciding as to which of the Hon’ble High Court should be followed by us. We find guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [(1972) 88 ITR 192 (SC)]. Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down a principle that “if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provisions are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted”. This principle has been consistently followed by the various authorities as also by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination

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