Search Results For: Deepak Gupta J


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DATE: May 4, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2020 (Date of publication)
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Contempt of Court by Advocates: There is not an iota of remorse or any semblance of apology on behalf of the contemnors. In view of the scurrilous and scandalous allegations levelled against the judges of this Court and no remorse being shown by any of the contemnors we are of the considered view that they cannot be let off leniently. It is obvious that this is a concerted effort to virtually hold the Judiciary to ransom. All three contemnors are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months each with a fine of Rs. 2000

There is not an iota of remorse or any semblance of apology on behalf of the contemnors. Since they have not argued on sentence, we have to decide the sentence without assistance of the contemnors. In view of the scurrilous and scandalous allegations levelled against the judges of this Court and no remorse being shown by any of the contemnors we are of the considered view that they cannot be let off leniently. We have also held in our judgment that the complaints were sent by the contemnors with a view to intimidate the Judges who were yet to hear Shri Nedumpara on the question of punishment, so that no action against Shri Nedumpara is taken. Therefore, it is obvious that this is a concerted effort to virtually hold the Judiciary to ransom.

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DATE: May 6, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2020 (Date of publication)
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Extension of limitation period: Taking into consideration the effect of the Corona Virus (COVID 19) and resultant difficulties being faced by lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders to be passed by this Court in the present proceedings

In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown

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DATE: April 27, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 1, 2020 (Date of publication)
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Contempt of Court: There can be no manner of doubt that any citizen of the country can criticise the judgments delivered by any Court including this Court. However, no party has the right to attribute motives to a Judge or to question the bona fides of the Judge or to raise questions with regard to the competence of the Judge. Judges are part and parcel of the justice delivery system. When there is a concerted attack by members of the Bar, the Court cannot shut its eyes to the slanderous and scandalous allegations made. If such allegations are permitted to remain unchallenged then the public will lose faith not only in those particular Judges but also in the entire justice delivery system and this definitely affects the majesty of law

The purpose of having a law of contempt is not to prevent fair criticism but to ensure that the respect and confidence which the people of this country repose in the judicial system is not undermined in any manner whatsoever. If the confidence of the citizenry in the institution of justice is shattered then not only the judiciary, but democracy itself will be under threat. Contempt powers have been very sparingly used by the Courts and rightly so. The shoulders of this Court are broad enough to withstand criticism, even criticism which may transcend the parameters of fair criticism. However, if the criticism is made in a concerted manner to lower the majesty of the institution of the Courts and with a view to tarnish the image, not only of the Judges, but also the Courts, then if such attempts are not checked the results will be disastrous. Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act itself provides that publishing of any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and finally decided does not amount to contempt.

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DATE: April 27, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2020 (Date of publication)
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The concept of "constructive delivery" of goods as expounded in Arjan Dass Gupta 45 STC 52 (Del) is not proper to interpret the provisions of s. 3 of the CST Act. A legal fiction is created s. 3 that the movement of goods, from one State to another shall terminate, where the good have been delivered to a carrier for transmission, at the time of when delivery is taken from such carrier. There is no concept of constructive delivery either express or implied in the said provision. On a plain reading of the statute, the movement of the goods would terminate only when delivery is taken. There is no scope of incorporating any further word to qualify the nature and scope of the expression “delivery” within the said section. If the authorities felt any assessee or dealer was taking unintended benefit under the aforesaid provisions of the 1956 Act, then the proper course would be legislative amendment. The Tax Administration Authorities cannot give their own interpretation to legislative provisions on the basis of their own perception of trade practice. This administrative exercise, in effect, would result in supplying words to legislative provisions, as if to cure omissions of the legislature

In the case of Arjan Dass Gupta (supra) principle akin to constructive delivery was expounded and we have quoted the relevant passage from that decision earlier in this judgment. In our opinion, however, such construction would not be proper to interpret the provisions of Section 3 of the 1956 Act. A legal fiction is created in first explanation to that Section. That fiction is that the movement of goods, from one State to another shall terminate, where the good have been delivered to a carrier for transmission, at the time of when delivery is taken from such carrier. There is no concept of constructive delivery either express or implied in the said provision. On a plain reading of the statute, the movement of the goods, for the purposes of clause (b) of Section 3 of the 1956 Act would terminate only when delivery is taken, having regard to first explanation to that Section. There is no scope of incorporating any further word to qualify the nature and scope of the expression “delivery” within the said section. The legislature has eschewed from giving the said word an expansive meaning. The High Court under the judgment which is assailed in Civil Appeal No.2217 of 2011 rightly held that there is no place for any intendment in taxing statutes. We are of the view that the interpretation of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court given in the case of Arjan Dass Gupta does not lays down correct position of law. In the event, the authorities felt any assessee or dealer was taking unintended benefit under the aforesaid provisions of the 1956 Act, then the proper course would be legislative amendment. The Tax Administration Authorities cannot give their own interpretation to legislative provisions on the basis of their own perception of trade practise. This administrative exercise, in effect, would result in supplying words to legislative provisions, as if to cure omissions of the legislature

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DATE: April 3, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 147/ 148 Reopening: (i) Merely because the original assessment is a detailed one, the powers of the AO to reopen u/s 147 is not affected, (ii) Information which comes to the notice of the AO during proceedings for subsequent AYs can definitely form tangible material to reopen the assessment, (iii) As regards "full & true disclosure of material facts", the assessee has the duty to disclose the "primary facts". It is not required to disclose the "secondary facts". The assessee is also not required to give any assistance to the AO by disclosure of other facts. It is for the AO to decide what inference should be drawn from the facts, (iv) If the AO intends to rely upon the second Proviso to s. 148 for the extended period of 16 years limitation, the same should be stated either in the notice or in the reasons in support of the notice. It cannot be done in the order rejecting the objections or at a later stage (All imp judgements considered)

In our view the assessee disclosed all the primary facts necessary for assessment of its case to the assessing officer. What the revenue urges is that the assessee did not make a full and true disclosure of certain other facts. We are of the view that the assessee had disclosed all primary facts before the assessing officer and it was not required to give any further assistance to the assessing officer by disclosure of other facts. It was for the assessing officer at this stage to decide what inference should be drawn from the facts of the case. In the present case the assessing officer on the basis of the facts disclosed to him did not doubt the genuiness of the transaction set up by the assessee. This the assessing officer could have done even at that stage on the basis of the facts which he already knew. The other facts relied upon by the revenue are the proceedings before the DRP and facts subsequent to the assessment order, and we have already dealt with the same while deciding Issue No.1. However, that cannot lead to the conclusion that there is nondisclosure of true and material facts by the assessee

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DATE: March 6, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2020 (Date of publication)
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Attachment of property under Schedule II: Unless there is preference given to the Crown debt by a statute, the dues of a secured creditor have preference over Crown debts. As a charge over the property was created much prior to the notice issued by the TRO under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act and the sale of the property was pursuant to the order passed by the DRT, the sale is valid

The property in dispute was mortgaged by BPIL to the Union Bank of India in 2000 and the DRT passed an order of recovery against the BPIL in 2002. The recovery certificate was issued immediately, pursuant to which an attachment order was passed prior to the date on which notice was issued by the Tax Recovery Officer- Respondent No.4 under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act. It is true that the sale was conducted after the issuance of the notice as well as the attachment order passed by Respondent No.4 in 2003, but the fact remains that a charge over the property was created much prior to the notice issued by Respondent No.4 on 16.11.2003. The High Court held that Rule 16(2) is applicable to this case on the ground that the actual sale took place after the order of attachment was passed by Respondent No.4. The High Court failed to take into account the fact that the sale of the property was pursuant to the order passed by the DRT with regard to the property over which a charge was already created prior to the issuance of notice on 11.02.2003. As the charge over the property was created much prior to the issuance of notice under Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act by Respondent No.4, we find force in the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant

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DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of publication)
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If an amount (Dharmada, Charity) is paid at the time of the sale transaction for a purpose other than the price of the goods, it cannot form part of the transaction value. Such payment is not for the transaction of sale and cannot be treated as consideration for the goods. The fact that the payment is compulsory upon purchase does not mean that it is involuntary because the purchaser purchases the goods out of his own volition (All imp judgements referred)

When an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not made in consideration of the transfer of goods. Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller. If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods

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DATE: August 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
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We are shocked that the UOI through the CIT has taken the matter so casually. The petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10 lacs to be paid (by the exchequer)

First of all this petition has been filed after a delay of 596 days. There is an inadequate and unconvincing explanation given for the delay in filing the petition. Secondly, it is mentioned in the proforma for first listing that a similar matter being C.A. No. 7096/2012 is pending in this Court. However, the office has given a report stating that C.A. No. 7096/2012 was decided by this Court as far back as on 27.09.2012. In other words, the petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. We are shocked that the Union of India through the Commissioner of Income Tax has taken the matter so casually

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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When will the Rip Van Winkleism stop and Union of India wake up to its duties and responsibilities to the justice delivery system? To make matters worse, in this appeal, the Union of India has engaged 10 lawyers, including an Additional Solicitor General and a Senior Advocate! In other words, the Union of India has created a huge financial liability by engaging so many lawyers for an appeal whose fate can be easily imagined on the basis of existing orders of dismissal in similar cases. Yet the Union of India is increasing its liability and asking the taxpayers to bear an avoidable financial burden for the misadventure

To say the least, this is an extremely unfortunate situation of unnecessary and avoidable burdening of this Court through frivolous litigation which calls for yet another reminder through the imposition of costs on the Union of India while dismissing this appeal. We hope that someday some sense, if not better sense, will prevail on the Union of India with regard to the formulation of a realistic and meaningful National Litigation Policy and what it calls ‘ease of doing business’, which can, if faithfully implemented benefit litigants across the country