Search Results For: 153C


COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 12, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153A, 153C search assessments: (i) A statement recorded u/s 132(4) has evidentiary value but cannot justify the additions in the absence of corroborative material. (ii) The statement also cannot, on a standalone basis, constitute 'incriminating material' so as to empower the AO to frame a block assessment u/s 153A (iii) If the statement was recorded in the course of search conducted in the case of a third party, and assuming the statement is construed as 'incriminating material belonging to or pertaining to a person other than person searched', the only legal recourse available to the department is to proceed in terms of S. 153C of the Act by handing over the same to the AO who has jurisdiction over such person. An assessment framed u/s 153A on the basis of alleged incriminating material (being the statement recorded under 132(4) of the Act) is not valid. The Assessee also had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness (All imp judgements referred)

Now, coming to the aspect viz the invocation of section 153A on the basis of the statement recorded in search action against a third person. We may note that the AO has used this statement on oath recorded in the course of search conducted in the case of a third party (i.e., search of Pradeep Kumar Jindal) for making the additions in the hands of the assessee. As per the mandate of Section 153C, if this statement was to be construed as an incriminating material belonging to or pertaining to a person other than person searched (as referred to in Section 153A), then the only legal recourse available to the department was to proceed in terms of Section 153C of the Act by handing over the same to the AO who has jurisdiction over such person. Here, the assessment has been framed under section 153A on the basis of alleged incriminating material (being the statement recorded under 132(4) of the Act). As noted above, the Assessee had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, but that apart, the mandatory procedure under section 153C has not been followed.

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: , , , ,
DATE: January 19, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153D: The approving authority (JCIT) has to give approval for "each" assessment year after applying independent mind to the material on record to see whether the cases are un-abated or abated assessments and their effect. However, the JCIT has granted common approval for all AYs. Further, he did not have the seized material nor the appraisal report or other material at the time of granting approval. Therefore, the approval granted is merely technical approval just to complete the formality and without application of mind. The approval has been granted without application of mind and is invalid, bad in Law and is liable to be quashed

In our considered and humble opinion, no procedure for grant of approval has been provided u/s.153D of the Act and the Income tax Rules, 1962. However, when legislature has enacted some provision to be exercised by a higher revenue authority enabling the AO to pass assessment or reassessment orders in the search cases, then, it is the duty of the approving authority to exercise such power by applying his judicious, vigilant and cautious efforts. We are of the view that the obligation on the approval granting authority is of two folds, one the one hand, he has to apply his mind to secure in-build for the department against any omission or negligence by the AO in taxing right income in the hands of right person in the right assessment year and on the other hand he is also responsible and duty bound to do justice with the taxpayer/assessee by granting protection against arbitrary or unjust or unsustainable exercise and decision by the AO crating baseless tax liability on the assessee and thus he has to discharge his duties as superior authority. Thus, granting approval u/s.153D of the Act is not merely an official formality but it is a supervisory act which requires proper application of administrative and judicial skill by the authority on the application of mind and this exercise should be discernible from the order of approval u/s.153D of the Act

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153C: Compliance with the requirements of s. 153C is mandatory. (i) If the AO of the searched person is different from the AO of the other person, the AO of the searched person is required to transmit the satisfaction note & seized documents to the AO of the other person. He is also required to make a note in the file of the searched person that he has done so. However, the same is for administrative convenience and the failure by the AO of the searched person to make a note in the file of the searched person, will not vitiate the proceedings u/s 153C. (ii) If the AO of the searched person and the other person is the same, it is sufficient for the AO to note in the satisfaction note that the documents seized from the searched person belonged to the other person. Once the note says so, the requirement of s. 153C is fulfilled. In such case, there can be one satisfaction note prepared by the AO, as he himself is the AO of the searched person and also the AO of the other person. However, he must be conscious and satisfied that the documents seized/recovered from the searched person belonged to the other person. In such a situation, the satisfaction note would be qua the other person. The requirement of transmitting the documents so seized from the searched person would not be there as he himself will be the AO of the searched person and the other person and therefore there is no question of transmitting such seized documents to himself

This Court had an occasion to consider the scheme of Section 153C of the Act and the conditions precedent to be fulfilled/complied with before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act in the case of Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 6 SCC 444 as well as by the Delhi High Court in the case of Pepsi Food Pvt. Ltd (367) ITR 112 (Delhi). As held, before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act, the Assessing Officer of the searched person must be “satisfied” that, inter alia, any document seized or requisitioned “belongs to” a person other than the searched person. That thereafter, after recording such satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, he may transmit the records/documents/things/papers etc. to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of such other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional Assessing Officer may proceed 7 to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessment under Section 158BD of the Act and the other provisions of Chapter XIV-B shall apply.

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 24, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153A, 153C Search Assessments: The Act has separate provisions for making assessment in case of material found in the course of search from premises of assessee (s. 153A) as well as material found in course of search at premises of third party (S. 153C). Even if search happens in case of assessee, the AO cannot initiate proceedings u/s 153A if incriminating material is found during search of other person. Proceedings should be initiated u/s 153C and failure to do so renders the addition in the s. 153A assessment void-ab-initio (Vinod Kumar Gupta 165 DTR 409 (Del) distinguished)

In the case of Vinod Kumar Gupta the Hon’ble High Court held that as search and seizure was conducted through one authorization, there was no requirement of issuing separate notice under section 153C of the Act and following separate procedure under section 153C of the Act. But in the instant case, separate search warrant has been issued in the case of the assessee as well in the case of Sh. Ashok Chowdhary and the Assessing Officer has used the material found in the course of search at the premise of Sh. Ashok Chowdhary, which is not permitted in view of the express provision of the law.

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 6, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 25, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Search assessment u/s 153C: Proceedings u/s 153C of the Act can be initiated against a person only if the seized materials "belongs" to that person. It is not sufficient for the Revenue to urge that the seized document "pertains" to the person. Sinhgad Technical Education Society [2017] 84 Taxmann.com 290 (SC) followed

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Pune v. Sinhgad Technical Education Society [2017] 84 taxmann.com 290 (SC) settles the legal position in favour of the Assessees. The Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment of the Bombay High Court, approved the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III, (2013) 263 CTR (Guj) 362 that a document seized ‘should belong to a person other than the person referred to in Section 153A of the Act’. It has been categorically observed by the Supreme Court that the above position of law laid down by the Gujarat High Court is correct. Consequently, this Court rejects the contention of the learned counsel for the Revenue that even prior to 1st June 2015 at the stage of initiation of proceedings under Section 153C of the Act, it is sufficient if the seized document ‘pertained to’ the other person and it is not necessary to show that the seized material ‘belonged to’ the other person

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03, 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153A/ 153C: The seized incriminating material have to pertain to the AY in question and have co-relation, document-wise, with the AY. This requirement u/s 153C is essential and becomes a jurisdictional fact. It is an essential condition precedent that any money, bullion or jewellery or other valuable articles or thing or books of accounts or documents seized or requisitioned should belong to a person other than the person referred to in S. 153A. Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel 31 TM.com 50 (Guj) approved. SSP Aviation 20 TM.com 214 (Del) distinguished

Insofar as the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III, (2013) 31 taxmann.com 50 (Gujarat) relied upon by the learned Solicitor General is concerned, we find that the High Court in that case has categorically held that it is an essential condition precedent that any money, bullion or jewellery or other valuable articles or thing or books of accounts or documents seized or requisitioned should belong to a person other than the person referred to in Section 153A of the Act. This proposition of law laid down by the High Court is correct, which is stated by the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment as well

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 68: Statements recorded u/s 132 (4) do not by themselves constitute incriminating material. A copy of the statement together with the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent has to provided to the assessee. If the statement is retracted and/or if cross-examination is not provided, the statement has to be discarded. The onus of ensuring the presence of the deponent cannot be shifted to the assessees. The onus is on the Revenue to ensure his presence

A copy of the statement of Mr. Tarun Goyal, recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act, was not provided to the Assessees. Mr. Tarun Goyal was also not offered for the cross-examination. The remand report of the AO before the CIT(A) unmistakably showed that the attempts by the AO, in ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal for cross-examination by the Assessees, did not succeed. The onus of ensuring the presence of Mr. Tarun Goyal, whom the Assessees clearly stated that they did not know, could not have been shifted to the Assessees. The onus was on the Revenue to ensure his presence. Apart from the fact that Mr. Tarun Goyal has retracted his statement, the fact that he was not produced for cross-examination is sufficient to discard his statement. Statements recorded under Section 132 (4) of the Act of the Act do not by themselves constitute incriminating material as has been explained by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Harjeev Aggarwal (supra)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153B(2)(a): Merely visiting the premises on the pretext of concluding the search but not actually finding anything new for being seized cannot give rise to a second panchnama so as to extend the limitation period for passing the s. 153A assessment order. In such event, there would be no occasion to draw up a panchnama at all. The visit and the panchnama drawn up on that date cannot lead to postponement of the period for completion of assessment with reference to s. 153B (2) (a) of the Act

The Court is not prepared to accept the plea of the Revenue that merely because a panchnama was drawn up on 15th May, 2007 showing that the search was ‘finally concluded’ on that date, it postponed the period of limitation in terms of Section 153B (2) (a) of the Act. It had to be the “last panchnama drawn in relation to any person in whose case the warrant of authorization has been issued”. The last panchnama, no doubt, is dated 15th May, 2007 but what it records is the seizure of the jewellery items not of any of the persons searched but the wives of one of the directors i.e., of Ms. Neena Jain who was not even a director of any of these entities. Therefore, even assuming that the jewellery of Ms. Neena Jain was seized under panchnama of 15th May, 2007, as far as the searched entities are concerned, the Revenue cannot take advantage of Section 153B (2) (a) to contend that the period of limitation in respect of them stands extended for completing of assessment up to 31st December, 2009

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: June 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 69C/ 153C: An admission of the assessee which is retracted cannot be the basis of addition. The allegations made by the authorities have to be supported by actual cash passing hands. The addition cannot be sustained in the absence of material which would conclusively show that huge amounts revealed from the seized documents are transferred from one side to another and if the Revenue did not bring on record a single statement of the vendors of the land in different villages and if none of the sellers has been examined to substantiate the claim of the Revenue that extra cash has actually changed hands

After reproducing Section 69C and adverting to the fact that Dilip Dherai has retracted his statement, the Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that merely on the strength of the alleged admission in the statement of Dilip Dherai, the additions could not have been made. The concurrent findings of fact would demonstrate that the essential ingredients of Section 69C of the IT Act enabling the additions were not satisfied. This is not a case of ‘no explanation’. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the allegations made by the authorities are not supported by actual cash passing hands. The entire decision is based on the seized documents and no material has been referred which would conclusively show that huge amounts revealed from the seized documents are transferred from one side to another. In that regard, the Tribunal found that the Revenue did not bring on record a single statement of the vendors of the land in different villages. None of the sellers has been examined to substantiate the claim of the Revenue that extra cash has actually changed hands

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
(i) S. 153A/ 153C: When the Addl CIT records that he is granting “mechanical approval” u/s 153D to the draft assessment order for want of time to have meaningful discussion, the assessment order is bad in law and has to be annulled (ii) The Respondent is entitled to raise an objection under Rule 27 even in respect of fresh issues. It is not necessary that the ground should have been decided against the Respondent by the CIT(A)

The approval granted by the Addl. Commissioner is devoid of any application of mind, is mechanical and without considering the materials on record. In our considered opinion, the power vested in the Joint Commissioner/Addl Commissioner to grant or not to grant approval is coupled with a duty. The Addl Commissioner/Joint Commissioner is required to apply his mind to the proposals put up to him for approval in the light of the material relied upon by the AO. The said power cannot be exercised casually and in a routine manner. We are constrained to observe that in the present case, there has been no application of mind by the Addl. Commissioner before granting the approval. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the assessment order made u/s. 143(3) of the Act r.w. Sec. 153A of the Act is bad in law and deserves to be annulled