Year: 2010

Archive for 2010


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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Though the revenue has argued that a distinction is to be made between “employers’ contribution” and “employees’ contribution” and that employees’ contribution being in the nature of trust money in the hands of the assessee cannot be allowed as a deduction if not paid on or before the due date specified in the PF etc law, the scheme of the Act is that employees’ contribution is treated as income u/s 2 (24) (x) on receipt by the assessee and allowed as a deduction u/s 36 (1) (va) on making deposit with the concerned authorities. S. 43B (b) stipulates that such deduction would be permissible only on actual payment. The assessee can get the benefit if the actual payment is made before the return is filed, as per the principle laid down in Vinay Cement

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 4, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

While notice u/s 143 (2) is not necessary if the AO accepts the return as filed, the notice within the prescribed time is mandatory if the AO proposes to make an assessment u/s 158BC r.w.s143 (3). Omission to issue notice u/s 143(2) is not a procedural irregularity and the same is not curable and, the requirement of notice u/s 143(2) cannot be dispensed with. If the intention of the legislature was to exclude the provisions of s. 143 (2), the legislature would have indicated that.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 1, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

The argument that notional interest income cannot be assessed is not acceptable in the context of transfer pricing. S 92(1) provides that any income arising from an international transaction has to be computed having regard to the arm’s length price. S. 92B (1) defines an “international transaction” to mean “a transaction between two or more associated enterprises … in the nature of … lending or borrowing money …” In considering the “arms length” price of a loan, the rate of interest has to be considered and income on account of interest can be attributed

COURT:
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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

S. 153A does not authorize the making of a de novo assessment. While under the 1st Proviso, the AO is empowered to frame assessment for six years, under the 2nd Proviso, only the assessments which are pending on the date of initiation of search abate. The effect is that completed assessments do not abate. There can be two assessments for the same assessment year. Assessments which are not pending on the date of search but are pending before an appellate authority will survive.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Under the proviso to s. 147, an assessment made u/s 143 (3) can be reopened after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the assessment year only if there is a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The condition precedent to a valid exercise of the power to reopen the assessment was absent. An exceptional power has been conferred upon the Revenue to reopen an assessment after a lapse of four years and the conditions prescribed by the statute for the exercise of such a power must be strictly fulfilled and in their absence, the exercise of power would not be sustainable in law.

COURT:
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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Though the Court has repeatedly asked the department to examine the process applicable to the product in question and not to go only by dictionary meanings, the recommendation is not being followed. Even when the assessee gives an opinion on a given process, the Department does not submit any counter opinion. Applying the test laid down in Oracle Software India Ltd, as POY simplicitor is not fit for being used in the manufacture of a fabric and it becomes usable only after it undergoes the operation/process which is called as thermo mechanical process which converts POY into texturised yarn, the said process is “manufacture”.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

The term “manufacture” implies a change, but, every change is not a manufacture, despite the fact that every change in an article is the result of a treatment of labour and manipulation. However, this test of manufacture needs to be seen in the context of the process adopted by the assessee for duplication of software. If an operation/ process renders a commodity or article fit for use for which it is otherwise not fit, the operation/ process falls within the meaning of the word “manufacture”. Applying this test, as the assessee has undertaken an operation which renders a blank CD fit for use for which it was otherwise not fit, the duplicating process constitutes ‘manufacture’ u/s 80IA(12)(b).

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Though the power to reopen under the amended s. 147 is much wider, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which s. 147 would give arbitrary powers to the AO to re-open assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to re-open. One must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to re-assess. The AO has no power to review; he has the power to re-assess. But re-assessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain pre-condition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of re-opening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the AO. Hence, after 1.4.1989, the AO has power to re-open, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. This is supported by Circular No.549 dated 31.10.1989 which clarified that the words “reason to believe” did not mean a change of opinion.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Applying the principle in Govinddas 103 ITR 123 (SC), the amended s. 74 is applicable to computation of loss under the head “Capital Gains” for AY 2003-04 and onwards. As regards loss of earlier years, the law as it then stood gave a vested right of set off the loss against all capital gains. There is nothing in the amendment which withdraws the said vested right. Consequently, the loss can be set off against short-term capital gains despite the amendment.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2010 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

The Tribunal has correctly applied the principle of law in accepting the position that it is open to an assessee to maintain two separate portfolios, one relating to investment in shares and another relating to business activities involving dealing in shares. Delivery based transactions were rightly treated as being in the nature of investment transactions giving rise to capital gains. The Tribunal correctly accepted the position that though the principle of res judicata is not attracted, there ought to be uniformity in treatment and consistency when the facts and circumstances are identical. The Tribunal has noted that the assessee has followed a consistent practice in regard to the nature of the activities, the manner of keeping records and the presentation of shares as investment at the end of the year in all the years and there is no justification for a different view being taken by the AO.