Law on s. 192 TDS obligation on medical reimbursement & LTC explained

Though TDS has to be effected at the time of payment of salary, s. 192(3) permits the employer to increase or reduce the amount of TDS for any excess or deficiency. Even assuming that the case of the AO that at the time of payment the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source is sustainable, the assessee, on a review of the taxes deducted during the earlier months of the previous year, is entitled to give effect to the deductions permissible under proviso (iv) to s.17(2) or exemption u/s10(5) of the Act in the later months of the previous year. What has to be seen is the taxes to be deducted on income under the head ‘salaries’ as on the last date of the previous year. The case of the AO that LTC and Medical reimbursement should be paid at the time the expenditure is incurred or after the expenditure is incurred by way of reimbursement and not at an earlier point of time and that if it is so paid, then, even though the payment would not form part of taxable salary of an employee, the employer has to deduct tax at source treating it as part of salary, is contrary to s.192(3) and cannot be sustained. The reliance placed by the AO on the expression “actually incurred” in s.10(5) & Proviso (iv) to s.17(2) cannot be sustained. In any event, the interpretation of the word “actually paid” is not relevant while ascertaining the quantum of tax that has to be deducted at source u/s192. As far as the assessee is concerned, his obligation is only to make an ”estimate” of the income under the head “salaries” and such estimate has to be a bona fide estimate. The primary liability of the payee to pay tax remains. In a situation of honest difference of opinion, it is not the deductor that is to be proceeded against but the payees of the sums. On facts, as the assessee had granted exemption towards medical expenditure and leave travel after verifying the details and evidence furnished by the employees, it could not be treated as an assessee-in-default.

S. 32: A finance lease designed as a sale-and-lease back has to be treated as a sham transaction

A distinction between an ‘operating lease’ and a ‘finance lease’ has been made by the Special Bench in IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) on the basis of which it can be said that a ‘finance lease’ is a ‘sale’ which is given the colour of a ‘lease’ by the parties for their mutual benefit and to avoid tax. In such transactions, it has to be seen whether the sale transaction is a real transaction or a sham transaction with the object of enabling the alleged purchaser to claim himself as the owner of the goods, which are further claimed to be leased back to the original owner of the goods. In a sham transaction of sale and lease back the ownership of the goods is not transferred to the alleged lessor, but is shown to be done, so as to enable the purchaser to claim ownership for the goods for the purpose of tax relief. On facts, the ‘sale and lease back’ transaction is a sham transaction done with the object to facilitate the benefits of depreciation to a person who otherwise is not eligible to claim the same. The intention of the parties was not that of sale or lease but was a loan transaction. The rates of interest/ rental have been fixed taking into consideration that the equipments are eligible for 100% depreciation and it is provided that if the claim of depreciation is changed, the rental in the shape of interest will accordingly change. Such clauses cannot be a part of any lease agreement but finance agreement only because in a normal lease agreement, the lessee is not concerned as to what benefits are available to the owner/ lessor under the Income-tax Act. The contention that as the transaction is with a State Government undertaking, it would be highly improper to impute any collusiveness or colourable nature of the transaction is misconceived. The argument that there is no bar for the assessee for making tax planning so as to reduce its taxes, provided it is within the framework of the law, is also not acceptable as u/s 23 of the Indian Contract Act, even if the consideration or object of an agreement may not be expressly forbidden by law, but if it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of law, the same will not be lawful. Engaging in sham transactions with the object of reducing tax liability cannot be said to be a case of tax avoidance but is one of tax evasion (ICDS 350 ITR 527 (SC), IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum)(SB) & Development Credit Bank referred)

S. 80-IB: Though Duty Drawback & DEPB were held not eligible for deduction in Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC), answer could be different if business model shows dependence on Duty Drawback & DEPB for survival

Though in Liberty India it was held that duty drawback and DEPB arises from an independent source and is not “derived” from the industrial undertaking, in Dharam Pal Premchand 317 ITR 353 (Del) (SLP dismissed) it was held that refund of excise duty had a direct nexus with the manufacturing activity & was eligible for s. 80-IB deduction. Accordingly, though duty drawback & DEPB was held in Liberty India to be an independent source of income and to not have a “first degree” nexus with the undertaking, this was in the context of a fact-situation where the duty drawback & DEPB did not arise from core activities of the undertaking and was an additional, ancillary or supplemental profit. There can be situations in which duty drawback itself could be more than the overall profits and in such situations, the duty drawback may not be seen on standalone basis or as an independent source of income because the overall profit is only a part of the duty drawback receipt, and the commercial motivation of running the industrial undertaking is earning only that part of duty drawback receipts. On the present facts, the duty drawback was more than the entire operational profit and so it cannot be an open and shut inference that the duty drawback receipts are an independent source of income and have no first degree nexus with the business activity of the industrial undertaking. There is still room for consideration of the plea that but for the duty drawback the assessee would not have carried out the business activity in the industrial undertaking, because, that would have meant carrying out business for incurring losses. If that be so, the duty drawback receipts can be said to derived from the undertaking and to be eligible for s. 80-IB deduction. The question whether the duty drawback is an incidental profit or a profit of the first degree depends on the business model followed by the assessee

ICAI directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings against CA for suppressing information and obtaining order by fraud

In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final. On facts, it was the duty of the assessee to disclose the decision of the High Court to the Tribunal while moving the MA and by not doing so, they did not come to the ITAT with clean hands. The assessee and his CA are guilty of fraud for deliberately suppressing the fact that the High Court had dismissed the assessee’s appeal and that the MA was not maintainable. The MA order is thus a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. The CA’s conduct amounts to professional misconduct and requires disciplinary action by the ICAI

Transfer Pricing: Law on adjustment for notional interest on interest-free loan & excess credit period to AE explained

The question which really needs to be adjudicated is whether, in the context of s. 92A, but for the management, capital or control being in the same hands, the AE would have entered into the transaction on the same terms. In other words, whether there is such a commercial justification for the values at which transactions have been entered or not, so as not to attract the adjustment in the arm’s length price, has to essentially depend on factors other than the factors regarding management, capital or control. In still other words, merely because the entity receiving interest free funds is a subsidiary wholly owned by the assessee cannot be reason enough to justify such loans or advances being interest free and not warranting an arm’s length price adjustment, so far as transfer pricing provisions are concerned

Transfer Pricing: Scope in the context of expenditure (royalty payment) explained

The TPO’s argument that the assessee need not have paid for the technology as it did not derive any benefit therefrom is not acceptable. The assessee is free to conduct business in the manner it deems fit and the commercial and business expediency of incurring any expenditure has to be seen from the assessee’s point of view. The Revenue cannot step into the shoe of the assessee and decide what is prudent for the business. On facts, the very survival of the assessee in the industry depended upon the licence and technology & know how provided by the AE. There has been a considerable increase in the sales figures and the growth in revenue clearly demonstrates the benefits derived by the assessee from the use of technology