Home › 2020 › March › Page 2
Month: March 2020

Archive for March, 2020

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements


Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 10(38) Bogus capital gains from penny stocks: As the detailed explanation of the assessee does not sufficiently discharge the onus on proving the source of impugned deposits, the impugned addition should be restricted to 30% only with a rider that same shall not be treated as a precedent in any other assessment year

It emerges that from a perusal of these case files that although the assessee has produced her documentary evidence before the lower authorities about the impugned sums to be in the nature of income derived from the sales of shares, the fact remains that her detailed explanation tendered in the course of assessment till date does not sufficiently discharg her onus on proving the source of impugned deposits

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 153C: Compliance with the requirements of s. 153C is mandatory. (i) If the AO of the searched person is different from the AO of the other person, the AO of the searched person is required to transmit the satisfaction note & seized documents to the AO of the other person. He is also required to make a note in the file of the searched person that he has done so. However, the same is for administrative convenience and the failure by the AO of the searched person to make a note in the file of the searched person, will not vitiate the proceedings u/s 153C. (ii) If the AO of the searched person and the other person is the same, it is sufficient for the AO to note in the satisfaction note that the documents seized from the searched person belonged to the other person. Once the note says so, the requirement of s. 153C is fulfilled. In such case, there can be one satisfaction note prepared by the AO, as he himself is the AO of the searched person and also the AO of the other person. However, he must be conscious and satisfied that the documents seized/recovered from the searched person belonged to the other person. In such a situation, the satisfaction note would be qua the other person. The requirement of transmitting the documents so seized from the searched person would not be there as he himself will be the AO of the searched person and the other person and therefore there is no question of transmitting such seized documents to himself

This Court had an occasion to consider the scheme of Section 153C of the Act and the conditions precedent to be fulfilled/complied with before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act in the case of Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 6 SCC 444 as well as by the Delhi High Court in the case of Pepsi Food Pvt. Ltd (367) ITR 112 (Delhi). As held, before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act, the Assessing Officer of the searched person must be “satisfied” that, inter alia, any document seized or requisitioned “belongs to” a person other than the searched person. That thereafter, after recording such satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, he may transmit the records/documents/things/papers etc. to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of such other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional Assessing Officer may proceed 7 to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessment under Section 158BD of the Act and the other provisions of Chapter XIV-B shall apply.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 19, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 12AA: Registration can be applied for by a newly registered trust. There is no stipulation that the trust should have already been in existence and should have undertaken any activities before making the application for registration. The term ‘activities’ in s. 12AA includes ‘proposed activities’. The CIT must consider whether the objects of the Trust are genuinely charitable in nature and whether the activities which the Trust proposed to carry on are genuine in the sense that they are in line with the objects of the Trust. However, he cannot refuse registration on the ground that no activities are carried out

Since section 12AA pertains to the registration of the Trust and not to assess of what a trust has actually done, we are of the view that the term ‘activities’ in the provision includes ‘proposed activities’. That is to say, a Commissioner is bound to consider whether the objects of the Trust are genuinely charitable in nature and whether the activities which the Trust proposed to carry on are genuine in the sense that they are in line with the objects of the Trust. In contrast, the position would be different where the Commissioner proposes to cancel the registration of a Trust under sub-section (3) of section 12AA of the Act. There the Commissioner would be bound to record the finding that an activity or activities actually carried on by the Trust are not genuine being not in accordance with the objects of the Trust. Similarly, the situation would be different where the trust has before applying for registration found to have undertaken activities contrary to the objects of the Trust.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 80-IA(4): As per s. 575 of the Companies Act, the conversion of a partnership firm into a company under Part IX causes a statutory vesting of all assets of the firm into the company without the need for a conveyance. The business of the firm is carried on by the company and the latter is eligible for the benefits of s. 80-IA.

It is manifest that all properties, movable and immovable (including actionable claims) belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration would vest in the company as incorporated under the Act. In other words, the property acquired by a promoter can be claimed by the company after its incorporation without any need for conveyance on account of statutory vesting. On such statutory vesting, all the properties of the firm, in law, vest in the company and the firm is succeeded by the company. The firm ceases to exist and assumes the status of a company after its registration as a company. A priori, it must follow that the business is carried on by the enterprise owned by a company registered in India and the agreement entered into between the erstwhile partnership firm and the State Government, by legal implication, assumes the character of an agreement between the company registered in India and the State Government for (i) developing, (ii) maintaining and operating or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating a new infrastructure facility.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 14, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 90(3): The law laid down in PVAL Kulandagan Chettiar 267 ITR 654 (SC) that once an income of an Indian assessee is taxable in the treaty partner source jurisdiction under a treaty provision, the same cannot be included in its total income taxable in India as well i.e. the residence jurisdiction, is no longer good law in view of s. 90(3) inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2004 read with Notification no. 91 of 2008 dated 28.08.2008. The substitution of s. 90 w.e.f. 01.10.2009 does not affect the validity of the said Notification. The mere amendment or substitution of a section does not affect the validity of notifications, circulars and instructions issued therein (all imp judgements referred).

The effect of Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in PVAL Kulandagan Chettiar 267 ITR 654 (SC) thus was clearly overruled by the legislative developments. It was specifically legislated that the mere fact of taxability in the treaty partner jurisdiction will not take it out of the ambit of taxable income of an assessee in India and that “such income shall be included in his total income chargeable to tax in India in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), and relief shall be granted in accordance with the method for elimination or avoidance of double taxation provided in such agreement”.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 28, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 92A(2): The law in Diageo India Pvt Ltd 47 SOT 252 that the definition of "Associated Enterprises" in section 92A(1)(a) & (b) is the basic rule which is unaffected by the specific instances referred to in s. 92A(2) is not good law in view of the amendment by the FA 2002 and CBDT Circular No. 8 dated 27.08.2008. The correct law as held in Veer Gems 95 taxmann.16 (Guj) is that S. 92A(2) restricts the scope of S. 92A(1) and it is only when the criterion specified in sub section (2) is satisfied, two enterprises can be treated as associated enterprises. Judgements of non jurisdictional High Courts are binding on the Tribunal

Section 92A(2) governs the operation of Section 92A(1) by controlling the definition of participation in management or capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise. If a form of participation in management, capital or control is not recognized by Section 92A(2), even if it ends up in de facto or even de jure participation in management, capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise, it does not result in the related enterprises being treated as ‘associated enterprises’. Section 92A(1) and (2), in that sense, are required to be read together, even though Section 92A(2) does provide several deeming fictions which prima facie stretch the basic rule in Section 92A(1) quite considerably on the basis of, what appears to be, manner of participation in “control” of the other enterprise. What is thus clear that as long as the provisions of one of the clauses in Section 92A(2) are not satisfied, even if an enterprise has a de facto participation capital, management or control over the other enterprises, the two enterprises cannot be said to be associated enterprises

Read more ›