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DATE: February 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 54: The expression “cost of the residential house so purchased” in s. 54 is not confined to the cost of civil construction but includes furniture and fixtures if they are an integral part of the purchase. The fact that the assessee did not make the claim is no reason to deny the claim if he is otherwise entitled to it (Scope of Srinivas R Desai 155 TTJ 743 (Ahd) expanded)

The expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” and it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. There are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well

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DATE: November 7, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 54B Exemption: The fact that the investment and document is registered is made in the name of the spouse (wife) is not a ground for disallowing exemption from capital gains u/s 54B if the funds utilized for the investment belong to the assessee. Contra view in Kalya 251 CTR 174 (Raj) not followed

It is true that the contentions which have been raised by the department is that the investment is made by the assessee in his own name but the legislature while using language has not used specific language with precision and the second reason is that view has also been taken by the Delhi High Court that it can be in the name of wife. In that view of the matter, the contention raised by the assessee is required to be accepted with regard to Section 54B regarding investment

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DATE: December 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 54: Acquisition of new flat in an apartment under construction should be considered as a case of “Construction” and not “Purchase”. The date of commencement of construction is not relevant for purpose of s. 54. The fact that the construction may have commenced prior to the date of transfer of the old asset is irrelevant. If the construction is completed within 3 years from the date of transfer, the exemption is available

For the purpose of sec. 54 of the Act, we have to see whether the assessee has completed the construction within three years from the date of transfer of old asset. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the assessee took possession of the new flat within three years from the date of sale of old residential flat. Accordingly, we are of the view that the assessee has complied with the time limit prescribed u/s 54 of the Act. Since the amount invested in the new flat prior to the due date for furnishing return of income was more than the amount of capital gain, the requirements of depositing any money under capital gains account scheme does not arise in the instant case. Further, the Hon’ble High Court has held in the case of ITO Vs. K.C.Gopalan (2000)(162 CTR 0566) that there is no requirement that the sale proceeds realised on sale of old residential house alone should be utilised

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DATE: August 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 80-IA: Difference between 'manufacturing' and 'production' explained. The word ‘production’ has a wider connotation in comparison to ‘manufacture’. Any activity which brings a commercially new product into existence constitutes production. The process of bottling of LPG renders it capable of being marketed as a domestic kitchen fuel and, thereby, makes it a viable commercial product

At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid provisions of the Act use both the expressions, namely, ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’. It also becomes clear after reading these provisions that an assessee whose process amounts to either ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ (i.e. one of these two and not both) would become entitled to the benefits enshrined therein. It is held by this Court in Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC) that the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’. The two expressions, thus, have different connotation. Significantly, Arihant Tiles judgment decides that cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs does not amount to manufacture. At the same time, it clarifies that it would be relevant for the purpose of the Central Excise Act. When it comes to interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act (which was involved in the said case), the Court was categorical in pointing out that the aforesaid interpretation of ‘manufacture’ in the context of Central Excise Act would not apply while interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act as this provision not only covers those assessees which are involved in the process of manufacture but also those who are undertaking ‘production’ of the goods

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 54F: U/s 161, a trust which is for the sole benefit of an individual, has to be assessed as an “individual” and not as an “AOP”. Consequently, a trust is eligible for s. 54F deduction

The issue is as to whether the assessee trust, which is for the sole benefit of an individual, will be entitled to deduction u/s. 54F or not, when its status is that of A.O.P. As per Section 54F the benefits of this section is available to individual or Hindu undivided family (HUF). Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Mrs. Amy F. Cama vs. CIT 237 ITR 82 has elaborately considered the same issue. The jurisdictional High Court was dealing with assessee trust’s claim for deduction for purchase price of the flat from capital gain as per Section 54 of the Act. The Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court has held that the assessee trust was entitled for the same. The Hon’ble Court had expounded that Section 161 of the I.T Act, 1961, makes a representative assessee subject to the same duties, responsibilities and liabilities as if the income was received by him beneficially. The fiction is created as it was never the object or intention of the Act to charge tax upon persons other than the beneficial owner of the income. Whatever benefits the beneficiary will get in the said assessment must be made available to the trustee while assessing him under section 161

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DATE: April 26, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 54/ 54F: There is no requirement that the investment in the new residential house should be situated in India prior to the amendment by the Finance (Nos.2) Act, 2014 w.e.f. 01/04/2015

A similar situation, though in the context of section 54F of the Act, has been considered by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Smt.Leena J. Shah (supra); notably, so far as the impugned issue is concerned, the requirement of sections 54F & 54F of the Act is pari-materia, inter-alia, requiring the assessee to make investment in a new residential house in order to avail the exemption on the capital gains earned. As per the Hon’ble High Court, prior to the amendment the only stipulation was to invest in a new residential property and that there was no scope for importing the requirement of making such investment in a residential property located in India

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 10(37) Capital Gains: Meaning of "compulsory acquisition" under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 explained. The fact that the assessee entered into a settlement with the Collector regarding the compensation amount does not mean that the acquisition was not "compulsory" if the prescribed procedure was followed. Info Park Kerala vs. ACIT (2008) 4 KLT 782 overruled

It goes without saying that had steps not been taken by the Government under Sections 4 & 6 followed by award under Section 9 of the LA Act, the appellant would not have agreed to divest the land belonging to him to Techno Park. He was compelled to do so because of the compulsory acquisition and to avoid litigation entered into negotiations and settled the final compensation. Merely because the compensation amount is agreed upon would not change the character of acquisition from that of compulsory acquisition to the voluntary sale. It may be mentioned that this is now the procedure which is laid down even under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as per which the Collector can pass rehabilitation and resettlement award with the consent of the parties/land owners. Nonetheless, the character of acquisition remains compulsory

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DATE: December 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 54EC: Investment in specified bonds from the amounts received as an advance is eligible for s. 54EC deduction. The fact that the investment is made prior to the transfer of the asset is irrelevant

Thus, these amounts when received as advance under an Agreement to Sale of a capital asset are invested in specified bonds the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act is available. Moreover, on almost identical facts, this Court in Parveen P. Bharucha Vs. DCIT, 348 ITR 325, held that the earnest money received on sale of asset, when invested in specified bonds under Section 54EC of the Act, is entitled to the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act. This was in the context of reopening of an assessment and reliance was placed upon CBDT Circular No. 359 dated 10th May, 1983 in the context of Section 54E of the Act

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 10(23C)(vi)/ (via)/ 80G: The law laid down in Visvesvaraya Technological University vs. ACIT 384 ITR 37 (SC) is that the generation of surplus is not fatal to the grant of exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi)(via)/ 80G if such surplus is utilized for charitable purposes. The fact that the hospital charges of the assessee, as compared to other commercial establishments, are very nominal, throws further light on its charitable character

In view of the findings of the Apex Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its judgment in Visvesvaraya’s case (supra), as reproduced earlier, we unhesitantly conclude that even if substantial surplus is generated, but the same is found to have been ploughed back for building infrastructure/assets, which in turn are used for educational/charitable purposes, the institution would not lose its charitable character. In the case before us, it has not been disputed that the assessee is registered under Section 12A and that it has been held entitled to the grant of exemption under Section 10 (23C)(vi) of the Act as per orders of this Court passed in C.W.P. No. 6031 of 2009, upheld by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 9606 of 2013. It has further come on record that the assessee was granted exemption under Section 80G of the Act from the year 1997 till the passing of the impugned order. Further, the finding of the Tribunal, that the assessee has never mis-utilized its funds, has not been assailed before us. The generated surplus having been ploughed back for expansion purposes also remains undisputed by the Revenue as no challenge to the same has been made. In fact, the utilization of surplus for large scale expansion at the behest of the assessee was also acknowledged by the Commissioner. The Tribunal had further detailed in its order the receipts, expenditure, capital expenditure, income/surplus of receipts over expenditure, income applied for the charitable purposes and percentage of the income applied in a tabulated form, which clearly depicted utilization of surplus by the assessee for only charitable purposes

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 29, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 2(15)/11: Impact of the amendment to the definition of "charitable purpose" in s. 2(15) by insertion of a proviso by the Finance Act, 2008 and whether it supersedes the verdicts in Loka Shikshana Trust 101 ITR 234 (SC), Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs. Association 121 ITR 1 (SC) etc explained

If the legislature intended the latter part of the proviso to apply to the word “advancement” as well and not merely to the words “object of general public utility”, it would have worded the amendment entirely differently. The proviso would have expressly been made applicable to the advancement as well as to the object of general public utility. That the legislature did not do so is an indication that it accepted the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Section 2(15) as it originally stood and retained the effect of the section in that regard in the 2009 amendment. The ratio of the judgment in Surat Art Silk’s case (supra), in this regard, therefore, remains the same

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