Category: All Judgements

Archive for the ‘All Judgements’ Category


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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 26, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The service of notice u/s 143(2) within the statutory time limit is mandatory and is not an inconsequential procedural requirement. Omission to issue notice u/s 143(2) is not curable and the requirement cannot be dispensed with. S. 143(2) is applicable to proceedings u/s 147 & 148. While the Proviso to s. 148 protects and grants liberty to the Revenue to serve notice u/s 143(2) before passing of the assessment order for returns furnished on or before 1.10.2005, in respect of returns filed pursuant to notice u/s 148 after 1.10.2005, it is mandatory to serve notice u/s 143(2) within the stipulated time limit (Hotel Blue Moon 321 ITR 362 (SC) referred)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2012 (Date of publication)
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Though, prima facie, the Rule appears to be a correct notification supposedly issued in public interest in line with the rules and practice clamping ban on the legal practice by the retired judges of High Court in the courts where they remain posted as permanent judge and the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court, however, it appears to be offensive in two respects; namely, that the retired members have been completely barred from practice before the Tribunal, and secondly, that the aforesaid rule 13E has been interpreted to apply retrospectively in the judgment rendered in the case of Concept Creations vs. ACIT 120 ITD 19 (Delhi) (Special Bench) by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, beyond its pale of competence as it has the jurisdiction to decide only the matters relating to tax appeals as contained in the Income Tax Act vide Sections 253 and 254 thereof

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 21, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The fact that by virtue of the Explanation to s. 80IA added with retrospective effect from 1.4.2000, income derived from the works contract would not qualify for deduction u/s 80IA does not mean that an assessment can be reopened beyond 4 years without there being any failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts (Sadbhav Engineering 333 ITR 483(Guj) followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2012 (Date of publication)
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The High Court’s finding that, applying the “nature and character of the transaction” test, the transfer of the CGP share was not adequate in itself to achieve the object of consummating the transaction between HTIL and VIH and that there was a transfer of other “rights and entitlements” which were “capital assets” is not correct because the transaction was one of “share sale” and not an “asset sale”. It had to be viewed from a commercial and realistic perspective. As it was not a case of sale of assets on itemized basis, the entire structure, as it existed, ought to have been looked at holistically. A transfer of shares lock, stock and barrel cannot be broken up into separate individual components, assets or rights such as right to vote, right to participate in company meetings, management rights, controlling rights, control premium, brand licences and so on as shares constitute a bundle of rights. The sum of US$ 11.08 bn was paid for the “entire package” and it was not permissible to split the payment and consider a part of it towards individual items (Mugneeram Bangur 57 ITR 299 (SC) followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2012 (Date of publication)
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In view of the two decisions of the Supreme Court which held the field when the return was filed, the claim was patently disallowable. The claim was also not discernible on the face of the record and the details of expenses had to be gone into in order to decipher the claim. The argument that the assessee does not have expertise in taxation matters and so it relied on expert opinion is not acceptable because the opinion was not furnished for accounting purposes. An accountant’s view is not really material for deciding the deductibility or otherwise of an expenditure. The assessee knew about the problem at the time of filing of return, but still made the claim. Not only this, the claim was pursued even up to the level of the CIT (A) in gross disregard for the decision of the Supreme Court, which the assessee came to know at least after receiving the assessment order. Therefore, the claim was not only wrong but also false and it was persisted with for some time. The fact that the assessee did not even seek explanation from the tax auditor or the CA gave the impression that the whole thing was a sham.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 19, 2012 (Date of publication)
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Though the assessee owned the unaccounted transactions only after search action, when an assessee admits his mistake and that he has committed a wrong and offers the additional income to tax, it cannot be said that his statement is false or not bona fide. Neither the CIT (A) nor the Tribunal were completely clear about the exact amount of concealment and there was no conclusive evidence as some additions had been deleted. S. 271(1)(c) gives discretion to the AO to exonerate the assessee from levy of penalty even in case where the assessee has concealed the income or furnished incorrect particulars of income. Penalty should not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. The AO has to exercise his discretion judiciously. If an assessee files a revised return though at a later stage or discloses true income, penalty need not be levied. No doubt, merely offering additional income will not automatically protect the assessee from levy of penalty but in a given case where the assessee came forward with additional income though after detection because he was not in a position to explain the seized material properly and expresses remorse in his conduct un-hesitantly, the AO has to exercise the discretion in favour of such assessee as otherwise the expression ‘may’ in s. 271(1)(c) becomes redundant. In a case of admitted income, concealment penalty is not automatic. The discretion vested in the AO should be used not to levy penalty. On facts, the case was most befitting to exercise such discretion because there was divergent opinion while deleting or sustaining the addition and there was no conclusive proof that the assessee concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee’s offer was to avoid litigation. If the AO had clinching evidence of concealment, he should not have accepted the assessee’s offer and should have proceeded on the basis of material on record (VIP Industries 112 TTJ 289, Siddharth Enterprises 184 TM 460 (P&H) & Reliance Petro Products 322 ITR 158 (SC) followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 16, 2012 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

S. 80IB(10) allows deduction to an undertaking engaged in the business of developing and constructing housing projects. There is no requirement that the land must be owned by the assessee seeking the deduction. Under the development agreement, the assessee had undertaken the development of housing project at its own risk and cost. The land owner had accepted the full price of the land and had no responsibility. The entire risk of investment and expenditure was that of the assessee. Resultantly, profit and loss also accrued to the assessee alone. The assessee had total and complete control over the land and could put the land to the agreed use. It had full authority and responsibility to develop the housing project by not only putting up the construction but by carrying out various other activities including enrolling members, accepting members, carrying out modifications engaging professional agencies and so on. The risk element was entirely that of the assessee. The assessee was a “developer” in common parlance as well as legal parlance and could not be regarded as only a “works contractor”. The Explanation to s. 80IB inserted w.r.e.f 1.4.2001 has no application as the project is not a “works contract”. Further, as the assessee was, in part performance of the agreement to sell the land, given possession and had also carried out the construction work for development of the housing project, it had to be deemed to be the “owner” u/s 2(47)(v) r.w.s. 53A of the TOP Act even though formal title had not passed (Faqir Chand Gulati vs. Uppal Agencies (2008) 10 SCC 345 distinguished)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2012 (Date of publication)
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Rule 10B(e)(iii) provides that “the profit margin arising in comparable uncontrolled transactions has to be adjusted to take into account the differences, if any between the international transaction and the comparable uncontrolled transactions, or between the enterprises entering into such transactions, which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin in the open market“. While the “differences” are not specified, it covers “any differences” which could materially affect the amount of net profit margin. The litmus test to be applied is if the ‘difference, if any, is capable of affecting the NPM in open market? If yes, then the TPO is under statutory obligation to eliminate such differences. The revenue cannot say that difference is likely to exist in all accounts and so the demands of the assessee should be ignored. The revenue’s stand that the assessee is ineligible for any adjustments if he provides the set of comparable is not correct because under Rule 10(3) it is the duty of the AO/TPO/DRP to minimize/eliminate the difference which is likely to materially affect the price. It is the settled proposition that ‘working capital’ adjustment is an adjustment that is required to be made in TNMM. The revenue’s contention that the ‘differences’ specified should refer to only (i) the factor of demand and supply; (ii) existence of marketable intangibles i.e. brand name etc; (iii) geographical location and the like is not acceptable. Further, as the difference in the Arm’s length Operating Margin of the Comparables before and after making the adjustment for working capital was up to 3.77%, it was “material” and had to be eliminated (Mentor Graphics 109 ITD 101 (Del), E-gain Communication 118 ITD 243 (Pune) Sony India 114 ITD 448 (Del) & TNT India followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2012 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

S. 72 (1) allows brought forward business loss to be set-off against the “profits & gains of any business or profession” of the subsequent year. The expression “profits & gains of business” means income earned out of business carried on by the assessee and not just income connected in some way to the business or profession carried on by the assessee. The land & building were fixed & capital assets used by the assessee for its business purposes. The gains arising there from were assessable as capital gains and were not eligible for set-off against the brought forward business loss u/s 72 (Express Newspapers 53 ITR 250 (SC) followed; Cocanada Radhaswami Bank 55 ITR 17(SC) distinguished; Steelcon Industries reversed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2012 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

In order to constitute a PE under Article 5(1) & 5(2), three criteria are required to be satisfied viz; physical criterion (existence), functionality criterion (carrying out of business through that place of physical location) & subjective criterion (right to use that place). There must exist a physical “location”, the enterprise must have the “right” to use that place and the enterprise must “carry on” business through that place. An “agency” PE will not satisfy this condition because the enterprise will not have the “right” to use the place of the agent. Under Article 5(6) of the India-French DTAA (which is at variance with the UN & OECD Model Conventions), even a wholly dependent agent is to be treated as an independent agent unless if it is shown that the transactions between him and the enterprise are not at arms’ length. The Department’s argument that as the AO had not examined whether the transactions were done in arm’s length conditions, the matter should be restored to him is not acceptable because the onus was on the Revenue to demonstrate that the assessee had a PE. The onus is greater where the very foundation of DAPE rested on the negative finding that the transactions between the agent and the enterprise were not made under at arms length conditions. A negative finding about transactions with the dependent agent not being at ALP is sine qua non for existence of a DAPE under the India-France DTAA. The AO could not be granted a fresh inning for making roving and fishing enquiries whether the transactions were at arm’s length conditions or not