Under Rule 5 of the BSE Rules, membership is a personal permission from the Exchange which is nothing but a “licence” which enables the member to exercise rights and privileges attached thereto. It is this licence which enables the member to trade on the floor of the Exchange and to participate in the trading session on the floor of the Exchange. It is this licence which enables the member to access the market. Therefore, the right of membership, which includes right of nomination, is a “licence” or “akin to a licence” which is one of the items which falls in s. 32(1)(ii). The right to participate in the market has an economic and money value. It is an expense incurred by the assessee which satisfies the test of being a “licence” or “any other business or commercial right of similar nature” in terms of s. 32(1)(ii)

The Karnataka High Court in CIT vs. Samsung Electronics 320 ITR 209 misunderstood the observations in Transmission Corporation of AP 239 ITR 387. The only issue raised in that case was whether TDS was applicable only to pure income payments and not to composite payments which had an element of income embedded in them. The controversy was different and the Court held that if some part of the payment was taxable, an application u/s 195(2) had to be made. The High Court’s interpretation completely loses sight of the plain words of s. 195(1) which in clear terms lays down that tax at source is deductible only from “sums chargeable” under the Act i.e. chargeable u/s 4, 5 and 9

The scheme of settlement does not contemplate revision of the income so disclosed in the application. If an assessee is permitted to revise his disclosure, in essence, he would be making a fresh application in relation to the same case by withdrawing the earlier application. S. 245C (3) prohibits the withdrawal of an application. An assessee cannot be permitted to resile from his stand at any stage during the proceedings. By revising the application, the applicant would be achieving something indirectly what he cannot otherwise achieve directly and in the process rendering s. 245 (3) otiose and meaningless. As there is no stipulation for revision of an application filed u/s 245C(1), the natural corollary is that determination of income by the Settlement Commission has necessarily to be with reference to the income disclosed in the application

On the larger issue of whether criticism of a judicial body amount to contempt, fair criticism of the system of administration of justice or functioning of institutions or authorities entrusted with the task of deciding rights of the parties gives an opportunity to the operators of the system/institution to remedy the wrong and also bring about improvements. Such criticism cannot be castigated as an attempt to scandalize or lower the authority of the Court or other judicial institutions or as an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice except when such criticism is ill motivated or is construed as a deliberate attempt to run down the institution or an individual Judge is targeted for extraneous reasons. Ordinarily, the Court would not use the power to punish for contempt for curbing the right of freedom of speech and expression, which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Only when the criticism of judicial institutions transgresses all limits of decency and fairness or there is total lack of objectivity or there is deliberate attempt to denigrate the institution then the Court would use this power