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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: The fact that the assessee did not disclose the material is not relevant if the AO was otherwise aware of it. If the AO had the information during the assessment proceeding, irrespective of the source, but chooses not to utilize it, he cannot allege that the assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts & reopen the assessment (Scope of Explanation 1 to S. 147 explained)

As per this Explanation thus, production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 147. Here is not a case where the Assessee is seeking to rely on a disclosure which the Revenue can seek to bring within the fold of the said Explanation. Here is a case where the Department already had collected certain documents and materials which were before the Assessing Officer at the time of framing assessment. If the Assessing Officer did not, for some reason, advert to such material or did not utilize the same, he surely cannot allege that the Assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts.

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 148 Reopening: As per settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid. The fact that the AO was not informed of the death before issue of notice is irrelevant. Consequently, the s. 148 notice is set aside and order of assessment stands annulled (Alamelu Veerappan 257 TM 72 (Mad) followed)

There are several judgments of different High Courts holding that the notice or reopening of assessment is invalid in law. It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments on the point. Suffice it to say, as per the settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid

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DATE: March 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C Capital Gains: The assessee cannot avoid the impact of s. 50C by claiming that his s. 54EC investment is large enough to cover the deemed consideration based on stamp duty valuation. Such interpretation renders s. 50C redundant

The deeming fiction under section 50C of the Act, must be given its full effect and the Court should not allow to boggle the mind while giving full effect to such fiction. We are not opposing the proposition canvassed by the Counsel of the Assessee that deeming fiction must be applied in relation to the situation for which it is created. However, while giving full effect to the deeming fiction contained under section 50C of the Act for the purpose of computation of the capital gain under section 48, for which section 50C is specifically enacted, the automatic fallout thereof would be that the computation of the assessee’s capital gain and consequently the computation of exemption under section 54EC, shall have to be worked out on the basis of substituted deemed sale consideration of transfer of capital asset in terms of section 50C of the Act

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 281B Tax Recovery: Dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue. They should apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as binding decisions. The petitioner is being singled out for unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000 to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment

We have to express our dismay at the conduct of the Officers of the Revenue in this matter. We pride ourselves as a State which believes in rule of law. Therefore, the least that is expected of the Officers of the State is to apply the law equally to all and not be over zealous in seeking to collect the revenue ignoring the statutory provisions as well as the binding decisions of this Court. The action of respondent nos.1 and 2 as adverted to in para 14 herein above clearly indicates that a separate set of rules was being applied by them in the case of the petitioner. Equal protection of law which means equal application of law has been scarified in this case by the Revenue. It appears that the S.R.JOSHI 21 of 22 WP-543-2018 petitioner is being singled out for this unfair treatment. The desire to collect more revenue cannot be at the expense of Rule of law. In the above view, we direct the Respondent-Revenue to pay cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty thousand only) to the Petitioner for the unnecessary harassment, it had to undergo at the hands of the Revenue

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DATE: March 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 194H TDS: Payment gateway charges paid to a bank for swiping credit cards are in the nature of fees for banking services and not "commission" or "brokerage". Accordingly, no TDS is deductible from the said charges u/s 194H and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made (JDS Apparels 370 ITR 454 (Del) followed)

The bank in question is not concerned with buying or selling of goods or even with the reason and cause as to why the card was swiped. It is not bothered or concerned with the quality, price, nature, quantum etc. of the goods bought/sold. The bank merely provides banking services in the form of payment and subsequently collects the payment. The amount punched in the swiping machine is credited to the account of the retailer by the acquiring bank, i.e. HDFC in this case, after retaining a small portion of the same as their charges. The banking services cannot be covered and treated as services rendered by an agent for the principal during the course of buying or selling of goods as the banker does not render any service in the nature of agency.

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 45(4): If new partners come into the partnership and bring cash by way of capital contribution and the retiring partners take cash and retire, the retiring partners are not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquish is their share in the partnership. As there is no transfer of a capital asset, no capital gains or profit can arise & s. 45(4) has no application (A. N. Naik 265 ITR 346 (Bom) distinguished, Dynamic Enterprises 359 ITR 83 (Karn) [FB] followed)

The property belongs to the partnership firm. It did not belong to the partners. The partners only had a share in the partnership asset. When the five partners came into the partnership and brought cash by way of capital contribution to the extent of their contribution, they were entitled to the proportionate share in the interest in the partnership firm. When the retiring partners took cash and retired, they were not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquished is their share in the partnership. Therefore, there is no transfer of a capital asset, as such, no capital gains or profit arises in the facts of this case. In that view of the matter, Section 45(4) has no application to the facts of this case

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DATE: March 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 10(38) Bogus Capital Gains from Penny Stocks: It is intriguing is that the company had meagre resources and reported consistent losses. The astronomical growth of the value of company’s shares naturally excited the suspicions of the Revenue. The company was even directed to be delisted from the stock exchange. The assessee’s argument that he was denied the right to cross-examine the individuals whose statements led to the inquiry and ultimate disallowance of the long term capital gain claim is not relevant in the wake of findings of fact

There was a specific information that assessee has indulged in non-genuine and bogus capital gain obtained from the transactions of purchase and sale of shares of M/s Kappac Pharma Ltd., a Mumbai based company. It is noticed that the purchase transaction has been done off market in physical form by paying cash. The assessee has purchased the share M/s Kappac Pharma Ltd. in physical form and thereafter, the same have been converted into electronic mode. The purchase payments were made in cash and not through the normal banking channel therefore the same were non verifiable from the authentic supporting details such as bank account/ documents. Assessee is not a regular investor in shares. The assessee has failed to furnish the proof of source for the purchase transactions. Thus, the entire transactions are against human probability

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: Merely because the investment was considerably large and several corporate structures were either created or came into play in routing the investment in the assessee through a Mauritius entity would not be sufficient to brand the transaction as colourable device. The assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of source (PCIT Vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) referred)

As is well known in the context of Section 68 of the Act, the basic duty would be on the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction, credit worthiness of the investor and the source of funds. Equally well settled principle through series of judgments is that the Department cannot insist on the assessee establishing source of the source.

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DATE: March 19, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: Merely because the High Court has admitted the Appeal and framed substantial questions of law, it cannot be said that the entire issue is debatable one and under no circumstances, penalty could be imposed (CIT vs. Dharamshi B. Shah 366 ITR 140 (Guj) followed)

Admission of a tax appeal by the High Court, in majority cases, is ex parte and without recording even prima facie reasons. Whether ex parte or after by-parte hearing, unless some other intention clearly emerges from the order itself, admission of a tax appeal by the High Court only indicates the court’s opinion that the issue presented before it required further consideration. It is an indication of the opinion of the High Court that there is a prima facie case made out and the questions are required to be decided after admission. Mere admission of an appeal by the High Court cannot without there being anything further, be an indication that the issue is debatable one so as to delete the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act

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