Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


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DATE: September 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 158BC: Action of the Revenue in issuing s. 158BC notice despite the appraisal report clearly stating that no incriminating material was found is highly deplorable as it amounts to harassment of the taxpayer. The Officers cannot act on their whim and fancy. The Dept should adopt a SOP to provide adequate safeguards before issuing notices under Ch. XVIB. Chief CIT directed to pay costs to the assessee

We note that this action on the part of the revenue to issue the impugned notice ignoring the appraisal report is highly deplorable. We live in a Country governed by laws. The Officers of the Income Tax Department are obliged to proceed in accordance with the statutory provisions and not on their whim and fancy. The Officers hold power in trust and must ensure that no citizen is harassed by sending him notices, when on the basis on its own record, such notices are not sustainable. We trust that the Income Tax Department would adopt a standard operating procedure which would provide for appropriate safeguards before issuing notices under Chapter XIVB of the Act. This alone would ensure that Officers of the Revenue act in terms of the mandate provided in the Act. In fact, at the very outset, after a preliminary hearing, we had asked the learned Counsel for the Revenue whether the Revenue would still want to persist with the impugned notice under Section 158BC of the Act. On instructions, Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the revenue informed us that the revenue seeks to press the impugned notice and seek dismissal of the present Petition. In the above view, this is the fit case where costs should be awarded to the Petitioner

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DATE: October 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
37(1)/43(5): Loss suffered in foreign exchange transactions entered into for hedging business transactions cannot be disallowed as being “notional” or “speculative” in nature. S. Vinodkumar Diamonds is not good law as it lost sight of Badridas Gauridas 261 ITR 256 (Bom)

It appears that in S. Vinodkumar, the Tribunal held the forward contract on facts before it to be speculative in nature in view of Section 43(5) of the Act. However, it appears that the decision of this court in CIT vs. Badridas Gauridas (P) Ltd. (134) Taxman Pg. 376 was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal when it rendered its decision in S. Vinodkumar (supra). In the above case, this court has held that forward contract in foreign exchange when incidental to carrying on business of cotton exporter and done to cover up losses on account of differences in foreign exchange valuations, would not be speculative activity but a business activity

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DATE: September 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1993-94
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CITATION:
S. 147: Non-supply by the AO of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment (even where the reopening is prior to GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC)) renders the reassessment order bad as being without jurisdiction

An alternative submission is made on behalf of the Revenue that the obligation to supply reasons on the Assessing Officer was consequent to the decision of the Apex Court that GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) rendered in 2003 while, in the present case, the reopening notice is dated 9 December 1996. Thus it submitted at the time when the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued and the time when assessment was completed, there was no such requirement to furnish to the assessee a copy of the reasons recorded. This submission is not correct. We find that the impugned order relies upon the decision of this Court in Seista Steel Construction (P.) Ltd. [1984] 17 Taxman 122(Bom.) when it is held that in the absence of supply of reasons recorded for issue of reopening notice the assessment order would be without jurisdiction and needs to be quashed. The above view as taken by the Tribunal has also been taken by this Court in CIT vs. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2012] 21 Taxmann 53 (Bombay) viz. non-supply of reasons recorded to issue a reopening notice would make the order of Assessment passed thereon bad as being without jurisdiction

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 200A/234E: As the amendment to s. 200A has come into effect on 1.6.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee u/s 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices u/s 200A for payment of fee u/s 234E is without authority of law

It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

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DATE: September 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): While expenditure for purchase of a capital asset is capital expenditure, guarantee commission to acquire the asset on installment terms is revenue expenditure

Expenditure incurred for the purchase of the machinery was undoutedly capital expenditure; for it brought in an asset of enduring advantage. But the guarantee commission stands on a different footing. By itself, it does not bring into existence any asset of an enduring nature; nor did it bring in any other advantage of an enduring benefit. The acquisition of the machinery on installment terms was only a business exigency

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DATE: August 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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S. 54F(4): Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. The fact that the entire amount has been paid to the developer/builder before the last date to file the ROI is irrelevant. Contrary view in K. Ramchandra Rao 277 CTR 0522 (Kar) is sub-silentio and is not good law

The sale of capital asset took place on 29th April, 1995 for a consideration of Rs.85.33 lakhs. The agreement for purchase of construction of flat for consideration of Rs.69.90 lakhs was entered into by the appellant on 16th July, 1996. An amount of Rs.35 lakhs were utilized by the Appellant in purchase of flat before the return of income was filed on 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. However, the mandate under sub Section (4) of Section 54F of the Act is that the amount not utilized towards the purchase of the flat has to be deposited before the due date of filing return of Income under Section 139(1) of the Act in the specified bank account. In this case admittedly the entire amount of capital gains on sale of asset which is not utilized has not been deposited in a specified bank account before due date of filing of return under Section 139(1) of the Act. Therefore where the amounts of capital gains is utilized before filing of the return of income in purchase / construction of a residential house, then the benefit of exemption under Section 54F of the Act is available. Before us it is an undisputed position that except Rs.35 lakhs, the balance of the amounts subject to capital gains tax has not been utilized before date of furnishing of return of income i.e. 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. Therefore, on plain interpretation of Section 54F of the Act, it appears that the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted

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DATE: September 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 80-IB: Fact that the AO allowed s. 80-IB deduction in the year of setting up does not disentitle him from examining the eligibility in subsequent years. As per the CBDT’s low tax effect circular, the tax effect has to be seen each year irrespective of the fact that a common issue arises over several years

An assessee must fulfill each of the conditions stipulated in Section 80-IB in each of the years in which the deduction thereunder is sought. The Assessing Officer would be entitled to ascertain in each of the assessment years whether or not the conditions of Section 80-IB remained fulfilled. In other words, even where an assessee is found to have fulfilled all the conditions of Section 80-IB in the initial assessment year and has on account thereof been granted the deduction thereunder, an Assessing Officer assessing the assessee’s income in subsequent years would be entitled to ascertain whether in that assessment year the conditions in Section 80-IB remained fulfilled or not. If not, he is bound to deny the deduction

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DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 133A: While an assessment cannot be made on the basis of a statement recorded u/s 133A, if the maker of the statement has re-affirmed the statement and nothing has been produced to show that the contents of the statement are incorrect, the assessment is valid

Whatever statement is recorded under Section 133A of the Income-tax Act it is not given any evidentiary value obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary value as contemplated under law. Therefore, there is much force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the statement elicited during the survey operation has not evidentiary value and the Income-tax Officer was well aware of this

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Order of the Tribunal in refusing to follow judgement of the co-ordinate bench in the assessee’s own case (holding that transfer fees and TDR premium received by a cooperative society is not taxable on principles of mutuality) without giving reasons is not justified and is breach of principles of judicial discipline

We are of the view that when an identical issue, which had earlier arisen before the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal on identical facts and a view has been taken on the issue then judicial discipline would demand that a subsequent bench of the Tribunal hearing the same issue should follow the view taken by its earlier Coordinate Bench. No doubt this discipline is subject to the well settled exceptions of the earlier order being passed per incurim or sub silentio or in the meantime, there has been any change in law, either statutory or by virtue of judicial pronouncement. If the earlier order does not fall within the exception which affects its binding character before a coordinate bench of the Tribunal, then it has to follow it. However, if the Tribunal has a view different then the view taken by its Coordinate Bench on an identical issue, then the order taking such a different view must record its reasons as to why it does not follow the earlier order of the Tribunal on an identical issue, which could only be on one of the well settled exceptions which affect the binding nature of the earlier order. It could also depart from the earlier view of the Tribunal if there is difference in facts from the earlier order of Coordinate Bench but the same must be recorded in the order. The impugned order is blissfully silent about the reason why it chooses to ignore the earlier decision of the Tribunal rendered after consideration of Sind Co. Op. Hsg. Society (supra), and take a view contrary to that taken by its earlier Coordinate Bench

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DATE: July 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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Condonation of delay: An appeal wrongly filed before the AO and not CIT(A) is an unintentional lapse of the assessee. The AO ought to have returned the appeal to enable the assessee to take corrective steps. The likelihood of error is inherent in human nature The power of condonation is in view of human fallibility and must be exercised in cases of bona fide lapses

Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err