Article 12(5) of the DTAA defines “fees for technical services” to mean payments in consideration for the rendering of any technical or consultancy services “which make available technical knowledge, experience, etc or consist of the development and transfer of a technical pIan or technical design. To be said to “make available”, the service should be aimed at and result in transmitting technical knowledge etc so that the payer of the service could derive an enduring benefit and utilize the knowledge or know-how on his own in future without the aid of the service provider. In other words, to fit into terminology “making available”, the technical knowledge, skills” etc must remain with the person receiving the service even after the particular contract comes to an end. It is not enough that the services offered are the product of intense technological effort and a lot of technical knowledge and experience of the service provider has gone into it. The technical knowledge or skills of the provider should be imparted to and absorbed by the receiver so that the receiver can deploy similar technology or techniques in the future without depending upon the provider. On facts, while the Dutch company performed the surveys using substantial technical skills, it has not made available the technical expertise in respect of such collection or processing of data to the assessees, which the assessee can apply independently and without assistance and undertake such survey independently. Consequently, the consideration is not assessable as “fees for technical services” (AAR Rulings in Perfetti Van Melle Holding, Shell India & Areva T&D distinguished)

The Tribunal recorded a wrong factual finding that the search warrant did not include the assessee’s name. The Tribunal has not specifically referred to and dealt with the findings of the AO. which are detailed, specific & with reference to several factual aspects, documents, etc. The Tribunal is required to deal with the factual findings recorded by the AO and give its factual conclusions. The factual conclusion should be based upon reasons and should be outcome of analysis and discussion. The Tribunal being the final fact finding authority cannot merely record its conclusions without discussing the factual matrix, evidence and material. Merely stating that the papers etc. do not pertain to the assessee and the contents of the document cannot be utilized, is the conclusion or the final inference which is not sufficient in the light of what has been held by the AO in the block assessment order. The fact that the assessee filed a detailed written synopsis does not mean that the order of the Tribunal meets the legal requirement. The law mandates that the Tribunal should give reasons which are discernible and apparent from the order. What weighed with the Tribunal cannot be assumed in the absence of discussion

To determine whether an assessee is an investor in shares or a dealer in shares, a pragmatic and common sense approach has to be adopted always keeping in mind commercial considerations. The tests have been laid down in Instruction No.4/2007 dated 15.6.2007 & CIT vs. Rewashanker A. Kothari 283 ITR 338 (Guj). On facts, the Tribunal was right that the STCG was not assessable as business profits because (a) the assessee was a salaried employee, (b) He maintained two separate portfolios for investment and trading, (c) the shares were held for periods ranging from 2.4 months to 11 months, (d) though the quantum or total number shares was substantial, the transactions in question were only seven in number and the period of holding was insignificant and small. While the quantum or total number may not be determinative but in a given case keeping in view period of holding may indicate intention to make investment, (e) substantial dividend income had been received, (f) the element of uncertainty and risk is always there in securities and this factor cannot be a determinative factor to decide whether the assessee is trading in shares or is an investor. Some investors do take risk, (g) The ratio of sales and purchase will always be in favour of sales when the sales are sold and (h) in the earlier assessment years, transactions in the investment portfolio were accepted by the AO

The Tribunal finding that “The quantification of the remuneration was apparent from clause 8 of the partnership deed which provided that the remuneration would be payable as per norms fixed by the Income-tax Act. The requirement in law is that remuneration should have been authorized and the amount of remuneration shall not exceed the amount specified in s. 40(b)(v) which uses the word ‘authorised‘ and not the word ‘quantify‘” is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court

There is no requirement in s. 147, 148 or 149 that the reasons recorded should also accompany the notice issued u/s 148. The requirement in s. 149(1) is only that the notice u/s 148 shall be issued. There is no requirement that it should also be served on the assessee before the period of limitation. There is also no requirement in s. 148(2) that the reasons recorded shall be served along with the notice of reopening the assessment. The only mandatory requirement is that before issuing the notice to reopen the assessment the AO shall record his reasons for doing so. After GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC) the AO is duty bound to supply the recorded reasons to the assessee after the assessee files the return in response to the s. 148 notice. Haryana Acrylic turned on the peculiar facts of that case, where two sets of reasons had been recorded by the AO. As the second set of reasons alleging non-disclosure of material facts surfaced for the first time in the affidavit filed by the Revenue before the High Court after the expiry of 6 years, it was held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid. As this is not the fact situation here, the assessee’s plea cannot be accepted

We are constrained to observe about the effort made by us to persuade the Central Government to take steps to prevent generation and circulation of black money. Through a detailed interim order we appraised the Government that unless prohibition is introduced against cash dealings particularly in property sales in film industry and the like against at least for payments over a certain limit in cash, black money generation and circulation cannot be controlled because the disincentives on cash dealings contained under the various provisions of the Income Tax Act have failed to achieve the objective. Further, by prohibiting use of cash in major transactions terror and mafia funding and corruption could be arrested to a large extent. Above all, the worst enemy of our economy that is, circulation of high denomination counterfeit currencies (presently estimated at 7000 crores) could be prevented to a large extent. Unfortunately, the response of the Central Finance Ministry is not at all encouraging in as much as Government wants status quo to continue to the detriment of the economic interest of the country and the people as a whole. Our limitations while exercising appellate jurisdiction u/s 260A inhibit us from initiating any proceedings or issuing direction against the Central Government. However, we express our anguish on the attitude of the Central Government to have created this vicious situation and allow the same to continue

The Tribunal held that the “make available” condition was not satisfied inasmuch as no technical knowledge etc, was made available by the assessee to the Indian insurance companies operating in India. The Tribunal conclusions are based on an assessment of the factual matrix of the case at hand and are factual in nature. As there is no perversity in the findings, it does not give rise to a substantial question of law

The question whether an agreement is a finance agreement or an operating lease cannot be decided by merely looking at the title of the agreement or the nomenclature given to the said agreement. The terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement may be relevant but the surrounding circumstances & type and nature of the asset have also to be considered. There is a difference between a finance agreement and an operational lease. A finance lease is one where the lessee uses the asset for substantially the whole of its useful life and the lease payments are calculated to cover the full cost together with interest charges. It is thus a disguised way of purchasing the asset with the help of a loan. An operating lease is any other type of lease where the asset is not wholly amortised during the non-cancellable period, if any, of the lease and where the lessor does not rely for his profit on the rentals in the non-cancellable period. This distinction has been explained in Asea Brown Boveri Ltd vs. IFCI (2004) 12 SCC 570, Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies vs. UOI (2011) 2 SCC 352 & Sundaram Finance Ltd vs. Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1178. As the Tribunal has not considered the issue from the right perspective, matter remanded

S. 10A is a deduction provision and not an exemption provision. S. 10A has to be given effect to at the stage of computing the profits and gains of business. This is anterior to the application of the provisions of s. 72 which deals with the carry forward and set off of business losses. A distinction has been made by the Legislature while incorporating the provisions of Chapter VI-A. S. 80A(1) stipulates that in computing the total income of an assessee, there shall be allowed from his gross total income, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Chapter, the deductions specified in s. 80C to 80U. S. 80B(5) defines for the purposes of Chapter VI-A “gross total income” to mean the total income computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, before making any deduction under the Chapter. What the Revenue in essence seeks to attain is to telescope the provisions of Chapter VI-A in the context of the deduction which is allowable u/s 10A, which would not be permissible unless a specific statutory provision to that effect were to be made. In the absence thereof, such an approach cannot be accepted. Accordingly, the decision of the Tribunal is affirmed since it is plain and evident that the deduction u/s 10A has to be given at the stage when the profits and gains of business are computed in the first instance (Hindustan Unilever Ltd vs. DCIT 325 ITR 102 (Bom) followed)

Q whether the s. 127(2) transfer order is invalid for want of reasons referred to Full Bench The CIT, Valsad, passed an order u/s 127(2) centralizing the assessee’s case from Vapi to Surat “to facilitate coordinated and effective investigation”. The …

Millenniun Houseware vs. CIT (Gujarat High Court) Read More »