A Co-op Hsg Society is not a mutual association because its members can earn income from its property. The transfer fee and TDR premium charged by the Society from its members is a commercial transaction and not eligible for exemption on grounds of mutuality

There are three objections to treating a co-op housing society as a mutual concern. The first objection is that while a mutual concern cannot lead to any profit for the members, a member of a co-op housing society can earn income from the property such as by letting. The contributors, by virtue of their membership, obtain a valuable capital asset in their own hands, i.e., the leasehold right in the plots allotted to them, as well as the interest in the super structure. They may encash or capitalize on or even trade on the property. Such valuable rights that inure to the members are separate and distinct from the rights that vest in them as a part of the class of contributors and militates against the very notion of mutuality, which in its concept and operation cannot yield any income to them in their individual capacity. The second objection is that the assessee’s activities of charging premium at one half the amount of the premium received by the transferor-member from the transferee-member is a commercial transaction. As such, not only does the arrangement lead to creation and holding of wealth/property by the individual-members, it allows them to encash or otherwise exploit it, paying the society its share. That is, the society also partakes of the profit arising on the subsequent transfer by a member, to the extent of 50% thereof. The third objection is that the policy of allowing the individual members to purchase TDRs from outside and load them on to their existing structures and of allowing non-members residing in the flats built by the members on their plots to have access to and enjoy the common facilities means that there is a break-down in the identity between the contributors and participants and violates another basic condition of mutuality that there must be no dealings with the non-members

TDS Credit must be given even if TDS Certificate is not available/ entry is not shown in Form 26AS

The AO is not justified in denying credit for TDS on the ground that the TDS is not reflected in the computer generated Form 26AS. In Yashpal Sahwney 293 ITR 539the Bombay High Court has noted the difficulty faced by taxpayers in the matter of credit of TDS and held that even if the deductor had not issued a TDS certificate, still the claim of the assessee has to be considered on the basis of the evidence produced for deduction of tax at source. The Revenue is empowered to recover tax from the person responsible if he had not deducted tax at source or after deducting failed to deposit with Central Government. The Delhi High Court has in Court On Its Own Motion Vs. CIT 352 ITR 273 directed the department to ensure that credit is given to the assessee even where the deductor had failed to upload the correct details in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced before the department. Therefore, the department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where the deductor had not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

S. 50B: Transfer of assets via amalgamation without monetary consideration is not a “slump sale”

S. 2(42C) defines a ‘slump sale’ to mean the transfer of one or more undertakings as a result of the sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities in such sales. A plain reading of s. 2(42C) makes it clear that to qualify as a slump sale, two conditions have to be satisfied viz., (i) there must be transfer of one or more undertakings as a result of sale and (ii) the sale should be for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities. The presence of money consideration is an essential element to a transaction of sale. If the consideration is not money but some other valuable consideration it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale. In the present case, as no monetary consideration was received by the assessee for transfer of the assets and liabilities of the manufacturing division to Novapan Industries Ltd, the transaction is not a “slump sale” and does not attract s. 50B (Motors and General Stores 66 ITR 692 (SC), R.R. Ramakrishna Pillai 66 ITR 725 & Avaya Global Connect 26 SOT 397 (Mum) followed)

S. 147/ 151: Merely writing “approved” in the sanction form without recording satisfaction renders the reopening void

S. 147 and 148 are a charter to the Revenue to reopen earlier assessments and are, therefore protected by safeguards against unnecessary harassment of the assessee. They are sword for the Revenue and shield for the assessee. S. 151 guards that the sword of S. 147 may not be used unless a superior officer is satisfied that the AO has good and adequate reasons to invoke the provisions of S. 147. The superior authority has to examine the reasons, material or grounds and to judge whether they are sufficient and adequate to the formation of the necessary belief on the part of the assessing officer. If, after applying his mind and also recording his reasons, howsoever briefly, the Commissioner is of the opinion that the AO’s belief is well reasoned and bona fide, he is to accord his sanction to the issue of notice u/s 148 of the Act. In the instant case, we find from the perusal of the order sheet which is on record, the Commissioner has simply put “approved” and signed the report thereby giving sanction to the AO. Nowhere the Commissioner has recorded a satisfaction note not even in brief. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commissioner has accorded sanction after applying his mind and after recording his satisfaction (Chhugamal Rajpal 79 ITR 603 (SC) & United Electrical Co 258 ITR 317 (Del) followed)

S. 153A: In case of completed assessments, addition can be made only if incriminating document found during search

There are three possible circumstances that emerge on the date of initiation of search u/s 132 (1): (a) proceedings are pending; (b) proceedings are not pending but some incriminating material found in the course of search indicating undisclosed income and/or assets and (c) proceedings are not pending and no incriminating material has been found. In circumstance (a), since the proceedings are pending, they are abated and the AO gets a free hand to make the assessment. In circumstance (b), there is no question of abatement as the proceedings are not pending and the AO has to pass an assessment order u/s 153A to assess the undisclosed income. In circumstance (c), the AO has to pass an assessment order though as there is no incriminating material no income can be assessed. On facts, as the assessments were completed and there was no incriminating material found during the search, the AO was not entitled to make any addition (All Cargo Global Logistics 137 ITD 287 (Mum)(SB), Anil Kumar Bhatia 80 DTR 169 (Del), Pratibha Industries & Gurinder Singh Bawa followed)

S. 32: Sale & lease transactions by banks are genuine and eligible for depreciation

S. 32 allows depreciation if the asset is “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business“. There is no requirement that the asset must be used by the assessee himself. It is sufficient if the asset is utilized for the purpose of business of the assessee. The argument, relying on McDowell 154 ITR 148 (SC), that Sale & Lease Back transactions are a devise for lowering the tax effect cannot be accepted. Sale & Lease Back transactions are genuine and cannot be considered to be sham. By virtue of the judgement in Cosmo Films Ltd 338 ITR 266 (Del), the contrary judgements in MidEast 87 ITD 537 (Mum) (SB) and Induslnd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) are impliedly reversed (ICDS Ltd 350 ITR 527 (SC) & Development Credit Bank Ltd (ITAT Mum) followed)

The real object of the entering into the sale and lease back transaction so far as Konkan Railway is concerned is to raise funds. The transaction of sale of the asset to the assessee bank and its lease back to Konkan Railway cannot be separated. It was not possible for Konkan Railway to sell out the railway system. Thus, the sale transaction was merely on paper and to facilitate the financial arrangement by the assessee to Konkan Railway without involving any real intention of transfer of the assets. The terms of the lease agreement are only to secure the interest of the bank till the recovery of the full amount along with the interest. The assessee cannot exercise the real and actual ownership over the asset keeping in view the facts and circumstances and nature of the asset in question. Further, under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 read with RBI circular dated 19.2.1994, banking companies can undertake the activities of equipment leasing but these are required to be treated on par with loans and advances. Therefore, the activity of equipment leasing permitted by the RBI is only in the nature of finance lease. The terms and conditions specified by the RBI for income recognition of lease transactions are also on par with the manner in which a loan transaction is treated. In view of the said circular, there is no scope for treating the instant lease agreement as that of an operating lease (IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) followed; ICDS 350 ITR 527 (SC) distinguished on the basis that the lease there was not by a Bank but by a NBFC).

There is a distinction between a case where the software is supplied along with hardware as part of the equipment and there is no separate sale of the software and a case where the software is sold separately. Where the software is an integral part of the supply of equipment, the consideration for that is not assessable as “royalty”. However, in a case where the software is sold separately, the consideration for it is assessable as “royalty”. On facts, the assessee had received a license to use the copyright belonging to the non-resident. The non-resident supplier continued to be the owner of the copyright and all other intellectual property rights. As there was a transfer of the right to use the copyright, the payment made by Reliance to Lucent was “for the use of or the right to use copyright” and constituted “royalty” under s. 9(1)(vi) and Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA.

Law on non-taxing foreign PE profits no longer good law after insertion of s. 90(3) & Notification dated 28.08.2008 (which has clarificatory effect)

The law laid down by the Courts on the interpretation of the expression “may be taxed” that once the tax is payable or paid in the country of source, then the country of residence is denied of the right to levy tax on would no longer apply after the insertion of s. 90 (3) w.e.f. 1.4.2004, i.e. AY 2004-05 pursuant to which Notification dated 28.08.2008 has been issued. The said Notification is clarificatory in nature and hence the interpretation given by the Central Government through the Notification is effective from 1.4.2004. Also, as the phrase “may be taxed” is not appearing in the statute but is appearing in the DTAA, the interpretation as understood and intended by the negotiating parties should be adopted. Here one of the parties i.e., Government of India has clearly specified the intent and the object of this phrase and the meaning assigned by the Government of India for a phrase or term used in the DTAA notification will prevail. The result is that the business income from the P.E. in Oman and Qatar and also the capital gain from sale of assets in these countries will be chargeable to tax in India

Expl 5 to s. 271(1)(c): Undisclosed income offered in belated return filed u/s 139(4) eligible for immunity from penalty

Explanation 5A to s. 271(1)(c) provides that if during the course of search, the assessee is found to be the owner of any asset or income which has not been shown in the return of income which has been furnished before the date of search and the “due date” for filing the return of income has expired, the assessee is deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income or furnish inaccurate particulars of income and liable for penalty u/s 271(1)(c). In other words, if the income is offered in the return is filed by the “due date”, no penalty can be imposed. The question is whether the “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s 139(4). The “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income u/s 139(4) because wherever the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of the return of income u/s 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided. E.g., s. 139(3) which denies the benefit of carry forward of losses u/s 72 to 74A if the return of income is not filed within the time limit provided u/s 139(1). In absence of such a restriction, the limitation of time of “due date” cannot be strictly reckoned with s. 139(1). Even a belated return filed u/s 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty (Rajesh Kumar Jalan 286 ITR 276 (Gau) & Jagriti Aggarwal 339 ITR 610 (P&H) & Jagtar Singh Chawla (decisions in the context of s. 54) followed)