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Home › All Judgements › CIT vs. Grasim Industries (Bombay High Court)

CIT vs. Grasim Industries (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 14, 2009 (Date of publication)
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Click here to download the judgement (grasim_260A_condonation_of_delay.pdf)

U/s 260A, High Court has no power to condone delay

S. 260A permits the filing of an appeal to the High Court within 120 days. In CIT vs. Velingkar Brothers 289 ITR 382 (Bom) (FB), The Full Bench held that the Court had power to condone delay u/s 260A. However, in Hongo India 236 E.L.T. 417 and Chaudharana Steels 238 E.L.T. 705, the Supreme Court held in the context of sections 35H & 35G of the Excise Act, that in the absence of specific powers, the High Court has no power to condone delay. On the question whether the said judgement of the Supreme Court would apply to s. 260A as well, HELD:

S. 35 G of the Excise Act is pari materia with s. 260 A of the I. T. Act. S. 260 A (7) as well as s. 35 G (9) of the Excise Act provide that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 relating to appeals to the High Court shall as far as may be, apply to the appeals filed under the respective provisions. No such provision is to be found in Section 35 H of the Excise Act. Therefore, the argument advanced by the Counsel for the revenue that s. 35 G and s. 35 H of the Excise Act are materially different cannot be said to be wholly without substance. However, once the Apex Court has held that the High Court has no power to condone delay in filing Appeal under s. 35 G of the Excise Act, we have no option but to hold that this Court has no power to condone delay under s. 260 A because s. 260 A is pari materia with s. 35 G of the Excise Act. As the appeals were delayed, they had to be dismissed.

Note: The Finance Bill, 2009 has proposed to amend ss. 35G & 35H of the Excise Act to supercede the said judgements of the Supreme Court. However, no amendment has been proposed to s. 260A so far.

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