Search Results For: Dharmesh Shah


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DATE: January 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 251(1)(a): The CIT(A) has no jurisdiction to permit an assessee to withdraw an appeal and to dismiss it in limine. Notwithstanding the request seeking withdrawal of the appeal, the CIT(A) is obliged and duty bound under the Act to decide the appeal on merits

This is amply clear from the Section 251(1)(a) and (b) and Explanation to Section 251(2) of the Act which requires the CIT(A) to apply his mind to all the issues which arise from the impugned order before him whether or not the same has been raised by the appellant before him. Accordingly, the law does not empower the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution as is evident from the provisions of the Act

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DATE: January 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 263 Revision: Explanation 2 to s. 263 inserted by the FA 2015 (which confers power upon the CIT to revise assessments where inadequate inquiries have been conducted by the AO) is prospective in nature and does not apply even to a case where the CIT passed the order after Explanation 2 came on the statute. The CIT should show that the view taken by the AO is unsustainable in law. The action of the CIT in directing the AO to conduct enquiry in a particular manner is contrary to the law interpreted by the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Goetze (India) Ltd 361 ITR 505. If such course of action is permitted, the CIT can find fault with each and every assessment order without making any enquiry or verification in order to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law

Ld. DR also submitted that in light of the introduction of the Explanation 2 to s.263 by the Finance Act, 2015, the Ld. CIT had power to conduct further enquiry even in a case where inadequate enquiries have been conducted by the Assessing Officer. (a) Crompton Greaves Ltd v. CIT [ITA No. 1994/Mum/2013] dated 01.02.2016, (b) Madhurima International Pvt Ltd v. Pr. CIT [ITA No. 421/Mum/2017] dated 28.04.2017. 23. In this regard, we observe that the aforesaid judgments have been later considered by Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in several other cases. Further, in the recent judgments, the Hon’ble Tribunal has taken a view that the provisions to Explanation 2 to s. 263 of the Act introduced by the Finance Act, 2015 is prospective in nature and would not apply to the year under consideration

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DATE: March 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 50C does not apply to transfer of leasehold rights in land

Section 50C of the Act provides that if the consideration received or accruing is less than the value adopted or assessed or assessable by the stamp valuation authority of the State Government for such transfer then the value so adopted or assessed or assessable shall be deemed to be the full value of consideration and the capital gains will be computed accordingly. The phraseology of section 50C of the Act clearly provides that it would apply only to “a capital asset, being land or building or both”. The moot question before us is as to whether such expression would cover the transfer of a capital asset being leasehold rights in land or building. There cannot be a dispute to the proposition that the expression land by itself cannot include within its fold leasehold right in land also. Of-course, leasehold right in land is also a capital asset and we find no fault with this stand of the Revenue. So however, every kind of a ‘capital asset’ is not covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act for the purposes of ascertaining the full value of consideration. Infact, the heading of section itself provides that it is “Special provision for full value of consideration in certain cases”. Therefore, there is a significance to the expression “a capital asset, being land or building or both” contained in section 50C of the Act. The significance is that only capital asset being land or building or both are covered within the scope of section 50C of the Act, and not all kinds of capital assets

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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 2(22)(d): Redemption of preference shares does not constitute "deemed dividend"

As can be seen by s. 2(22)(d), there should be a reduction of its capital and distribution to the shareholders out of the accumulated profits. Section 80(3) of the Companies Act states that the redemption of preference shares under this section by a company shall not be taken as reducing the amount of its authorised share capital. By virtue of section 80(3) redemption of preference shares cannot be considered as reduction of authorised share capital, therefore, treating them as deemed dividend does not arise, as the provisions of section 2(22)(d) can only be invoked only when there is distribution of accumulated profits by way of reduction of share capital. Therefore the question of invoking deemed dividend provision on this transaction does not arise, eventhough the redemption of shares are to be made out of the profits of the company by virtue of section 80(1) of the Companies Act. However, since it cannot be treated as reduction of authorised share capital by virtue of section 80(3) of the Companies Act, the amount received by assessee on redemption of preference shares cannot be treated as deemed dividend

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DATE: October 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 4, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Scope of Explanation 5A to S. 271(1)(c) on deemed concealment despite income having been offered in the search return explained

The deeming provisions of Explanation 5A under section 271(1)(c) of the Act are applicable to all the searches initiated under section 132 of the Act on or after first day of June, 2007. Reading the said provisions of the Explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) of the Act, it is noted that the person is deemed to have concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, which is equivalent to the value of money, bullion, jewellery, valuable articles or things from the possession of the assessee during the course of search conducted on or after first day of June, 2007