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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: Merely because the investment was considerably large and several corporate structures were either created or came into play in routing the investment in the assessee through a Mauritius entity would not be sufficient to brand the transaction as colourable device. The assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of source (PCIT Vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) referred)

As is well known in the context of Section 68 of the Act, the basic duty would be on the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction, credit worthiness of the investor and the source of funds. Equally well settled principle through series of judgments is that the Department cannot insist on the assessee establishing source of the source.

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DATE: February 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 147/148: If the AO is of the opinion that the issue requires verification, it tantamounts to fishing or roving inquiry. He is not permitted to reopen merely because in the later year, he took a different view on the basis of similar material. Even if the question of taxing interest income under the DTAA was not in the mind of the AO when he passed the assessment, he cannot reopen if there is no failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts

If during the assessment of the later assessment year, the Assessing officer collects or chances upon new material which may have bearing on the assessment of the assessee, and in case where the assessment is sought to be reopened beyond four years, he can also establish lack of true and full disclosures on the part of the assessee, it may be open for him to reopen assessment of the earlier year. However, merely because in the later year, the Assessing Officer takes a different view on the basis of similar material, which may have been collected during such process, would not permit him to reopen the assessment

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DATE: December 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 92BA(i)/ 40A(2)(b) Domestic Transfer Pricing: Entire law on what constitutes "Specified Domestic Transactions” explained. The Dept's contention that a shareholder has beneficial interest in the assets of the company is contrary to all canons of Company law

We cannot, and the law does not permit us, to hold that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of 22.64% of the shares in the Petitioner by clubbing the share holding of HDFC Investments Ltd. with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. If we were to do this, we would be effectively holding that HDFC Ltd., being a shareholder of HDFC Investments Ltd., is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This, in law, is clearly impermissible because a shareholder of a company can never have any beneficial interest in the assets (movable or immovable) of that company. In the present case, if we were to accept the contention of the Revenue, it would mean that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This would be contrary to all canons of Company Law. It is well settled that a shareholder of a company can never be construed either the legal or beneficial owner of the properties and assets of the company in which it holds the shares. This being the position in law, we find that the Revenue is incorrect in trying to club the shareholding of HDFC Investments Ltd. in the Petitioner along with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. in the Petitioner, to cross the threshold of 20% as required in explanation (a) to section 40A(2)(b). We are supported in the view that we take by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1955) 27 ITR 1].

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DATE: September 11, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 26, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 220(6)/ 246: The AO is not justified in insisting on payment of 20% of the demand based on CBDT's instruction dated 29.02.2016 during pendency of appeal before the CIT(A). This approach may defeat & frustrate the right of the assessee to seek protection against collection and recovery pending appeal. Such can never be the mandate of law

All that we are worried about is the understanding of this Deputy Commissioner of a demand, which is pending or an amount, which is due and payable as tax. If that demand is under dispute and is subject to the appellate proceedings, then, the right of appeal vested in the petitioner/assessee by virtue of the Statute should not be rendered illusory and nugatory. That right can very well be defeated by such communication from the Revenue/Department as is impugned before us. That would mean that if the amount as directed by the impugned communication being not brought in, the petitioner may not have an opportunity to even argue his Appeal on merits or that Appeal will become infructuous, if the demand is enforced and executed during its pendency. In that event, the right to seek protection against collection and recovery pending Appeal by making an application for stay would also be defeated and frustrated. Such can never be the mandate of law

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DATE: August 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 32(2): There is no conflict between CIT vs. Hindustan Unilever Ltd 394 ITR 73 (Bom) & Miltons/ Confidence Petroleum because while the former is at the stage of final hearing, the latter is at the stage of admission. Accordingly, the request for reference to a Larger Bench is not acceptable. Merely filing of an SLP would not make the order of this Court bad in law or give a license to the Revenue to proceed on the basis that the order is stayed and/or in abeyance

Therefore, no reason has been shown to us at the final hearing, why the decision is Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (supra) is not to be followed. Merely filing of an SLP from the order of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. (supra) would not make the order of this Court bad in law or give a license to the Revenue to proceed on the basis that the order is stayed and/or in abeyance. The Revenue is entitled to challenge the view taken by us following our decision in Hindustan Unilever (supra) by challenging this decision in the Apex Court. However, in the present facts, at this stage, there can be no question of our not following the order in Hindustan Unilever

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) to curtail the limitation period for filing rectification applications to six months from four years is prospective and applicable to appeal orders passed after 01/06/2016 and not the orders passed prior to 01/06/2016. The contrary view in Lavanya Land (Mum ITAT) is not good law in view of K. Ravindranathan Nair (SC)

We found that Tribunal in the case of Lavanya Land Private Limited vide order dated 25/04/2017 have held that since miscellaneous application was filed beyond a period of six months from the date of the order of the Tribunal which was sought to be rectified, the miscellaneous application was barred by limitation. We observe that while rendering the decision, the Co-ordinate Bench has not considered the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ravindranathan Nair (Supra) where Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that right to appeal is vested in the litigant at the commencement of Lis and therefore, such vested right cannot be taken away and cannot be impaired or made more stringent by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention in interfere or impair a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by the express words or by necessary implication

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
An additional ground (relating to claim u/s 80-IA) cannot be permitted to be raised if the necessary evidence that the assessee is entitled to the claim is not on record. The fact that claim has been allowed by the AO in a subsequent year and that there is no reason why the claim should not be allowed in the present year is irrelevant. Also, the assessee must satisfy the appellate authority that the ground now raised was bona fide and the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons

We note that it is an undisputed position before us that for the subject assessment year, the appellant assessee had not claimed benefit of Section 80IA of the Act in respect of its Jetty / Port either before the Assessing Officer or before the CIT(A). A claim for benefit under Section 80IA of the Act can only be made if the infrastructure facility such as Jetty / Port is, among other things, being run on the basis of an agreement for either developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility. The sine qua non provided in SubSection (7) of Section 80IA of the Act is the furnishing along with its Return of Income, a report of audited accounts in Form 10CCB as required under Rule 18BBB(3) of the Act. The Form 10CCB which is required to be filed along with Return of Income has various details to be filled in, including the initial assessment year from which the deduction is being claimed, the nature of the activity carried out with regard to the infrastructure facility, namely, whether it is for developing or developing and operating or for developing, operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It is only on examination of those details as submitted by the auditor in Form 10CCB that the claim of deduction can be considered. It is undisputed that for the subject assessment year, no Form 10CCB has been filed by the appellant assessee. Therefore, there is no evidence on record for subject assessment year to allow the claim. The submission of Mr.Agrawal for the appellant that primary evidence in the form of jetty is on record is not acceptable. Mere ownership or existence of jetty is not evidence of eligibility to the benefit of Section 80IA of the Act, which is admittedly conditional upon satisfaction of certain requirements as provided therein

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DATE: July 20, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 147: S. 148 reopening notice issued to a private trust which received contributions of Rs. 6.58 crore on the ground that it has not obtained a PAN or filed a return of income is not valid. The AO cannot assume all receipts are income and issue the reopening notice

Mere non filing of return of income does not give jurisdiction to the Assessing Officer to re-open the assessment unless the person concerned has total income which is assessable under the Act exceeding maximum amount which is not chargeable to Income Tax. This is provided in Explanation 2 to Section 147 of the Act. This is for the reason that in terms of Section 139(1) of the Act the obligation to file a return of income is only when the total income of a person exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. So also the obligation to obtain PAN only arises on the income being in excess of the maximum amount not chargeable to tax. Therefore, non filing of return of income and/or not obtaining of PAN does not ipso facto give jurisdiction to reopen an assessment under Section 147/148 of the Act

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DATE: March 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Non-consideration by the ITAT of a judgement of the co-ordinate Bench makes the order a non-speaking one and breaches the principles of natural justice

In fact the impugned order of the Tribunal ought to have dealt with its decision in J. K. Investors (supra) and considered its applicability to the present facts. In view of the fact that the impugned order of the Tribunal does not deal with its decision in J. K. Investors (supra) relied upon by the assessee in support of its submission as recorded in the impugned order itself makes the impugned order a nonspeaking order and, therefore, in breach of principles of natural justice. The substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the revenue

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DATE: March 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): Dept directed to redeposit moneys collected illegally by attachment of assessee’s bank account during pendency of stay application. A order passed on a stay application must give reasons for the refusal to stay the demand

Thus, any action to recover taxes adopting coercive means is not permissible till the petitioner’s application for stay under Section 220(6) of the Act is disposed of. Therefore, the action of the Assessing Officer in attaching the petitioners’ bank accounts under Section 226(3) of the Act as well as subsequent withdrawal of the attached amounts from the bank accounts is without jurisdiction and bad in law. The petitioners have a statutory right to its stay application being heard and disposed of before the Revenue can adopt any coercive proceedings on the basis of the Notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act issued to the assessee. This action on the part of the Assessing Officer, if permitted, would lead Section 220(6) of the Act becoming redundant. In the above view, the Notice under Section 226(3) of the Act issued by the Assessing Officer to the petitioners’ bankers are quashed and set aside. Further, the Assessing Officer is directed to deposit the amount of Rs.7,59,185 in HDFC Bank, Fort, Mumbai and Rs.34,265/in State Bank of India, Byculla, Mumbai within a period of one week from today

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