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DATE: January 8, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 24, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 11/ 12AA: The only requirement for granting registration is that the objects of the society should be charitable in nature and activities are genuine (i) A trust may be of a public charitable nature even if the control of the trust property is not vested in the public but is retained by the settlors, (ii) Registration u/s 12A cannot be declined on the ground that the Trust Deed does not contain "dissolution clause". This is totally irrelevant & beyond the scope of enquiry contemplated u/s 12A. of the Act, (iii) Registration cannot be refused for non furnishing of registration with the Registrar of Societies. Registration with the Registrar of Societies is not a precondition for granting registration u/s 12A.

In the instant case, the Ld. CIT(E) denied the registration by observing that the head of the society is restricted to be from Shree Dhar Vansh and no other member of the Sabha will have any right to raise any objection. In my opinion that cannot also be a ground to refuse the registration when the object of the assessee society are charitable in nature. On a similar issue the Hon’ble Kolkata High Court in the case of Smt. Ganesh Devi Rami Devi Charity Trust Vs. CIT reported at 71 ITR 696 held as under: ” (i) a trust may be of a public charitable nature even if the control of the trust property was not vested in the public but was retained by the settlers

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DATE: October 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 571 days: Mistake of counsel may be taken into account in condoning delay. Claim that the delay was caused by Counsel not communicating the order has to be accepted unless it is shown that blame put on counsel is with malafide intentions in order to cover up mistake/lapse on the part of the assessee. As per human conduct and probabilities, a professional counsel cannot be expected to admit his lapses as it may affect his reputation. Also, if the appeal is adjudicated on merits, refusing to condone the delay is an error (All imp judgements referred)

When an assessee authorizes a counsel to appear on his behalf, such authorization is given by placing faith on the legal expertise of the Counsel and also with the hope that the counsel shall take care of the interest of the assessee. Hence, when there is a lapse on the part of the legal counsel, in my view, the assessee should not be found fault with, unless it is shown that the blame put on the counsel with malafide intentions in order to cover up the mistake/lapse on the part of the assessee.

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DATE: April 23, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/(2): The fact that the judges indicate a decision during the hearing or even dictate a judgement in open court gives no right to the litigant. Judges can change or alter their decision at any time until the judgement is signed & sealed. A MA on the ground that the ITAT Members stated a particular decision during the hearing but did the opposite in the order is not maintainable

The question arises as to whether the Bench while hearing the appeal has given any decision. May be the assessee got the impression in good faith. Even if the impression went to the assessee then also the same does not have any effect on the order of the Court as it is well settled law that a judge can recall the order and change his mind in extreme case where the though draft copy signed and dictated in the open, as held in the case of Kaushalbhai Ratanbhai Rohit & Ors. vs. State of Gujrat, [SLP (Criminal) 453/2014)], by the Apex Court

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DATE: May 7, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c)/ 292B: The AO cannot initiate penalty on the charge of 'concealment of particulars of income', but ultimately find the assessee guilty in the penalty order of 'furnishing inaccurate particulars of income' (and vice versa). In the same manner, he cannot be uncertain in the penalty order as to concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by using slash between the two expressions. Such error is not procedural but goes to the root of the matter and is not saved by s. 292B. The error renders the penalty order unsustainable in law

When the AO is satisfied that it is a clear-cut case of concealment of particulars of income, he must specify it so in the notice at the time of initiation of penalty proceedings and also in the penalty order. The AO cannot initiate penalty on the charge of `concealment of particulars of income’, but ultimately find the assessee guilty in the penalty order of `furnishing inaccurate particulars of income’. In the same manner, he cannot be uncertain in the penalty order as to concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by using slash between the two expressions. When the AO is satisfied that it is a clear-cut case of `furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’, he must again specify it so in the notice at the time of initiation of penalty proceedings and also in the penalty order. After initiating penalty on the charge of `furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income’, he cannot impose penalty by finding the assessee guilty of `concealment of particulars of income’

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DATE: April 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
Disallowance u/s 14A & Rule 8D has to be made even if the assessee has not earned any tax-free income on the investment. Cheminvest 378 ITR 33 (Del) is not binding on the AO as it is a non-jurisdictional High Court. CBDT's Circular 5/2014 is in accordance with Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd 394 ITR 449 (SC) & Maxopp Investment Ltd 402 ITR 640 (SC)

The principle that it is the net income, i.e., net of expenditure relatable thereto, which is subject to tax and, correspondingly, not liable to tax, i.e., where it does not form part of the total income, is well established. Equally well settled is the principle that once an income is liable (or not liable) to tax, all expenditure relatable thereto is to be reckoned, and it matters little that the said expenditure has indeed resulted in a positive income, or in whatever sum. It is in fact this, i.e., the expenditure being higher than the gross income, which could be nil, that leads to the phenomenon of loss, which could therefore be across both the categories income, i.e., taxable or non-taxable, being essentially a matter of fact

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DATE: March 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 143(3): In an AIR scrutiny assessment, the AO is not entitled to widen the scope of scrutiny without approval of the CIT as per CBDT's Instruction. Such an assessment order is not sustainable

In fact, what the AO did was to widen the scrutiny. Now, para 2 of CBDT Instruction is specific when it states that where it is felt that apart from the AIR information, there is potential escapement of income more than Rs. 10 lakhs, the case may be taken up for wider scrutiny with the approval of the administrative Commissioner. So, the proper course for the AO before making these additional enquiries would have been to take approval from the administrative Commissioner to widen the scrutiny. This, however, was not done and therefore, the action of the AO is violative of the CBDT Instruction

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DATE: September 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2011-12
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CITATION:
Even post insertion of proviso to s. 2 (15) but before 01.04.2016, s. 11 benefit cannot be denied to business activities carried by the trust in the course of actual carrying out of such advancement of any other object of general public utility. Trusts are entitled to carry out activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business etc as long as these activities are carried out in the course of actual carrying out of advancement of any other object of general public utility. On facts, activity of auctioning commercial plots for maximum revenue cannot be regarded as a profit-making exercise

This substitution of proviso to Section 2(15) may be viewed as representing a paradigm shift in the scope of the exclusion clause. The paradigm shift is this. So far as the scope of earlier provisos is concerned, the CBDT itself has, dealing with an assessee pursing “the advancement of any object of general pubic utility”, observed that “If such assessee is engaged in any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business or renders any service in connection to trade, commerce or business, it would not be entitled to claim that its object is for charitable purposes” because “In such a case, the object of ‘general public utility’ will only be a mask or a device to hide the true purpose which is trade, commerce, or business or rendering of any service in relation to trade, commerce or business.” The advancement of any objects of general public utility and engagement in trade, commerce and business etc. were thus seen as mutually exclusive in the sense that either the assessee was pursuing the objects of general public utility or pursuing trade, commerce or business etc. in the garb of pursing the objects of general public utility

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DATE: August 31, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 11, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 10(10D): Keyman Insurance: Even a "United Linked Endowment Assurance Plan" with the main object of guaranteed returns rather than life insurance is a "keyman insurance" as defined in s. 10(10D). The fact that policy was not termed as a "keyman insurance" and the fact that the IRDA Guidelines disapproved the issue of such policies is irrelevant

All that is required for an insurance policy to meet the requirements of Section 10(10D), therefore, has to be – (a) it should be a life insurance policy; (b) it should be taken by the assesse on the life of another person who is, or was, an employee of the assesse or is related to the business of the assesse is any manner. As long as a policy is an insurance policy, whether it involves a capital appreciation or is under any other investment scheme, it meets the tests laid down under section 10(10D). Even if such an inference is desirable, as long as it does not emerge from the plain words of the statute, it cannot be open to supply the same. The concepts of term policy, pure life policy and the IRDA guidelines find no mention in the statutory provisions. But even if these concepts ought to be incorporated in this statutory provision of the Income Tax Act to make it more meaningful and workable, it cannot be open to any judicial forum to supply these omissions. The IRDA guidelines, no matter how relevant as these guidelines may be, have no role to play in the interpretation of the statutory provisions. The fact that the insurance policies in question were not termed as keyman insurance policies is irrelevant. The keyman insurance policy is a defined concept and as long as it meets the requirements of this definition, the terminology given by the insurers have no relevance for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.

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DATE: June 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 234E: Prior to the amendment to s. 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015, the fee for default in filing TDS statements cannot be recovered from the assessee-deductor

Section 200A was amended by the Finance Act 2015 with effect from 1st June 2015 to provide that in the course of processing of a TDS statement and issuance of intimation under section 200A in respect thereof, an adjustment could also be made in respect of the fee computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E. As the law stood prior to 1st June 2015, there was no enabling provision therein for raising a demand in respect of levy of fees under section 234E

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DATE: June 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 11/ 12AA(3): The Proviso to s. 2(15) has no bearing on the grant or denial of registration. The applicability of the proviso has to be evaluated on a year to year basis and it only affects the grant of exemption u/s 11

The impact of the proviso to Section 2(15) being hit by the assessee will be that, to that extent, the assessee will not be eligible for exemption under section 11 of the Act. The mere fact that the assessee is granted registration under section 12 A or 12AA as a charitable institution will have no bearing on this denial of registration. As a corollary to this legal position, the fact that the objects of the assessee may be hit by the proviso to section 2(15) cannot have any bearing on the grant, denial or withdrawal of the registration under section 12AA

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