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DATE: August 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03, 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 153A/ 153C: The seized incriminating material have to pertain to the AY in question and have co-relation, document-wise, with the AY. This requirement u/s 153C is essential and becomes a jurisdictional fact. It is an essential condition precedent that any money, bullion or jewellery or other valuable articles or thing or books of accounts or documents seized or requisitioned should belong to a person other than the person referred to in S. 153A. Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel 31 TM.com 50 (Guj) approved. SSP Aviation 20 TM.com 214 (Del) distinguished

Insofar as the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Kamleshbhai Dharamshibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III, (2013) 31 taxmann.com 50 (Gujarat) relied upon by the learned Solicitor General is concerned, we find that the High Court in that case has categorically held that it is an essential condition precedent that any money, bullion or jewellery or other valuable articles or thing or books of accounts or documents seized or requisitioned should belong to a person other than the person referred to in Section 153A of the Act. This proposition of law laid down by the High Court is correct, which is stated by the Bombay High Court in the impugned judgment as well

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DATE: August 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CCTV cameras are culture of the day and promotes good governance. All Tribunals including the ITAT should have CCTVs with audio recording. The footage of the CCTV Camera will not be available under the RTI and will not be supplied to anyone without permission of the concerned High Court

We asked learned Additional Solicitor General as to why the Union of India has not so far installed CCTV cameras in Tribunals where open hearing takes place like Court such as ITAT, CESTAT etc. as the tribunals stand on the same footing as far as object of CCTV camera are concerned. He is unable to dispute the utility and requirement of doing so and we see no reason why this should not be done. Recordings will help the constitutional authorities and the High Courts exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution over such Tribunals. We, therefore, direct that this aspect may now be taken up by learned Additional Solicitor General with the concerned authorities so that an appropriate direction is issued by the concerned authority for installation of CCTV cameras in Tribunals in same manner as in Courts and an affidavit filed in this Court

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DATE: August 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 260A: Right of appeal is not a matter of procedure. It is a substantive right. This right gets vested in the litigants at the commencement of the lis and such a vested right cannot be taken away or cannot be impaired or imperilled or made more stringent or onerous by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or by necessary implication.

We may mention at the outset that after referring to the judgments noted above even the High Court in the impugned judgment has accepted that right of appeal is not a matter of procedure and that it is a substantive right. It is also recognised that this right gets vested in the litigants at the commencement of the lis and, therefore, such a vested right cannot be taken away or cannot be impaired or imperilled or made more stringent or onerous by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention to interfere with or impair or imperil a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by express words or by necessary implication. However, the High Court has still dismissed the writ petition as it was of the opinion that the vested right of appeal conferred under Section 260A of the IT Act, insofar as payment of court fee is concerned, is taken away by necessary implication. In other words, the provisions of Section 52A of the 1959 Act inserted by the Amendment Act of 2003, in that sense, have retrospective operation thereby effecting the earlier assessment also. This proposition is advanced with the logic that before prior to introduction of Section 260A in the IT Act with effect from October 01, 1998, there was no right of appeal

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DATE: August 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80P Test of Mutuality: An assessee cannot be treated as a co-operative society meant only for its members and providing credit facilities to its members if it has carved out a category called ‘nominal members’. These are those members who are making deposits with the assessee for the purpose of obtaining loans, etc. and, in fact, they are not members in the real sense. Most of the business of the assessee was with this category of persons who have been giving deposits which are kept in Fixed Deposits with a motive to earn maximum returns. A portion of these deposits is utilised to advance gold loans, etc. to the members of the first category. It is found that the depositors and borrowers are quite distinct. In reality, such activity of the appellant is that of finance business and cannot be termed as co-operative society

It is pointed out by the Assessing Officer that the assessee is catering to two distinct categories of people. The first category is that of resident members or ordinary members. There may not be any difficulty as far as this category is concerned. However, the assessee had carved out another category of ‘nominal members’. These are those members who are making deposits with the assessee for the purpose of obtaining loans, etc. and, in fact, they are not members in real sense. Most of the business of the appellant was with this second category of persons who have been giving deposits which are kept in Fixed Deposits with a motive to earn maximum returns. A portion of these deposits is utilised to advance gold loans, etc. to the members of the first category. It is found, as a matter of fact, that the depositors and borrowers are quiet distinct. In reality, such activity of the appellant is that of finance business and cannot be termed as co-operative society. It is also found that the appellant is engaged in the activity of granting loans to general public as well. All this is done without any approval from the Registrar of the Societies. With indulgence in such kind of activity by the appellant, it is remarked by the Assessing Officer that the activity of the appellant is in violation of the Co-operative Societies Act

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DATE: August 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 80-IA: Difference between 'manufacturing' and 'production' explained. The word ‘production’ has a wider connotation in comparison to ‘manufacture’. Any activity which brings a commercially new product into existence constitutes production. The process of bottling of LPG renders it capable of being marketed as a domestic kitchen fuel and, thereby, makes it a viable commercial product

At the outset, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid provisions of the Act use both the expressions, namely, ‘manufacture’ as well as ‘production’. It also becomes clear after reading these provisions that an assessee whose process amounts to either ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ (i.e. one of these two and not both) would become entitled to the benefits enshrined therein. It is held by this Court in Arihant Tiles and Marbles P. Ltd. (2010) 320 ITR 79 (SC) that the word ‘production’ is wider than the word ‘manufacture’. The two expressions, thus, have different connotation. Significantly, Arihant Tiles judgment decides that cutting of marble blocks into marble slabs does not amount to manufacture. At the same time, it clarifies that it would be relevant for the purpose of the Central Excise Act. When it comes to interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act (which was involved in the said case), the Court was categorical in pointing out that the aforesaid interpretation of ‘manufacture’ in the context of Central Excise Act would not apply while interpreting Section 80-IA of the Act as this provision not only covers those assessees which are involved in the process of manufacture but also those who are undertaking ‘production’ of the goods

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DATE: June 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
Technical know-how: Entire law explained on whether expenditure incurred under a Technical Collaboration Agreement for setting up of new plant for the first time to manufacture cars constitutes capital or revenue expenditure

When we apply the aforesaid parameters to the facts of the present case, the conclusion drawn by the High Court that expenditure incurred was of capital nature, appears to be unblemished. Admittedly, there was no existing business and, thus, question of improvising the existing technical know-how by borrowing the technical know-how of the HMCL, Japan did not arise. The assessee was not in existence at all and it was the result of joint venture of HMCL, Japan and M/s. HSCIL, India. The very purpose of Agreement between the two companies was to set up a joint venture company with aim and objective to establish a unit for manufacture of automobiles and part thereof. As a result of this agreement, assessee company was incorporated which entered into TCA in question for technical collaboration. This technical collaboration included not only transfer of technical information, but, complete assistance, actual, factual and on the spot, for establishment of plant, machinery etc. so as to bring in existence manufacturing unit for the products. Thus, a new business was set up with the technical know-how provided by HMCL, Japan and lumpsum royalty, though in five instalments, was paid therefor

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DATE: June 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 139AA (inserted by the Finance Act 2017) which mandates quoting of Aadhaar number with the PAN is constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The proviso to s. 139AA(2) (which deems the PAN void ab initio if the Aadhaar number is not quoted) is also valid. However, as the challenge under Article 21 is pending before the Constitution Bench, a partial stay is granted. Those who are already enrolled under the Aadhaar scheme should comply with s. 139AA (2). Those who are not enrolled need not do so for the time being and their PAN will not be treated as invalid. The said proviso to s. 139AA(2) cannot be read retrospectively as it takes away vested rights. It will only have prospective effect

Having said so, it becomes clear from the aforesaid discussion that those who are not PAN holders, while applying for PAN, they are required to give Aadhaar number. This is the stipulation of sub-section (1) of Section 139AA, which we have already upheld. At the same time, as far as existing PAN holders are concerned, since the impugned provisions are yet to be considered on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution, including on the debate around Right to Privacy and human dignity, etc. as limbs of Article 21, we are of the opinion that till the aforesaid aspect of Article 21 is decided by the Constitution Bench a partial stay of the aforesaid proviso is necessary. Those who have already enrolled themselves under Aadhaar scheme would comply with the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act. Those who still want to enrol are free to do so. However, those assessees who are not Aadhaar card holders and do not comply with the provision of Section 139(2), their PAN cards be not treated as invalid for the time being. It is only to facilitate other transactions which are mentioned in Rule 114B of the Rules. We are adopting this course of action for more than one reason. We are saying so because of very severe consequences that entail in not adhering to the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act. A person who is holder of PAN and if his PAN is invalidated, he is bound to suffer immensely in his day to day dealings, which situation should be avoided till the Constitution Bench authoritatively determines the argument of Article 21 of the Constitution. Since we are adopting this course of action, in the interregnum, it would be permissible for the Parliament to consider as to whether there is a need to tone down the effect of the said proviso by limiting the consequences

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DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Supreme Court issues strictures against the income-tax department stating that it is "extremely unhappy" with the delay of 3381 days in refiling the SLP and demands that "The concerned authorities need to wake up"

We are extremely unhappy with the delay of 3381 days in refiling the special leave petition but make no other comment. The concerned authorities need to wake up.

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DATE: May 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01
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Law on tests to be applied to determine whether income from property is chargeable as “Income from house property” or as “Profits and gains of business” explained. The objects clause is not determinative. Income earned from a shopping center is required to be taxed under the head “Income from House Property” (Chennai Properties 373 ITR 673 (SC) and Rayala Corporation distinguished)

Wherever there is an income from leasing out of premises and collecting rent, normally such an income is to be treated as income from house property, in case provisions of Section 22 of the Act are satisfied with primary ingredient that the assessee is the owner of the said building or lands appurtenant thereto. Section 22 of the Act makes ‘annual value’ of such a property as income chargeable to tax under this head. How annual value is to be determined is provided in Section 23 of the Act. ‘Owner of the house property’ is defined in Section 27 of the Act which includes certain situations where a person not actually the owner shall be treated as deemed owner of a building or part thereof. In the present case, the appellant is held to be “deemed owner” of the property in question by virtue of Section 27(iiib) of the Act. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, where the income may have been derived from letting out of the premises, it can still be treated as business income if letting out of the premises itself is the business of the assessee

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DATE: May 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Severe strictures passed against the High Court for "inconsistent decision-making" and passing orders which are "palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law" and by ignoring "large number of binding decisions of the Supreme Court" and giving "impermissible benefit to accused". Law on condonation of delay explained. CBI directed to implement mechanism to ensure that all appeals are filed in time

Judicial discipline requires that such a blatant contradiction in such an important matter should have been avoided. The order passed in the case of Dr. R.K. Rana was on sound basis and though the court had noted that there was some overlapping of facts but the offences were different, it, however, has taken a different view in the impugned order for the reasons which are not understandable. The court ought to have been careful while dealing with such matters and consistency is the hallmark of the court due to which people have faith in the system and it is not open to the court to take a different view in the same matter with reference to different accused persons in the same facts and same case. Such inconsistent decision-making ought to have been avoided at all costs so as to ensure credibility of the system. The impugned orders are palpably illegal, faulty and contrary to the basic principles of law and Judge has ignored large number of binding decisions of this Court while giving impermissible benefit to the accused persons and delayed the case for several years. Interference had been made at the advanced stage of the case which was wholly unwarranted and uncalled for

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