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DATE: March 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C Capital Gains: The assessee cannot avoid the impact of s. 50C by claiming that his s. 54EC investment is large enough to cover the deemed consideration based on stamp duty valuation. Such interpretation renders s. 50C redundant

The deeming fiction under section 50C of the Act, must be given its full effect and the Court should not allow to boggle the mind while giving full effect to such fiction. We are not opposing the proposition canvassed by the Counsel of the Assessee that deeming fiction must be applied in relation to the situation for which it is created. However, while giving full effect to the deeming fiction contained under section 50C of the Act for the purpose of computation of the capital gain under section 48, for which section 50C is specifically enacted, the automatic fallout thereof would be that the computation of the assessee’s capital gain and consequently the computation of exemption under section 54EC, shall have to be worked out on the basis of substituted deemed sale consideration of transfer of capital asset in terms of section 50C of the Act

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DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
If an amount (Dharmada, Charity) is paid at the time of the sale transaction for a purpose other than the price of the goods, it cannot form part of the transaction value. Such payment is not for the transaction of sale and cannot be treated as consideration for the goods. The fact that the payment is compulsory upon purchase does not mean that it is involuntary because the purchaser purchases the goods out of his own volition (All imp judgements referred)

When an amount is paid as Dharmada along with the sale price of goods, such payment is not made in consideration of the transfer of goods. Such payment is meant for charity and is received and held in trust by the seller. If such amounts are meant to be credited to charity and do not form part of the income of the assessee they cannot be included in the transaction value or assessable value of the goods

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: The judgement in PCIT vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) is distinguishable on facts & does not apply to a case where the assessee has discharged its onus to prove the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the share applicants by producing the PAN details, bank account statements, audited financial statements and Income Tax acknowledgments and the investors have shown the source of source & personally appeared before the AO in response to s. 131 summons

The ld DR placed reliance on the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Principal CIT vs. NRA Iron & Steel (P) Ltd reported in 103 taxmann.com 48 (SC) wherein the decision on addition made towards cash credit was rendered in favour of the revenue. We have gone through the said judgement and we find in that case, the ld AO had made extensive enquiries and from that he had found that some of the investor companies were non-existent which is not the case before us. Certain investor companies did not produce their bank statements proving the source for making investments in assessee company, which is not the case before us. Source of funds were never established by the investor companies in the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, whereas in the instant case, the entire details of source of source were duly furnished by all the respective share subscribing companies before the ld AO in response to summons u/s 131 of the Act by complying with the personal appearance of directors

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10, 2010-11
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S. 201(1) TDS: The time limit specified in s. 201(3) & (4) for passing orders does not apply to cases where payments are made to non-residents. In cases of payments made to non-residents, an order passed after one year from the end of the FY in which the proceedings were initiated is void ab initio and liable to be quashed

In our considered opinion, where the payments are made to the entities/persons other than the persons specified in sub-section (3), the limitation period of one year from the end of financial year in which the proceedings u/s. 201 were initiated, as laid down by the Special Bench of Tribunal and affirmed by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court would apply. In the instant case, since, the order u/s. 201 has been passed much after the elapse of one year period from the end of financial year in which proceedings u/s. 201 were initiated, the order u/s. 201 in the impugned assessment years is void-ab-initio and hence, is liable to be quashed

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DATE: February 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 68 Bogus Share Premium: No reason to interfere. SLP dismissed. High Court held there is no limitation on the amount of premium that can be charged. The AO cannot question the transaction merely because he thinks the investor could have managed by paying a lesser amount as share premium. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors to decide the premium and it is the wisdom of the shareholder whether they want to subscribe to shares at such a premium or not. S. 68 does not apply as the funds were received through banking channels and the identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the investors was established

Issuing the share at a premium was a commercial decision. It is the prerogative of the Board of Directors of a company to decide the premium amount and it is the wisdom of shareholder whether they want to subscribe the shares at such a premium or not. This was a mutual decision between both the companies. In day to day market, unless and until, the rates is fixed by any Govt. Authority or unless there is any restriction on the amount of share premium under any law, the price of the shares is decided on the mutual understanding of the parties concerned. Once the genuineness, creditworthiness and identity are established, the revenue should not justifiably claim to put itself in the armchair of a businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and assume the role of ascertaining how much is a reasonable premium having regard to the circumstances of the case

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DATE: April 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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S. 147 Reopening: High Court should decide (i) validity of s. 148 notice where assessment is made u/s 143(1) & not u/s 143(3), (ii) whether notice can be said to be based on change of opinion if there is no foundation to form any such opinion, (iii) Whether requirements of s. 148 are satisfied, namely, that it contains the facts constituting the "reasons to believe" and furnishes the necessary details for assessing the escaped income and (iv) whether finding recorded by ITAT on merits is legally sustainable

The objections raised by the respondent (assessee) to the notice contending inter alia that since the impugned notice was based on “change of the opinion” and hence bad in law was upheld by the ITAT resulting in allowing the respondent’s appeal and further by dismissing the Revenue’s appeal by the High Court. The Revenue has felt aggrieved by the order of the High Court dismissing their appeal in limine and has filed the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 142(2C) Special Audit/ Interpretation of statutes: The AO who has fixed the time in the first instance must necessarily, as an incident of the authority to fix time, be entitled to suo moto extend time without an application by the assessee. The amendment by FA 2008 was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. There exists a presumption of retrospective application in regard to amendments which are of a procedural nature

The issue as to whether the amendment which has been brought about by the legislature is intended to be clarificatory or to remove an ambiguity in the law must depend upon the context. The Court would have due regard to (i) the general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what power that the legislature contemplated

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

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DATE: February 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: In the absence of any exempt income, disallowance u/s 14A & Rule 8D of the Act of any amount is not permissible (Essar Teleholdings 401 ITR 445 (SC) followed, Cheminvest 378 ITR 33 (Del) approved)

In view of the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax 5, Mumbai vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd. through its Manager [401 ITR 445 (SC)] (2018) 3 SCC 253, we see no reason to entertain this special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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Articles 136, 141: Entire law on legal effect of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by a speaking/ non-speaking order explained. If the dismissal is by a speaking order & reasons are given, the same is a declaration of law which is binding under Article 141. The findings are also binding by way of judicial discipline. However, this does not mean that the order of the lower court has merged in the dismissal order of the Supreme Court

If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties

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