ITO vs. Dipti Nikhil Modi (ITAT Mumbai)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: March 25, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to download the file in pdf format
CITATION:
S. 2(22)(e)/ 271(1)(c): S. 2(22)(e) is a deeming provision and has to be strictly construed. Assessee can discharge onus by pointing to 'preponderance of probability' and If explanation is not found to be false then, even if amounts are assessed as 'deemed dividend', penalty cannot be levied

(i) It is an undisputed fact that assessee is major shareholder in M/s. Exim Multi Media P. Ltd.; M/s. Edge Fine Print P. Ltd. and M/s. Shipping Times (I) Pvt. Ltd. From these companies, the assessee has received money for sums aggregating Rs.1,01,00,000/- which has been contended to be in the form of refundable security deposits for letting the properties owned by the assessee to these companies for their business purpose. List of properties owned by the assessee and given for use to these company were filed before the authorities during the quantum proceedings. Along with these details, the assessee had also filed internal bank payment voucher by these companies which show that amount has been given as “deposit” for the use of the property. These bank vouchers mentions the cheque number, name of the assessee, the amount of deposits given and the detail of the property. All these evidences though filed in the course of the quantum proceedings, have not been taken into cognizance by any of the appellate authorities. It has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel that, assessee has not received any rent from these companies, instead she had received only security deposits.

(ii) In light of these facts, it cannot be conclusively held that the amounts given by these companies are in the form of loan or advance. This fact is further corroborated by the fact that, neither there is any entry of loan in the books of the assessee nor in the books of these companies. How such an amount received by the assessee is considered in the nature of loan is not borne out from the records. Be it that as may be, it is well settled proposition of law that the finding given in the quantum proceedings are quite relevant and have a provative value, but such a finding alone may not justify the imposition of penalty, because the considerations that arise in the penalty proceedings are separate and distinct from those in the assessment proceedings. Even though matter has been concluded in the quantum assessment proceedings, then also, they are not conclusive so far as penalty proceedings are concerned. The matter in the penalty proceedings has to be examined afresh from the angle whether the assessee is guilty of concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. The assessee may adduce fresh evidence in the penalty proceedings to establish that the material and relevant facts goes to prove the bona fide of the claim or take a different plea upon the same existing material that there is no concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. The degree of proof necessary under the Explanation-1 to section 271(1)(c) can be discharged by the assessee by pointing out the factors and the material in his favour, because explanation merely raises a rebuttal presumption to which assessee can always discharge his onus by pointing out the factors relating to pre-ponderence of probability. Here in this case, the assessee’s explanation that the money received from these companies were in the nature of refundable security deposits received by the assessee in lieu of letting of the properties owned by her has not been found to be false and in fact has been substantiated by the evidence in the form of internal bank vouchers and the entries in the books of account of the assessee as well as of the companies. The revenue has no material to rebut such an evidence or that the assessee’s explanation is false based on material on record. The assessee’s onus in the penalty proceedings stands fully discharged. Once, it has been shown that the amount has been received not as loan but as deposits, the deeming fiction of 2(22)(e) cannot be stretched to hold that the payment made by a company to a shareholder by way of deposit in lieu of usage of property for its business purpose is in the nature of loan. It is a trite law that the deeming fiction has to be strictly construed and such legal fiction cannot be extended for any kind of payment by a company to its shareholder. Thus, on the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the reasons recorded by the Ld. CIT(A) for deleting the penalty is legally and factually correct and accordingly the same is affirmed.

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