|CORAM:||Abhay Manohar Sapre J, Ranjan Gogoi J|
|CATCH WORDS:||annual value, interpretation of statutes, res judicata|
|DATE:||December 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)|
|DATE:||December 6, 2016 (Date of publication)|
|FILE:||Click here to download the file in pdf format|
|S. 10(19A): Though principles of res judicata do not apply, the Dept should not endlessly pursue matters which have attained finality in earlier years. Principles of interpretation of statutes explained. Interplay between s. 10(19A), s. 23 of the Income-tax Act & s. 5(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act explained|
(i) No reliance could be placed on Section 5(iii) of the Wealth Tax Act while construing Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. It is due to marked difference in the language employed in both sections. In Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act, the Legislature has used the expression “palace” for considering the grant of exemption to the Ruler whereas on the same subject, the Legislature has used different expression namely “any one building” in Section 5 (iii) of the Wealth Tax Act. We cannot ignore this distinction while interpreting Section 10(19A) which, in our view, is significant.
(ii) If the Legislature intended to spilt the Palace in part(s), alike houses for taxing the subject, it would have said so by employing appropriate language in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. We, however, do not find such language employed in Section 10(19A). Section 23(2) and (3), uses the expression “house or part of a house”. Such expression does not find place in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act. Likewise, we do not find any such expression in Section 23, specifically dealing with the 24 cases relating to “palace”. This significant departure of the words in Section 10(19A) of the I.T. Act and Section 23 also suggest that the Legislature did not intend to tax portion of the “palace” by splitting it in parts.
(iii) It is a settled rule of interpretation that if two Statutes dealing with the same subject use different language then it is not permissible to apply the language of one Statute to other while interpreting such Statutes. Similarly, once the assessee is able to fulfill the conditions specified in section for claiming exemption under the Act then provisions dealing with grant of exemption should be construed liberally because the exemptions are for the benefit of the assessee.
(iv) The question involved in this case had also arisen in previous Assessment Years’ (1973-74 till 1977-78) and was decided in appellant’s favour when Special Leave Petition(c) No. 3764 of 2007 filed by the Revenue was dismissed by this Court on 25.08.2010 by affirming the order of the Rajasthan High Court referred supra. In such a factual situation where the Revenue consistently lost the matter on the issue then, in our view, there was no reason much less justifiable reason for the Revenue to have pursued the same issue any more in higher courts.
(v) Though principle of res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings and each assessment year is an independent year in itself, yet, in our view, in the absence of any valid and convincing reason, there was no justification on the part of the Revenue to have pursued the same issue again to higher Courts. There should be a finality attached to the issue once it stands decided by the higher Courts on merits. This principle, in our view, applies to this case on all force against the Revenue [see M/s Radhasoami Satsang, Saomi Bagh, Agra’s case (supra)].