High Court imposes costs of Rs. 50,000 on AO for filing frivolous appeal & wasting public money & judicial time

Though the Bench clearly indicated to the department’s counsel that the appeal had no merit and gave the department an opportunity to withdraw, the department did not do so. HELD by the High Court, passing strictures and imposing costs:

CBDT’s low tax effect circulars have prospective effect

Clause 11 of Instruction No. 3/2011 dated 9.2.2011 specifically states that “this instruction will apply to appeals filed on or after 9.02.2011. However, the cases where appeals have been filed before 9.02.2011 will be governed by the instructions on this subject, operative at the time when such appeal was filed.” Similarly, clause 11 of instruction No. 5/2008 dated 15.5.2008 specifically provides that “this instruction will apply to appeals filed on or after 15.05.2008. However, the cases where appeals have been filed before 15.05.2008 will be governed by the instructions on this subject, operative at the time when such appeal was filed”. There is, thus, no ambiguity in the instructions of either 2011 or 2008 as regards the applicability of those instructions in respect of the appeals, and, at the same time, it has also been made clear that if those appeals are not filed after the given dates mentioned in those instructions, the fate of the appeals will be governed in accordance with the instructions prevailing on the date of presentation of such appeals. In view of such clear legislative intention, we are unable to hold that even if an appeal is filed prior to 9.02.2011, the same would be barred notwithstanding the fact that at the time of filing such appeal, the same was not barred by the then instructions of the CBDT (Sureshchandra Durgaprasad Khatod reversed, Vijaya V. Kavekar (Bom), Madhukar K. Inamdar (Bom) & other judgements dissented from)

S. 234E: High Court grants ad-interim stay against operation of notices levying fee for failure to file TDS statement

S. 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 provides for levy of a fee of Rs. 200/- for each day’s delay in filing the statement of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) or Tax Collected at Source (TCS). A Writ Petition to challenge the validity of s. 234E has been filed in the Bombay High Court. The Petition claims that assessees who are deducting tax at source are discharging an administrative function of the department and that they are a “honorary agent” of the department. It is stated that this obligation is onerous in nature and that there are already numerous penalties prescribed for a default. It is stated that the fee now levied by s. 234E is “exponentially harsh and burdensome” and also “deceitful, atrocious and obnoxious“. It is also claimed that Parliament does not have the jurisdiction or competence to impose such a levy on tax-payers

Entire law on formation of AOP & taxability of off-shore supply & services explained

(d) As regards taxability, the principle of apportionment of income on the basis of territorial nexus is now well accepted. Explanation 1(a) to section 9(1)(i) of the Act also specifies that only that part of income which is attributable to operations in India would be deemed to accrue or arise in India. It necessarily follows that in cases where a contract entails only a part of the operations to be carried on in India, the assessee would not be liable for the part of income that arises from operations conducted outside India. In such a case, the income from the venture would have to be appropriately apportioned. Merely because a project is a turnkey project would not necessarily imply that for the purposes of taxability, the entire contract be considered as an integrated one. Where the equipment and material is manufactured and procured outside India, the income attributable to the supply thereof could only be brought to tax if it is found that the said income therefrom arises through or from a business connection in India. It cannot be concluded that the Contract provides a “business connection” in India and accordingly, the Offshore Supplies cannot be brought to tax under the Act (Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries 288 ITR 408 (SC) and Hyundai Heavy Industries 291 ITR 482 (SC) followed)

If it is held by the dept that no income arose to the recipient then notices to payer for TDS default u/s 201 & s. 40(a)(i) disallowance are bad

(b) Thus the basis of both the notices (section 148 and 201) has been knocked out of existence by the DRP’s order in the reassessment proceedings of SEC for the same assessment year. On the date on which notices were issued to the petitioner under Sections 148 and 201(1)/(1A), there was an uncontested finding by the revenue authorities (i.e., the DRP) in the case of SEC that SEC cannot be taxed in respect of the sales made in India through the petitioner on the footing that the petitioner is its PE. If no income arose to SEC on account of sales in India since the petitioner cannot be held to be its PE in India, two consequences follow: (i) the payments made by the petitioner to SEC for the goods are not tax deductible under section 195(2) and hence they were rightly allowed as deduction in the original assessment of the petitioner and (ii) the assessee cannot be treated as one in default under section 201(1) and no interest can be charged under section 201(1A). It needs mention here that the notice under section 201 is a verbatim reproduction of the remand report of the assessing officer in SEC’s case filed before the DRP

Even a solitary transaction of redemption of (non-tradeable) mutual fund units amounts to a business activity for an assessee dealing in securities

Merely because deposits in mutual funds are not traded in the nature of sale and purchase of equity shares and such transactions are different in effect and consequences is no ground to treat those differently. Frequency of dealings in deposits of mutual funds with the strategy of firstly investing in tenurial plans and then getting redemption within the same year of deposit and at times resulting in huge profits while at other times in loss, has been usual business activity of the assessee. Such before term redemption, is done in the usual course of business by the assessee clearly to increase its actual cash inflow to tide over its commitments made in the market and at times to earn higher interest in other lucrative investment plans contemporaneously emerging in the market. In this case, in the name of consistency the assessee had tried to hoodwink the authorities. Rather previous conduct of the assessee reveals that the accounts had been manipulated by the assessee to treat the investment as a capital asset only as a camouflage and smoke screen. It is a case where intention as also principle of consistency sought to be used by the assessee in its favour rather goes against it as year after year the same manipulation strategy and maneuverability had been adopted to hoodwink the revenue

Not keeping separate books together with frequent transactions means that gains from shares has to be assessed as business profits instead of as STCG

The AO and CIT(A) held that separate books were not used. Amounts were freely transferred from the profits gained to business and vice-versa. However, perhaps the single-most telling circumstance is the volume, frequency, duration (of holding) of the transactions. Apart from the above significant aspect, the AO and the CIT (A) observed that the assessee had been purchasing and selling a large number of shares of a few companies. It was also held that the transactions involved large or substantial sums of money. Whenever any share is purchased with the intention of investment, it cannot be sold off within a very short span of time, since the share market is always fluctuating. Since in the present case, very frequent purchase and sale of shares have been done it indicates that the main intention of the assessee was to earn income out of these shares which have been claimed to be under the head of short term capital gains. Having regard to the short duration of holding of the shares, and the lack of clarity in the account books, this Tribunal was wrong in assessing the gains as STCG instead of as business profits

S. 40A(3): There is a difference between “crossed cheque” and “account payee cheque”. Payment by crossed cheque attracts s. 40A(3) disallowance

The expression earlier used in s. 40A(3)(a) was a “crossed cheque or a crossed bank draft”. This was amended by the legislature to be replaced by the expression “an account payee cheque or account payee bank draft”. This was done in the background of the experience that even crossed cheques were being endorsed in favour of a person other than the drawee making it difficult to trace the constituent of the money. To plug this possible loophole the requirement of section 40A(3) was made more stringent. If we accept the contention of counsel for the assessee that there was no distinction between a crossed cheque and an account payee cheque, we would be obliterating this amendment brought in the statute with specific purpose in mind. Accordingly, payment by a crossed cheque is subject to disallowance u/s 40A(3) (Anupam Tele Services vs. ITO distinguished)

Concept of “manufacture” explained. Non-claiming of s. 80-IB deduction in return is no bar for claiming it before CIT(A)

Though the assessee did not raise a claim in the return for deduction u/s 80IB & 80HHC, it was entitled to raise the claim before the CIT(A) for the first time. If a claim though available in law is not made either inadvertently or on account of erroneous belief of complex legal position, such claim cannot be shut out for all times to come, merely because it is raised for the first time before the appellate authority without resorting to revising the return before the AO. Courts have taken a pragmatic view and not a technical one as to what is required to be determined in taxable income. In that sense assessment proceedings are not adversarial in nature. The decision in Goetze (India) Ltd. vs. CIT (SC)is confined to the powers of the AO and accepting a claim without revised return and does not affect the power of the CIT(A) or the Tribunal to entertain a new ground or a legal contention