In Shruti Colorants a Division Bench held that where there was a delay in filing Appeals u/s 35G of the Central Excise Act (= s. 260A of the IT ACT), the Court had no power to condone the delay by taking recourse to s. 5 of the Limitation Act.
This view is incorrect because by virtue of s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, where a statute is silent, the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act applies and the Court has power to condone delay.
Accordingly, Shruti Colorants is overruled.
Where the AO issued a show-cause notice alleging that the Appellant was not an “new undertaking” eligible for deduction u/s 10B but in the assessment order denied deduction on the different ground that the activity of the assessee did not constitute “manufacturing” without considering any of the several judgements on the issue, HELD that arbitrariness was writ large on the face of the assessment order and that the same had to be quashed by the Court by exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution even though the assessee had alternative remedies of appeal against the said order.
Though s. 275(1) (c) provides that the limitation for levy of penalty shall be “after the expiry of the financial year in which the proceedings, in the course of which action for the imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from the end of the month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever period expires later”, in a case where the initiation of action for imposition of penalty is not in the course of some proceedings (e.g. penalty u/s 271B for failure to get accounts audited u/s 44AB and non-filing of audit report), the first part of s. 275(1)(c) would have no application and it is only the period of limitation prescribed in the second part which would apply. Since only one period of limitation would be applicable, the expression “whichever period expires later” would have to be read as that very period of limitation.
The general proposition laid down in Sir Shadilal Sugar and General Mills Ltd 168 ITR 705 (SC) that the surrender of undisclosed income made by an assessee to buy peace did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the amount surrendered was indeed concealed income, cannot be said to have been overruled in K.P. Madhusudhanan 251 ITR 99 (SC);
HELD in the context of s. 158BE (1) (b) which imposes a time limit for making a block assessment order with reference to the date of execution of the last of the authorizations for search u/s 132 which in turn is deemed to be the date of the conclusion of search as recorded in the last panchnama drawn that
The authorities under the Act are under an obligation to act in accordance with law. Tax can be collected only as provided under the Act. If any assessee, under a mistake, misconceptions or on not being properly instructed is over assessed, the authorities under the Act are required to assist him and ensure that only legitimate taxes due are collected. If particular levy is not permitted under the Act, tax cannot be levied applying the doctrine of estoppel.
The transfer pricing provisions are applicable to a well defined class which meets the test of intelligible differentia. It also meets the test of rational relationship to the object i.e. to determine the real income. There is no ambiguity or absurd consequence of application of Chapter X to persons who are subject to jurisdiction of taxing authorities in India
The fiction of s. 9 is subject to the territorial nexus doctrine and income that arises out of a transaction requires to be apportioned to each of the territories. Whatever is payable by a resident to a non-resident by way of fees for services would not always come within the purview of section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. It must have sufficient territorial nexus with India so as to furnish a basis for imposition of tax
Where the assessees challenged by writ petitions the orders passed by the Transfer Pricing Officer (“TPO”) determining the Arm’s Length Price (“ALP”) in relation to “International transactions” on the grounds that the said orders were passed without granting an oral hearing and without considering the documents and information filed by the assessees and without disclosing the information and documents obtained by the TPO which were used by him in the determination of the ALP, HELD, allowing the challenge: S. 92CA (3) imposes an obligation on the TPO to accord an oral hearing to the assessee. Even otherwise, an order entailing civil and penal consequences cannot be passed without a hearing.
In CCE vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd (223) E.L.T. 337 the Supreme Court held that the High Court has no power to condone delay in filing of a Reference Application u/s 35H(1) of the Excise Act on the ground that where the statute specifies a limitation period, s. 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. There are doubts about the correctness of this judgment because the power of the High Court to condone delay cannot be circumscribed by the statute. Accordingly, the issue should be referred to a Full Bench.