The Income-tax Act is a complete Code in itself. While the Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal have been given power to condone delay, no such power has been conferred upon the High Court u/s 260A. In the absence of a provision in s. 260A conferring jurisdiction to condone delay in filing the appeal, the Limitation Act would not apply and the delay cannot be condoned.
There cannot be two opinions about the irresistible conclusion that the orders of the settlement commission having been passed without a reasonable hearing, examination of records and due application of mind is in violation of s.245-D(4) and not sustainable.
The judgement of the Calcutta High Court in Exide Industries Ltd vs. UOI 292 ITR 470 holding that s. 43B (f) is arbitrary, unconscionable and de hors the apex Court decision in Bharat Earth Movers vs. CIT 245 ITR 428 has been stayed by the Supreme Court and it has been clarified that the assessee must pay tax as if s. 43B (f) is on the Statute Book though it is entitled to make a claim in its return.
Share broker is eligible to claim “bad debts” u/s 36 (1) (vii) / 36 (2) The assessee, a broker, purchased shares of the value of Rs.1,06,10,247 on behalf of its sub-broker. The sub-broker made payment of Rs.64 lakhs. As the…
Vide Notification dated 3rd June 2009, Rule 13E was inserted in the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Members (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1963 to provide that “The President, the Senior Vice-President, the Vice-President and the Members of the Tribunal shall not practice before the Tribunal after retirement from the service of the Tribunal”. The Special Bench had to consider whether the said Notification applied to Members who resigned / retired before the date of issue of the said Notification and allied issues.
In granting approval to the ESOP, the RBI had stipulated that no payment could be made while exercising the right to purchase shares. Accordingly, there was no “cost of acquisition” and in accordance with B. C. Srinivasa Setty 128 ITR 294 (SC), the gains could not be taxed.
Though the term ‘licences’ is a very wide term and includes permission to carry on any trade, business, profession, etc, it is used in s. 32(1)(ii) in a restricted sense. S. 32 restricts depreciation to a class of tangible & intangible assets specifically enumerated therein. All intangible assets enumerated in s. 32(1)(ii) (except the term ‘licences’) belong to the class of intellectual properties. As the expression ‘licences’ in s. 32(1)(ii) is preceded by the expressions know-how, patents, copyrights, trade marks and succeeded by the expression ‘franchises’ which are all relatable to intellectual property rights, the term ‘licences’ in s. 32(1)(ii) is, applying the principle of Noscitur a sociis, intended to be used restrictively and as applying only to licences relating to acquisition / user of intellectual property rights.
S. 158BC provides that in determining the undisclosed income, the provisions of s. 143 (2) shall apply “so far as may be”. S. 143 (2) provides that a notice shall not be issued after the expiry of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return is furnished. The question arose whether the non-issue or belated issue of s. 143 (2) notice renders the block assessment order ab initio void. In Mudra Nanavati, the Tribunal held that the issue of the s. 143 (2) notice within the stipulated period was mandatory and that failure to do so renders the block assessment order void. This decision has been approved by the High Court following Scindia HUF where it was held that non-issue of s. 16 (2) of the W. T. Act notice rendered the s. 17 order invalid.
Under the Companies Act it is not possible for a company to have less than two shareholders. The requirement of s. 47(v) that the whole of the share capital of the subsidiary company should be held by the holding company is certainly not the same thing as the whole of the share capital being held in the name of the holding company. If one proceeds on the basis that the entire share capital of the subsidiary company should be held in the name of the holding company, there cannot be any situation in which s. 47(v) can apply. That interpretation makes the statutory provision redundant. On facts, as the holding company was the beneficial owner of the entire share capital, s. 47 (v) applied.
The argument that the confidential asset declarations cannot be disclosed as it would entail breach of a fiduciary duty by the CJI is also not acceptable. A fiduciary relationship is one whereby a person places complete confidence in another in regard to his affairs. From this perspective, the CJI is not in a fiduciary vis-à-vis Judges of the Supreme Court. The asset information is not held by the CJI in a fiduciary capacity. The mere fact that the declaration is marked “confidential” is of no relevance.