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DATE: January 20, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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(i) 56(2)(vii)(b): The amendment w.e.f AY 2014-15 will not apply to a purchase transaction of immovable property for which full consideration is paid pre the amendment. Mere registration at a later date will not cover a transaction already executed in the earlier years and substantial obligations have already been discharged and a substantive right has accrued to the assessee therefrom. The Revenue is debarred to cover the transaction where inadequacy in purchase consideration is alleged (ii) Interest u/s 234A & 234B is chargeable with reference to the returned income and not the assessed income

It is not in dispute that purchase transactions of immovable property were carried out in FY 2011-12 for which full consideration was also parted with the seller. Mere registration at later date would not cover a transaction already executed in the earlier years and substantial obligations have already been discharged and a substantive right has accrued to the assessee therefrom. The pre-amended provisions will thus apply and therefore the Revenue is debarred to cover the transactions where inadequacy in purchase consideration is alleged

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DATE: October 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 8, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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S. 36(1)(iii): Dept's argument that Maxopp Investment/Avon Cycles 402 ITR 640 (SC) overrules the presumption that advances to sister concerns are made from own funds and not borrowed funds is not correct. Law on interpretation of judgements explained

It is evident from the above that the issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court was not whether the presumpt ion theory would apply or not where there are mixed funds and the assessee had demonstrated avai lability of sufficient own funds for making the investments . No discussion on this aspect has also been done by the Hon’ble Apex Court and merely not ing that the assessee had ut i l ized mixed funds, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the principle of apport ionment would apply. Wi thout any discussion or del iberat ion on the presumpt ion theory, the proposi t ion laid down in the case of Avon Cycles Ltd. (supra) by the Hon’ble Apex Court has to be restricted to the extent of the issue before the Hon’ble Apex Court and facts before i t and not beyond that . And on that basis the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Avon Cycles Ltd. (supra) can be read only to the extent of upholding the principle of apport ionment of expenses incurred in the context of the l imi ted fact of mixed funds avai lable wi th assessee and no further. The proposi t ion laid down cannot be stretched even logical ly to address the fact si tuat ion where suf f icient own interest free funds are avai lable wi th assessee, which fact was not there before the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Avon Cycles (supra) , and to negate the presumpt ion that the own funds were used for making the investment , which was nei ther the quest ion raised before the apex court and therefore not addressed by i t also.

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DATE: July 18, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 80-IA: There is a difference between "derived from the undertaking" and "derived from the business of the undertaking". The latter expression is wider than the former. Interest on fixed deposits from Bank and other interest are "derived from the business of the undertaking" and are eligible for deduction u/s 80-IA

Mr. Subramaniam, learned Counsel appearing in support of the appeal points out that Pandian Chemicals Ltd. (supra) was rendered in the context of Section 80HH of the Act and we are concerned with Section 80IA of the Act. It is particularly pointed out that there is a difference in the wording of the two sections as existing during the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Section 80HH of the Act grants deduction in respect of the profits and gains derived from industrial undertaking while Section 80IA of the Act as in force at the relevant time grants deduction of profits and gains derived from any business of an industrial undertaking. It is submitted that the above issue is no longer res integra as the issue stand concluded in its favour by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jagdishprasad M. Joshi, 318 ITR 420

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 194A TDS: Meaning of the expression "corporation" explained. Difference between "established by an Act" and "established under an Act" explained. Important principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes explained. Though NOIDA is not a "local authority", it is a "corporation established by the Act" and so payments to it are not liable to TDS u/s 194A

It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body

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DATE: October 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 10A/ 10B: Entire law on the concept of "derived from" the undertaking and "purposive interpretation" of statutes explained. The incidental activity of parking surplus funds with banks or advancing of staff loans by assessees covered u/s 10-A or 10-B is an integral part of their export business activity and a business decision taken in view of the commercial expediency. Such incidental income cannot be delinked from the profits and gains derived by the undertaking engaged from the export of specified goods and cannot be taxed separately u/s 56 of the Act

Sections 10-A and 10-B of the Act are special provisions and complete code in themselves and deal with profits and gains derived by the assessee of a special nature and character like 100% Export Oriented Units (EOUs.) situated in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), STPI, etc., where the entire profits and gains of the entire Undertaking making 100% exports of articles including software as is the fact in the present case, the assessee is given 100% deduction of profit and gains of such export business and therefore incidental income of such undertaking by way of interest on the temporarily parked funds in Banks or even interest on staff loans would constitute part of profits and gains of such special Undertakings and these cases cannot be compared with deductions under Sections 80-HH or 80-IB in Chapter VI-A of the Act where an assessee dealing with several activities or commodities may inter alia earn profits and gains from the specified activity and therefore in those cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the interest income would not be the income “derived from” such Undertakings doing such special business activity

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DATE: June 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 158BFA(1): If the delay in filing the return is completely attributable to the revenue for non-furnishing of copies of the documents and not giving inspection of the documents seized within a reasonable time after making the demand, the interest has to waived. Though s. 158BFA(1) does not (pre 2002) confer the power to waive interest, it has to be read in on equitable construction because the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State (J. H. Gotla 4 SCC 343 followed)

This now takes us to the final issue viz. is it open under the provisions of Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act to the Assessing Officer to waive interest imposable thereunder even in the absence of any discretion provided to waive interest under Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act. There can be no dispute that bare reading of the section does not provide for any discretion to waive and/or reduce the interest imposable on account of the late filing of the return of income. It is a settled position in law that a fiscal statute has to be strictly interpreted, particularly when there is no ambiguity in the statute. The normal rule of interpreting a fiscal statute is the literal rule of interpretation. However, when the Parliament makes a law, it proceeds on the basis that the Executive i.e. the State will act fairly and not cause unjustified burden upon the subject. The provisions of Section 158BFA(1) of the Act proceeds on the above premise and it was expected of the State to grant copies of the documents seized and/or inspection of the record as expeditiously as possible, so as to enable the appellant to file his return of income. This particularly so, as to delay in filing of return, leads to levy of interest. This not having been done, as was expected under the Statute, the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State. Therefore, in a case like this where strict construction may result in injustice, an equitable construction may be preferred

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DATE: July 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 221: A reading of s. 221 conjointly with the definition of “tax” in s. 2(43) leads to the irresistible conclusion that the phraseology “tax in arrears” in s. 221 would not take within its realm the interest component. The AO can impose penalty for default in making the payment of tax, but the same shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. Tax in arrears would not include the interest payable u/s 220(2) of the Act

Reading Section 221 in its entirety, it is abundantly clear that the aspect of default in payment of tax and the amount of interest payable are treated as distinct and separate components. The section categorically and specifically states that when an Assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making payment of tax, he shall in addition to the amount of arrears and the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220, be liable, to pay penalty, however the amount of penalty does not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The terminology “default in making a payment of tax and amount of interest payable” are considered to be separate for imposition of penalty and penalty is to be levied on account of default in making a payment of tax. However, the total amount of penalty shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The said penalty for non payment of the tax is in addition to the levy of interest under SubSection 2 of Section 220. Under no principle of interpretation, the arrears of tax as laid down in the said Section would include the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220. The amount of penalty will have to be restricted on the arrears of tax, which would not include the interest component charged under Section 220(2) of the Act

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DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 24, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 80P(2)(d): Interest and dividend earned by a co-op society on investments with other co-operative societies is eligible for deduction. The question whether the co-op society is engaged in the business of banking for providing credit facilities to its members and the head under which the income is assessable is not material (Totagar’s Co-op Society 322 ITR 283 (SC) distinguished)

The Supreme Court in the case of Totagar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd held that a society has surplus funds which are invested in short term deposits where the society is engaged in the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members in that case the said income from short term deposits shall be treated and assessed as income from other sources and deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) would not be available meaning thereby that deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) is available only in respect of income which is assessable as business income and not as income from other sources. Whereas in distinction to this , the provisions of section 80(P)(2)(d) of the Act provides for deduction in respect of income of a coop society by way of interest or dividend from its investments with other coop society if such income is included in the gross total income of the such coop society

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DATE: November 5, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1988-89
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S. 36(1)(iii): Law on when interest expenditure on loans diverted to sister concerns and directors can be allowed as business expenditure explained

Once it is established that there is nexus between the expenditure and the purpose of business (which need not necessarily be the business of the assessee itself), the Revenue cannot justifiably claim to put itself in the arm-chair of the businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and assume the role to decide how much is reasonable expenditure having regard to the circumstances of the case. It further held that no businessman can be compelled to maximize his profit and that the income tax authorities must put themselves in the shoes of the assessee and see how a prudent businessman would act. The authorities must not look at the matter from their own view point but that of a prudent businessman

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DATE: November 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 20, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 2(7) Interest-tax Act: Right to charge overdue interest on discounted Bills of Exchange is not “interest” as it does not arise on account of delay in repayment of any loan or advance. The right arises on account of default in the payment of amounts due under a discounted bill of exchange

Section 2(7) itself makes a distinction between loans and advances made in India and discount on bills of exchange drawn or made in India. It is obvious that if discounted bills of exchange were also to be treated as loans and advances made in India there would be no need to extend the definition of “interest” to include discount on bills of exchange. Indeed, this matter is no longer res integra. The Karnataka High Court’s view is directly contrary to the view of this Court in CIT v. Sahara India Savings & Investment Corpn. Ltd., (2009) 17 SCC 43, and, therefore, cannot be countenanced. “Loans and advances” has been held to be different from “discounts” and the legislature has kept in mind the difference between the two. It is clear therefore that the right to charge for overdue interest by the assessee banks did not arise on account of any delay in repayment of any loan or advance made by the said banks. That right arose on account of default in the payment of amounts due under a discounted bill of exchange.

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