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DATE: March 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Tribunal orders (in sister concern's case) are binding on the Tribunal unless set-aside or stayed. A rectification application on the ground that the orders in the sister concern's case are not correct is not permissible as it amounts to a review

The Revenue has filed appeals in the sister concern case for the Assessment Years 199697 to 200001 under Section 260A of the Act to this Court. The question raised therein is on the issue of appropriate classification of the rent/ compensation under the head ‘income from the other sources’ or under the head ‘income from the house property’. The aforesaid appeals have been admitted and are awaiting consideration for final disposal. Till such time, as the orders of the Tribunal of its Coordinate Bench in respect of the Assessment Years 1996-97 to 2000-01 are set aside or are stayed pending the final disposal, its ratio would, prima facie, continue to be binding. Therefore, even if the Revenue seek to contend to the contrary it would be a debatable issue. This cannot be a subject matter of rectification

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) to curtail the limitation period for filing rectification applications to six months from four years is prospective and applicable to appeal orders passed after 01/06/2016 and not the orders passed prior to 01/06/2016. The contrary view in Lavanya Land (Mum ITAT) is not good law in view of K. Ravindranathan Nair (SC)

We found that Tribunal in the case of Lavanya Land Private Limited vide order dated 25/04/2017 have held that since miscellaneous application was filed beyond a period of six months from the date of the order of the Tribunal which was sought to be rectified, the miscellaneous application was barred by limitation. We observe that while rendering the decision, the Co-ordinate Bench has not considered the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Ravindranathan Nair (Supra) where Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that right to appeal is vested in the litigant at the commencement of Lis and therefore, such vested right cannot be taken away and cannot be impaired or made more stringent by any subsequent legislation unless the subsequent legislation said so either expressly or by necessary intendment. An intention in interfere or impair a vested right cannot be presumed unless such intention be clearly manifested by the express words or by necessary implication

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to curtail the period available to file rectification applications from four years to six months cannot apply to appellate orders passed prior to that date because that would take away a vested right

The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
For purposes of filing a rectification application, the period of limitation of six months commences from the date of receipt of the order sought to be rectified by the assessee and not from the date of passing of the order

The second part of the Section requires that the Tribunal shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by either party to the appeal before it. The party to the appeal can bring the fact of apparent mistake on record only after going through the order made by the tribunal. Therefore, to read that the period of limitation has to computed at any time within six months from the date of the order does not fit in either with legislative intent or the language employed by the provision.

15. There is another angle from which the matter can be approached. It is only the party to the appeal who finds that the order contains a mistake apparent from the record and is aggrieved by such mistake, would be in a position to move an application seeking rectification of the order. Therefore also, unless and until a party to the appeal is in a position to go through and study the order it would not be possible, nor can it be envisaged, that a party can claim to be aggrieved by the mistake apparent from the record. Hence, even on this count the period of limitation has to be read and understood so as to mean from the date of the receipt of the order

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DATE: April 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The amendment by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to specify the time limit of 6 months to file a rectification application applies even to applications filed with respect to appeal orders passed prior to the date of the amendment. The Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing a Miscellaneous Application

It is to be noted that the earlier period of ‘four years’ has been substituted with ‘six months’ by the Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 01/06/2016. However, we find that no distinction has been made in this section between orders passed before 01/06/2016 and orders passed after 01/06/2016. Moreover, the Tribunal order was dated 22/03/2013 and therefore, the Revenue had ample time to go through the same and pin point the mistakes in the order but it has failed to do so. Therefore, we find no force in these miscellaneous petitions primarily because of the reason that the Statute does not authorize us to entertain any petition which has been filed u/s 254(2) at any time beyond a period of six months from the date of the order

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DATE: July 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The period of limitation for filing a rectification application is six months from the end of the month in which the “order is passed” and not from the date of “receipt of the order”. Even if a liberal view is taken, it can be considered as the date of uploading of the order on the ITAT website. The uploaded orders can be accessed by the assessee and constitutes service of the order upon the assessee

Section 254(2) of the Act refers to the period of limitation reckoning from the end of the month in which the order Is passed’ and not from the ‘date of receipt of the order’. As rightly pointed out by the Ld DR, the expressions “passed” “initiated” and “served / received” are not interchangeable and the Legislature in its wisdom expressly used the phraseology depending on the intention. In the instant case, the expression “passed” cannot be stretched to mean that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order. Even if a liberal view has to be taken, it can be considered as the date of uploading of the order. Ordinarily anything which is uploaded in the public domain can be accessed by the public at large and even the assessee would have access to the order and such a date always be treated as the service of the order

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Facts recorded by the ITAT have to be accepted as correct and conclusive and cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise. The mere placing of a case law in the paper book does not mean that it was cited before the ITAT and non-consideration thereof is not a mistake apparent from the record. A MA to rectify such alleged mistake of non-consideration of a judgement must be filed as quickly as possible

It is settled position in law that statement of fact recorded in the order of the Court/Tribunal has to be accepted as correct and conclusive. It cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas S. Nayak 1982 (2) SCC 463, Central Bank of India vs. Vrajlal K. Gandhi 2003(6) SCC 573 and Jagvir Singh & Others vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 2007 (5) SCC 359. Thus, mere filing of the paperbook is no indication of the fact that the case law referred to in paperbook was relied upon and submissions made on it during course of hearing of the appeal. Moreover, in cases such as this where it is contended by a party that particular case was not considered by the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority was cited during the course of hearing and is relevant to the issue, then a party would be expected to move the Tribunal as quickly as possible. This for the reason that the issues would be fresh in the mind of the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority

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DATE: August 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2007-08
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CITATION:
Conduct of the Counsel in making selective reference to the Tribunal’s order in “very deceitful manner” is “highly deplorable”. Attempt to re-argue matter is “clear case of abuse of process of court” and is condemned “in no uncertain terms as it resulted in colossal waste of valuable time of this Tribunal”. Verdict in Dr. T.K. Dayalu (202 TM 531 (Kar) on taxability of development agreements is “not good law” in view of CIT vs. N. Vemanna Reddy (Kar)

We highly deplore the attempts of the petitioner to knock the doors of the Tribunal again in the guise of seeking rectification of order alleging that additional ground of appeal was not decided. As mentioned supra, the additional grounds have been specifically adjudicated and a specific finding had been rendered vide para.9 of the impugned order. Attempts made by the petitioners is nothing but clear case of abuse of process of court and in breach of principles of Res Judicata. We condemn this conduct of petitioner in no uncertain terms as it resulted in colossal waste of valuable time of this Tribunal

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DATE: June 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): In an order passed in a Miscellaneous Application, the Tribunal cannot deal with the merits of the issue. The Tribunal must recall the original appellate order and refix the matter for hearing and pass an order u/s 254(1) of the Act

This disposing of Miscellaneous Application could only be after recalling the conclusion in its order dated 9th May, 2006 allowing the Revenue’s appeal and hearing the petitioner on the issue of penalty being imposable even in the absence of a demand notice being served upon the assessee. This was for the reason that its conclusion was reached without having considered the petitioner’s contention that no penalty can be imposed in the absence of receipt of a demand notice by the petitioner. However, the Tribunal in the impugned order has dealt with the issue of imposition of penalty being imposed under Section 221 of the Act even without service of demand notice under Section 156 of the Act upon an assessee. This the Tribunal could have only done while passing an order in appeal. The consequent order which would have been passed in appeal would enable the parties to challenge the same before this Court in an appeal under Section 260A of the Act. The procedure adopted by the Revenue in this case has deprived the right of statutory appeal to the petitioner

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