Search Results For: TDS deduction


Nagarjuna Fertilizers and Chemicals Limited vs. ACIT (ITAT Hyderabad) (Special Bench)

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DATE: February 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 206AA does not have an overriding effect over the other provisions of the Act. By virtue of s. 90(2), the provisions of the Treaty override s. 206AA to the extent they are beneficial to the assessee. Consequently, the payer cannot be held liable to deduct tax at higher of the rates prescribed in s. 206AA in case of payments made to non-resident persons in spite of their failure to furnish the PAN

In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that the provisions of section 206AA of the Act will not have a overriding effect for all other provisions of the Act and the provisions of the Treaty to the extent they are beneficial to the assessee will override sect ion 206AA by virtue of section 90(2). In our opinion, the assessee therefore cannot be held liable to deduct tax at higher of the rates prescribed in section 206AA in case of payments made to non-resident persons having taxable income in India in spite of their failure to furnish the Permanent Account Numbers

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Quick Flight Limited vs. ITO (ITAT Ahmedabad)

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 206AA: In case where payments have been made to deductees on the strength of the beneficial provisions of s. 115A(1)(b) of the Act or as per DTAA rates r.w.s. 90(2) of the Act, the provisions of s. 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO insisting to deduct tax @ 20% for non-availability of PAN

It is only elementary that, under the scheme of the Income Tax Act 1961- as set out under section 90(2) of the Act, the provisions of the applicable tax treaties override the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1961- except when the provisions of the Act are more beneficial to the assessee. The provisions of the applicable tax treaty, in the present case, prescribe the tax rate @ 10%. This rate of 10% is applicable on the related income whether or not the assessee has obtained the permanent account number. In effect, therefore, even when a foreign entity does not obtain PAN in India, the applicable tax rate is 10% in this case. Section 206AA, which provides a higher tax burden- i.e. taxability @ 20% in the event of foreign entity not obtaining the permanent account number in India, therefore, cannot be pressed into service, as has been done in the course of processing of return under section 200A. To that extent, short deduction of tax at source demand, raised in the course of processing of TDS return under section 200A, is unsustainable in law

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

ITO vs. Emami Paper Mills Ltd (ITAT Kolkata)

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vii)/ Article 12: There is a difference between a 'contract of work' and a ‘contract of service’. In a 'contract of work', the activity is predominantly physical while in a 'contract of service', the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual. Fees paid with respect to a ‘contract of work’ does not constitute "fees for technical services" and consequently the assessee is not liable to deduct TDS u/s 195

There is a difference between ‘Contract of work and ‘Contract of service’. The two words convey different ideas. In the ‘Contract of work’ the activity is predominantly physical; it is tangible. In the activity referred as ‘Contract of service’, the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual, or at least, mental. Certainly, ‘Contract of work’ also involves intellectual exercise to some extent. Even a gardener has to bestow sufficient care in doing his job; so is the case with a mason, carpenter or a builder. But the physical (tangible) aspect is more dominant than the intellectual aspect. In contrast, in the case of rendering any kind of ‘service’, intellectual aspect plays the dominant role. In the case under consideration, the scope of work mentioned in the agreement clearly explains that it is ‘contract of work’ to dismantle the machinery, therefore, it is not a ‘contract of service’ hence payment by the assessee is not for technical services, therefore, the assessee company is not liable to deduct TDS

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Ian Peter Morris vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: November 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 192/ 234B: Where receipt is by way of salary, TDS deductions u/s 192 has to be made. No question of payment of advance tax can arise in cases of receipt by way of 'salary'. Consequently, S. 234B & 234C which levy interest for deferment of advance tax have no application

A perusal of the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Act [Part A, B, C and F of Chapter VII] would go to show that against salary a deduction, at the requisite rate at which income tax is to be paid by the person entitled to receive the salary, is required to be made by the employer failing which the employer is liable to pay simple interest thereon. The provisions relating to payment of advance tax is contained in Part ‘C’ and interest thereon in Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII of the Act. In cases where receipt is by way of salary, deductions under Section 192 of the Act is required to be made. No question of payment of advance tax under Part ‘C’ of Chapter VII of the Act can arise in cases of receipt by way of ‘salary’. If that is so, Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII dealing with interest chargeable in certain cases (Section 234B – Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax and Section 234C – Interest for deferment of advance tax) would have no application to the present situation

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Pr. CIT vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (P&H High Court)

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DATE: December 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 194C vs. 194J: Law on whether payments for construction, erection & commissioning etc of plants involving inputs from technical personnel constitutes "payments for technical services" and attracts TDS obligations u/s 194J in the light of Bharti Cellular 330 ITR 239 (SC) explained

The contention of the revenue that in accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Bharti Cellular Ltd., (2011) 330 ITR 239 (SC), the matter ought to be remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine technical experts on this issue is not well founded. Firstly, the department never made an application for examining an expert. Secondly, it is not the department’s case that there was any material other than the contracts which required consideration. Apart from raising this contention, no such case was made out even before us at the hearing of this appeal. The case before us merely requires a construction of the contract. The extent of human intervention that was relied upon by the department is based on the provisions of the contract itself

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Gajanan Constructions vs. DCIT (ITAT Pune)

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DATE: September 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 234E: Entire law on whether fee for late filing of TDS returns can be levied prior to 01.06.2015 and whether the intimation issued u/s 200A is appealable explained

It is clear that the prescribed authority has been vested with the power to charge fees under section 234E of the Act only with regard to levy of fees by the substitution made by Finance (No.2) Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Once the power has been given, under which any levy has to be imposed upon tax payer, then such power comes into effect from the date of substitution and cannot be applied retrospectively. The said exercise of power has been provided by the statute to be from 01.06.2015 and hence, is to be applied prospectively. There is no merit in the claim of Revenue that even without insertion of clause (c) under section 200A(1) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the assessee to pay fees, in case there is default in furnishing the statement of tax deducted at source. Admittedly, the onus was upon the assessee to prepare statements and deliver the same within prescribed time before the prescribed authority, but the power to collect the fees by the prescribed authority vested in such authority only by way of substitution of clause (c) to section 200A(1) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.06.2015. Prior to said substation, the Assessing Officer had no authority to charge the fees under section 234E of the Act while issuing intimation under section 200A of the Act. Before exercising the authority of charging any sum from any deductor or the assessee, the prescribed authority should have necessary power vested in it and before vesting of such power, no order can be passed by the prescribed authority in charging of such fees under section 234E of the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under section 200A of the Act. Thus, in the absence of enabling provisions, under which the prescribed authority is empowered to charge the fees, the Assessing Officer while processing the returns filed by the deductor in respect of tax deducted at source can raise the demand on account of taxes, if any, not deposited and charge interest. However, prior to 01.06.2015, the Assessing Officer does not have the power to charge fees under section 234E of the Act while processing TDS returns. In the absence of enabling provisions, levy of fees could not be effected in the course of intimation issued under section 200A of the Act prior to 01.06.2015

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Fatheraj Singhvi vs. UOI (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 200A/234E: As the amendment to s. 200A has come into effect on 1.6.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee u/s 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices u/s 200A for payment of fee u/s 234E is without authority of law

It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

R K P Company vs. ITO (ITAT Raipur)

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DATE: June 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): When there are conflicting judgements of non-jurisdiction High Courts, the Tribunal is not permitted to choose based on its perception of what the correct law is because it will amount to sitting in judgement over the High Courts’ views. Instead, it has to follow the view which is in favour of the assessee even if it believes that this view is not the correct law. Second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by FA 2013 should be treated as retrospectively applicable from 1st April 2005

It will be wholly inappropriate for us to choose views of one of the High Courts based on our perceptions about reasonableness of the respective viewpoints, as such an exercise will de facto amount to sitting in judgment over the views of the High Courts something diametrically opposed to the very basic principles of hierarchical judicial system. We have to, with our highest respect of both the Hon’ble High Courts, adopt an objective criterion for deciding as to which of the Hon’ble High Court should be followed by us. We find guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [(1972) 88 ITR 192 (SC)]. Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down a principle that “if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provisions are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted”. This principle has been consistently followed by the various authorities as also by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

DDIT vs. Reliance Industries Ltd (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
(i) Purchase of a license to use shelf/shrink-wrapped software is purchase of a “product” and not a “copyright”, (ii) The retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi) to include “software” in the definition of “royalty” does not apply to DTAAs, (iii) In view of the conflict of views amongst the High Courts, the view in favour of the assessee should be followed, (iv) An obligation to deduct TDS u/s 195 cannot be imposed by the retrospective insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(vi), (v) As payments for software were not “royalty” at the time of payment, the assessee cannot be held to be in default for not deducting TDS

The assessee cannot be said to have paid the consideration for use of or the right to use copyright but has simply purchased the copyrighted work embedded in the CD- ROM which can be said to be sale of “good” by the owner. The consideration paid by the assessee thus as per the clauses of DTAA cannot be said to be royalty and the same will be outside the scope of the definition of “royalty” as provided in DTAA and would be taxable as business income of the recipient. The assessee is entitled to the fair use of the work/product including making copies for temporary purpose for protection against damage or loss even without a license provided by the owner in this respect and the same would not constitute infringement of any copyright of the owner of the work even as per the provisions of section 52 of the Copyright Act,1957

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Herbalife International India Pvt. Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination

Posted in All Judgements, High Court