Search Results For: TDS disallowance


ACIT vs. St. Mary’s Rubbers Private Ltd (ITAT Cochin)

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DATE: June 15, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Amounts paid by way of reimbursement of expenses do not constitute income in the hands of the recipient. Consequently, the payer is under no obligation to deduct TDS u/s 194C and no disallowance of the expenditure can be made u/s 40(a)(ia). CBDT Circular No.715 dated 08.08.1995 distinguished

The Tribunal, while giving the above decision, had also considered the effect of CBDT Circular No.715 dated 08.08.1995 and also ruled that the said Circular was applicable only where consolidated bills were raised inclusive of contractual payments and re-imbursement of actual expenditure. Same view was taken by the Bangalore Bench of this Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Dhanyaa Seeds (P) Ltd. (supra). Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Pr. CIT vs. Consumer Marketing (India) (P.) Ltd.(supra) held that when separate bills are there for reimbursement of expenditure received by C&F agent, TDS was not required to be made on reimbursement

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Palam Gas Service vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): S. 194C read with s. 200 are mandatory provisions. The disallowance stipulated in s. 40(a)(ia) for failure to deduct TDS u/s 194C is one of the consequences for the default. Accordingly, though there is a difference between “paid” and “payable”, s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid. The contrary interpretation that s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to cases where amounts are “payable” will result in defaulters going scot free

It is clear that Section 40(a)(ia) deals with the nature of default and the consequences thereof. Default is relatable to Chapter XVIIB (in the instant case Sections 194C and 200, which provisions are in the aforesaid Chapter). When the entire scheme of obligation to deduct the tax at source and paying it over to the Central Government is read holistically, it cannot be held that the word ‘payable’ occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) refers to only those cases where the amount is yet to be paid and does not cover the cases where the amount is actually paid. If the provision is interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant herein, then even when it is found that a person, like the appellant, has violated the provisions of Chapter XVIIB (or specifically Sections 194C and 200 in the instant case), he would still go scot free, without suffering the consequences of such monetary default in spite of specific provisions laying down these consequences

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Geo Connect Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

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DATE: January 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03, 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(i)/ 9(1)(vi)/ 9(1)(vii)/ 40(a)(i): Law on whether payment by the assessee to non-resident parties for “call transmission services through dedicated bandwidth” is assessable as income accruing in India, royalty or fees for technical services and whether a disallowance can be made for failure to deduct TDS explained

In the instant case also, the undersea cable for providing dedicated bandwidth to the assessee was installed beyond the territory of India and no operations were carried out by the non-resident party M/s Kick Communication in India. It was responsible for restoring connectivity and Managing faults in connectivity etc in respect of data transmitted through undersea cable only. Similarly, the operations carried out by M/s. IGTL Solutions are also in USA and not in India. Since operations by both the non-resident parties are carried out beyond the territory of India, we thus hold that section 9(1)(i) is of the Act is not attracted in case of above two non-resident parties

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

R K P Company vs. ITO (ITAT Raipur)

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DATE: June 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): When there are conflicting judgements of non-jurisdiction High Courts, the Tribunal is not permitted to choose based on its perception of what the correct law is because it will amount to sitting in judgement over the High Courts’ views. Instead, it has to follow the view which is in favour of the assessee even if it believes that this view is not the correct law. Second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by FA 2013 should be treated as retrospectively applicable from 1st April 2005

It will be wholly inappropriate for us to choose views of one of the High Courts based on our perceptions about reasonableness of the respective viewpoints, as such an exercise will de facto amount to sitting in judgment over the views of the High Courts something diametrically opposed to the very basic principles of hierarchical judicial system. We have to, with our highest respect of both the Hon’ble High Courts, adopt an objective criterion for deciding as to which of the Hon’ble High Court should be followed by us. We find guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [(1972) 88 ITR 192 (SC)]. Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down a principle that “if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provisions are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted”. This principle has been consistently followed by the various authorities as also by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Herbalife International India Pvt. Ltd (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

DCIT vs. Sesa Resources Ltd (ITAT Panaji)

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DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 195/ 40(a)(ia): Commission paid to non-resident agents for services rendered outside India is not liable for TDS u/s 195. The retrospective amendment to s. 195 to provide that s. 195 applies whether or not the non-resident person has a residence or place of business or business connection in India makes no difference to the legal position

As the commission agent did not have any business connection in India as they had no permanent establishment in India and in fact neither any income arose or accrued to non-resident agent in India. DCIT v/s Ardeshi B Cursetjee & Sons Ltd. 115 TTJ 916 which held that the commission paid to non-resident agent outside India for the services rendered were not chargeable to tax in India. In these circumstances, there was no occasion to deduct tax at source in respect of the payment made to the non-resident agent

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Farida Leather Company (Madras High Court)

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DATE: January 20, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 195/ 40(a)(ia): Commission paid to a non-resident for services rendered outside India is not chargeable to tax in India and is not liable for TDS. Insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(i) and Explanation 2 to s. 195(1) by FA 2012 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1962 and insertion of Explanation below s. 9 (2) by FA 2010, w.r.e.f. 01.06.1976 makes no difference to the law

The commission payments to the non-resident agents are not taxable in India, as the agents are remaining outside, services are rendered abroad and payments are also made abroad. The contention of the Revenue that the Tribunal ought not to have relied upon G.E.India Technology’s case, cited supra, in view of insertion of Explanation 4 to Section 9 (1) (i) of the Act with corresponding introduction of Explanation 2 to Section 195 (1) of the Act, both by the Finance Act, 2012, with retrospective effect from 01.04.1962 is not correct. When the transaction does not attract the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, then there is no question of applying Explanation 4 to Section 9 of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

DCIT vs. Mahanagar Gas Ltd (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia)/ 192: Employees deputed pursuant to a secondment agreement are not "employees" of the assessee and so the amounts paid by way of reimbursement of their salary is not subject to TDS in the assessee's hands

The employees are not the employees of assessee Mahanagar Gas Ltd but employees of British Gas and they are working with assessee only in view of secondment agreement. As per joint venture agreement GAIL and British Gas have agreed to second, therefore, employees to the joint venture company i.e. Mahanagar Gas Ltd. on secondment basis and under secondment agreement certain employees have been seconded to the assessee. Since the employers were seconded for limited time of 2 to 3 years, the remuneration payable to these seconded employees were being paid by British Gas or GAIL recoverable from assessee on cost to cost basis. The nature of secondment agreement make clear the duties of second employees, their liabilities towards assessee and reimbursement of actual cost of remuneration, benefits and disbursement by assessee to the joint venture partners. These are reimbursements. Also the employee’s remuneration was allowable to tax in India then there would be tax deduction obligation on the employer who was responsible for making payment to the employees

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Rakesh Tak vs. ITO (ITAT Jaipur)

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DATE: November 4, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia), though inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2013, is retrospective in operation because it is curative and intended to remedy an unintended consequence. Accordingly, if the payee has paid the tax, the payer will not suffer a disallowance

The second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by the Finance Act, 2012 is curative in nature intended to supply an obvious omission, take care of an unintended consequence and make the section workable. Section 40(a)(ia) without the second proviso resulted in the unintended consequence of disallowance of legitimate business expenditure even in a case where the payee in receipt of the income had paid tax, and, therefore, the second proviso although inserted with effect from 1st April, 2013 is curative in nature and has retrospective effect

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Kotak Securities Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 31, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vii)/ 40(a)(ia)/ 194J: “Technical services” & “Managerial and Consultancy service” denotes services that cater to special & exclusive needs of the consumer/user. A "facility", even if termed as a service, which is available to all users, does not come within the ambit of “technical services” in Explanation 2 of s. 9(1)(vii)

“Technical services” like “Managerial and Consultancy service” would denote seeking of services to cater to the special needs of the consumer/user as may be felt necessary and the making of the same available by the service provider. It is the above feature that would distinguish/identify a service provided from a facility offered. While the former is special and exclusive to the seeker of the service, the latter, even if termed as a service, is available to all and would therefore stand out in distinction to the former. The service provided by the Stock Exchange for which transaction charges are paid fails to satisfy the aforesaid test of specialized, exclusive and individual requirement of the user or consumer who may approach the service provider for such assistance/service. It is only service of the above kind that, according to us, should come within the ambit of the expression “technical services” appearing in Explanation 2 of Section 9(1)(vii) of the Act. In the absence of the above distinguishing feature, service, though rendered, would be mere in the nature of a facility offered or available which would not be covered by the aforesaid provision of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court