(1) The ICAI has the power to direct the name of a member to be removed from the Register for “misconduct” and consequently the member would lose his certificate and the right to practice. This is a matter having serious civil consequences and thus the power can only be exercised in accordance with law and the rule of fairness. Fairness should not only appear to have been done but should actually be done in such proceedings. To many a man, his professional reputation is his most valuable possession. It affects his standing and dignity among his fellow members in the profession and guarantees the esteem of his clientele;

(2) The law requires the principles of natural justice to be followed even in pure administrative action. It is a fundamental principle of fair hearing incorporated in the doctrine of natural justice and as a rule of universal obligation, that all administrative acts or decisions affecting the rights of the individual must comply with the principles of natural justice and the person or persons sought to be affected adversely must be granted not only an opportunity of hearing but a fair opportunity of hearing. This is all the more required when the reputation of a professional is involved and the damages may be irreparable and irretrievable. It is mandatory for the Disciplinary Committee to adhere to the principles of natural justice;

In respect of AY 2001-2002, the assessee claimed that though s. 80HHC (1B) limited the deduction to 80% of the profits eligible for deduction u/s 80HHC, this limitation did not apply for purposes of “book profits” u/s 115JB and that 100% of the 80HHC profits were deductible. The Tribunal allowed the claim by relying on the Special Bench judgement in Syncome Formulations 106 ITD 193 (Mum) (SB) and the Budget speech of the Finance Minister. On appeal by the Revenue, HELD, reversing the Tribunal’s order:

(1) S. 115JB allows a deduction from the “book profits” of “the amount of profits eligible for deduction u/s 80HHC, computed under clause (a) …. of sub-section (3) …. subject to the conditions specified in that section.” Ss (3) and (3A) provide for the method for computation of profits. Once the profits are worked out, then only the profit which is eligible can be deducted. In computing the “eligibility”, the limits of s. 80HHC (1B) have to be read in.

To give effect to s. 145A, if there is any change in the closing stock at the end of the year then there must necessarily be a corresponding adjustment made in the opening stock of that year. This does not amount to giving double benefit to the assessee and would be necessary to compute the true and correct profit for the purpose of assessment.

Disqualification of Ex-Members practicing before CESTAT is constitutional

Where the assessee-airline supplied blank tickets to the travel agent, on terms that the same be sold at a minimum price and the difference between the said minimum price and the price at which the tickets were sold to the passenger was retained by the travel agent and the question arose whether the amount so retained by the agent was “commission” and whether the assessee was required to deduct tax thereon u/s 194-H of the Act, HELD, reversing the decision of the Tribunal:

(a) The relationship between the airline and the travel agent was that of a principal and agent as all the requirements of s. 182 of the Contract Act were fulfilled by the PSA. By the acts of the travel agent, a legal relationship was created between the airline and the passenger;

(b) The monies retained by the travel agent in the form of supplementary commission is not a “discount” because the travel agent never obtains proprietary rights to the tickets and has never paid a “price” for the same. Instead, the same is “commission” because it is received for services rendered on behalf of the assessee-airline and the airline ought to have deducted tax u/s 194-H;

In admitting the appeal filed under section 260A against the judgement of the 5 Member Special Bench of the Tribunal in Aztec Software vs. ACIT 294 ITR (AT) 32 / 107 ITD 41, the High Court has granted stay of “the operation and all further proceedings” of the said judgement until further orders.

Held, affirming the majority view of the Special Bench in DCIT vs. Oman International Bank 100 ITD 285 that:

(i) Though the Circulars issued by the CBDT are not binding on the court as held in CCE vs. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries 231 ELT 22 (S.C.), it is binding on the authorities and while it is for the Court to read the section in its proper context, while so reading the Court will bear in mind the circular issued by the CBDT. Circulars are sometimes issued to obviate difficulties in the operation of the provisions and these are aspects which Courts do bear in mind while considering the Circulars. Accordingly, Circulars have to be taken into account.

(ii) The decision of an assessee to treat a debt as a bad debt in his books has to be a business or commercial decision and not whimsical or fanciful and must be based on material that the debt is not recoverable. The decision must be bona fide;

(iii) Post amendment of s. 36 (1)(vii) & 36 (2), the burden is not on the assessee to show the debt is “bad”. In order to disallow, the AO must show that the decision of the assessee was not bona fide.

Where the question arose whether in respect of an appeal admitted u/s 260A, the High Court has power to grant stay of recovery of outstanding demand, HELD:

(i) S. 260A provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals to the High Court shall apply;

(ii) Rules 5 (1) and 5 (3) of Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorize the Court to grant stay provided it is satisfied:

(a) that substantial loss may result to the party applying for stay of execution unless the order is made;

(b) that the application has been made without unreasonable delay; and

(c) that security has been given by the applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him.

(iii) On facts, as these conditions were satisfied, the assessee was entitled to stay subject to conditions.

Where the question arose whether the Explanation to s. 73 (which deems the loss from trading in shares by a company to be speculation loss) can be confined only to cases where there is manipulation and whether the loss arising on valuation of closing stock of shares is also covered, HELD:

(i) Though the Circular of the CBDT supports the interpretation that the object of the Expl. to s. 73 is to curb manipulation of group companies’ shares, the scope of the Expl. extends to all companies carrying on business in shares;

(ii) Though the Expl. refers to purchase and sale of shares and not to losses suffered on account of valuation, it applies to valuation losses as well as there is no difference between trading losses and valuation losses.

Where the assessee made a VDIS declaration in which diamonds were disclosed and he later claimed that the moneys received by him were the sale proceeds of the said diamonds which could not be taxed but the AO held that the sale was fictitious as the second purchaser to whom the diamonds were stated to have been sold by the first purchaser was not traceable, HELD

In view of the fact that the diamonds formed a part of the declaration which was accepted by the department and the consideration was received from the purchaser by cheque and recorded in the books of accounts, the assessee had proved the possession of the diamonds at the time of declaration and the sale thereof could not be disbelieved merely because there was doubt about the second sale.