Search Results For: Atul Jasani


PCIT vs. PMP Auto Components Pvt. Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: February 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 92C: Taxability under Transfer Pricing provisions of shares purchased at value in excess of FMV: As the transaction of purchase of equity shares is a capital transaction and does not give rise to any income, the transfer pricing provisions do not apply. Chapter X is a machinery provision. It can only be invoked to bring to tax any income arising from an international transaction. It is necessary for the revenue to show that income does arise from the international transaction. S. 2(24)(xvi) & 56(2)(viib) are prospective

There is no dispute before us that the transaction of purchase of shares by the respondent of its subsidiary company i.e. A.E. at a price much higher than its fair market value would be international transaction as defined in Section 92(B) of the Act. The only issue before us as considered by the impugned order of the Tribunal is whether Chapter X of the Act would at all be applicable in case of any investment made on capital account. This on the premise that the transaction of purchase of equity share capital would not give rise to any income. We note that similar issue was before this Court in Vodafone 268 ITR 1 and this court inter alia observed that Chapter X of the Act is machinery provision to arrive at the arm’s length price of transaction between associated enterprises

State Bank Of India vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: June 15, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 147: The computation of income is the basic document for making the s. 143(3) assessment. If there is a disclosure in the computation, it leads to the prima facie necessary inference that there is application of mind by the AO. The fact that the AO did not raise specific queries & is silent in the assessment order does not mean there is no application of mind (Techspan 404 ITR 10(SC) followed, other contra judgements distinguished)

There was also no reason in the present facts for the Assessing Officer to ask any queries in respect of this claim of the petitioner, as the basic document viz. computation of income at note 21 (Assessment Year 2013-14) and note 22 (Assessment Year 2014-15) thereof explained the basis of the claim being made to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer. Thus, it must necessarily be inferred that the Assessing Officer has applied his mind at the time of passing an assessment order to this particular claim made in the basic document viz. computation of the income by not disallowing it in proceedings under Section 143(3) of the Act as he was satisfied with the basis of the claim as indicated in that very document. Therefore, where he accepts the claim made, the occasion to ask questions on it will not arise nor does it have to be indicated in the order passed in the regular assessment proceedings. Thus, issuing the impugned notices on the above ground would, prima-facie, amount to a change of opinion

PCIT vs. Inarco Limited (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: July 23, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 147/50C: The assessment cannot be reopened (within 4 years) on the ground that the AO lost sight of a statutory provision like 50C. This amounts to a review. A.L.A. Firm 55 TM 497 (SC) distinguished on the basis that the reopening in that case was because the AO was unaware of a binding High Court judgement. Here it is not the case of the Revenue that the AO was not aware of s. 50C at the time of passing the S. 143(3) assessment order

The basis of reopening the assessment in A.L.A. Firm (Supra) was the decision in the case of G.R.Ramachari & Co. (Supra) coming to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the completion of assessment proceedings. In this case it is not the case of the Revenue that the Assessing Officer was not aware of Section 50C of the Act at the time of passing the Assessement Order dated 26.12.2007 under Section 143 of the Act. In this case the trigger to reopen assessment proceedings as recorded in the reasons is nonfurnishing of copy of the sale deed by the Respondent. This has been found factually to be incorrect. Therefore, once the sale deed was before Assessing Officer and enquiries were made during the assessment proceedings regarding the quantum of capital gains, it must follow that the Assessing Officer had while passing the order dated 26.12.2007 under Section 143(3) of the Act had taken view on facts and in law as in force at the relevant time. Thus, this is a case of change of opinion

Pr CIT vs. Amphenol Interconnect India P. Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 7, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07, 2007-08, 2009-09
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: The Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method is not the Most Appropriate Method for determining the Arm's Length Price (ALP) in respect of the transactions of (sales of goods and sales commission) with Associated Enterprises (AEs) if there are geographical differences, volume differences, timing differences, risk differences and functional differences. If it is not shown that the selection of TNMM as the Most Appropriate Method is perverse, the same cannot be challenged

The TPO has while stating that FAR analysis has to be carried out, does not indicate that it was carried out. On the contrary, we find that the Tribunal in the impugned order has done the necessary FAR analysis. This is so as it has compared the risk and functional differences involved in finished goods being sold to AEs as against those sold to third parties as we have enumerated above to come to the conclusion that the prices at which the finished goods sold to the third parties are not comparables to the prices at which the goods sold to the AEs inter alia on the FAR analysis. We note that the finished goods are customized goods and the geographical differences, volume differences, timing differences, risk differences and functional differences, came to a conclusion that the CUP method would not be the MAM to determine the ALP

CIT vs. Hercules Hoists Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: June 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA(5): Only losses of the years beginning from the initial assessment year are to be brought forward for set-off against profits of the eligible unit. Losses of earlier years which are already set off against income cannot be brought forward notionally for set-off. The fiction in s. 80-IA(5) is created only for a limited purpose and cannot be extended

The eligible business were the only source of income, during the previous year relevant to the initial assessment year and every subsequent assessment years. When the assessee exercises the option, the only losses of the years beginning from initial assessment year alone are to be brought forward and no losses of earlier years which were already set off against the income of the assessee. Looking forward to a period of ten years from the initial assessment is contemplated. It does not allow the Revenue to look backward and find out if there is any loss of earlier years and bring forward notionally even though the same were set off against other income of the assessee and the set off against the current income of the eligible business. Once the set off is taken place in earlier year against the other income of the assessee, the Revenue cannot rework the set off amount and bring it notionally. A fiction created in subsection does not contemplates to bring set off amount notionally. The fiction is created only for the limited purpose and the same cannot be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created

Ultratech Cement Ltd vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
An additional ground (relating to claim u/s 80-IA) cannot be permitted to be raised if the necessary evidence that the assessee is entitled to the claim is not on record. The fact that claim has been allowed by the AO in a subsequent year and that there is no reason why the claim should not be allowed in the present year is irrelevant. Also, the assessee must satisfy the appellate authority that the ground now raised was bona fide and the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons

We note that it is an undisputed position before us that for the subject assessment year, the appellant assessee had not claimed benefit of Section 80IA of the Act in respect of its Jetty / Port either before the Assessing Officer or before the CIT(A). A claim for benefit under Section 80IA of the Act can only be made if the infrastructure facility such as Jetty / Port is, among other things, being run on the basis of an agreement for either developing or operating and maintaining or developing, operating and maintaining a new infrastructure facility. The sine qua non provided in SubSection (7) of Section 80IA of the Act is the furnishing along with its Return of Income, a report of audited accounts in Form 10CCB as required under Rule 18BBB(3) of the Act. The Form 10CCB which is required to be filed along with Return of Income has various details to be filled in, including the initial assessment year from which the deduction is being claimed, the nature of the activity carried out with regard to the infrastructure facility, namely, whether it is for developing or developing and operating or for developing, operating and maintaining the new infrastructure facility. It is only on examination of those details as submitted by the auditor in Form 10CCB that the claim of deduction can be considered. It is undisputed that for the subject assessment year, no Form 10CCB has been filed by the appellant assessee. Therefore, there is no evidence on record for subject assessment year to allow the claim. The submission of Mr.Agrawal for the appellant that primary evidence in the form of jetty is on record is not acceptable. Mere ownership or existence of jetty is not evidence of eligibility to the benefit of Section 80IA of the Act, which is admittedly conditional upon satisfaction of certain requirements as provided therein

CIT vs. Gagandeep Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital/ premium: The proviso to s. 68 (which creates an obligation on the issuing Co to explain the source of share capital & premium) has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 01.04.2013 and does not have retrospective effect. Prior thereto, as per Lovely Exports 317 ITR 218 (SC), if the AO regards the share premium as bogus, he has to assess the shareholders but cannot assess the same as the issuing company's unexplained cash credit

The proviso to Section 68 of the Act has been introduced by the Finance Act 2012 with effect from 1st April, 2013. Thus it would be effective only from the Assessment Year 2013-14 onwards and not for the subject Assessment Year. In fact, before the Tribunal, it was not even the case of the Revenue that Section 68 of the Act as in force during the subject years has to be read/understood as though the proviso added subsequently effective only from 1st April, 2013 was its normal meaning. The Parliament did not introduce to proviso to Section 68 of the Act with retrospective effect nor does the proviso so introduced states that it was introduced “for removal of doubts” or that it is “declaratory”. Therefore it is not open to give it retrospective effect, by proceeding on the basis that the addition of the proviso to Section 68 of the Act is immaterial and does not change the interpretation of Section 68 of the Act both before and after the adding of the proviso

CIT vs. Green Infra Limited (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 68: Even if the premium at which the shares are issued defies commercial prudence, the receipt cannot be assessed as "unexplained credit" if the identity of the payer, genuineness of the transaction and capacity of the subscriber are not disputed. Interest earned on short-term fixed deposits is assessable as "profits and gains of business" and not as "income from other sources"

Mr.Chhotaray the learned counsel for the Revenue states that the impugned order itself holds that share premium of Rs.490/per share defies all commercial prudence. Therefore it has to be considered to be cash credit. We find that the Tribunal has examined the case of the Revenue on the parameters of Section 68 of the Act and found on facts that it is not so hit. Therefore, Section 68 of the Act cannot be invoked. The Revenue has not been able to show in any manner the factual finding recorded by the Tribunal is perverse in any manner

Otters Club vs. DIT (E) (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

Prashanth Projects Ltd vs. DCIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: July 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay: An appeal wrongly filed before the AO and not CIT(A) is an unintentional lapse of the assessee. The AO ought to have returned the appeal to enable the assessee to take corrective steps. The likelihood of error is inherent in human nature The power of condonation is in view of human fallibility and must be exercised in cases of bona fide lapses

Human interaction is influenced by human nature. Inherent in human nature is the likelihood of error. Therefore, the adage “to err is human”. Thus, the power to condone delay while applying the law of limitation. This power of condonation is only in view of human fallibility. The laws of nature are not subject to human error, thus beyond human correction. In fact, the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradip Kumar 2000(7) SCC 372 has observed to the effect that although the law assists the vigilant, an unintentional lapse on the part of the litigant would not normally close the doors of adjudication so as to be permanently closed, as it is human to err

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