It is true that Instruction No.4 (B)(b) of the Circular dated 29.2.2016, gives two instances where less than 15% can be asked to be deposited. However, it is equally true that the factors, which were directed to be kept in mind both by the Assessing Officer, and by the higher superior authority, contained in Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, still continue to exist. For, as noted above, the said part of Circular No.1914 has been left untouched by the Circular dated 29.2.2016. Therefore, while dealing with an application filed by an assessee, both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to see if the assessee’s case would fall under Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, or not? Both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to examine whether the assessment is “unreasonably high pitched”, or whether the demand for depositing 15% of the disputed demand amount “would lead to a genuine hardship being caused to the assessee” or not?
By no interpretative process the explanation to Section 164 of the Act, which is pressed in service can be read for determinability of the shares of the beneficiary with the quantum on the date when the Trust deed is executed and the second reason is that the real test is the determinability of the shares of the beneficiary and is not dependent upon the date on which the trust deed was executed if one is to connect the same with the quantum. The real test is whether shares are determinable even when even or after the Trust is formed or may be in future when the Trust is in existence
It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.
The question arose whether s. 14A applies to a case where the motive of the assessee is to acquire controlling interest in a company and not to earn dividends. The Tribunal followed the judgement of the Special Bench in ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd (2009) 312 ITR (AT) 1 and held that section 14A is applicable even where the motive in acquiring the shares was to obtain controlling interest in the companies. The Tribunal upheld in principle the applicability of section 14A but remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to ascertain from the facts of the case as to how much interest bearing borrowings was utilized to acquire shares in the companies
Section 147/148 of the Act is not meant for reopening an already concluded assessment by first issuing notice and then proceeding to investigate and find out if there was any lacuna in the accounts. If such further investigation, by reopening a concluded assessment, is permitted, it, would give rise to fishing and rowing enquiries, because, in every case, the Assessing Officer can then issue notice for the purpose of investigation, and thus reopen any concluded assessment
Under the general law relating to mutual concerns, the surplus accruing to a mutual concern cannot be regarded as income, profits or gains for the purpose of the Act (s.4), and where the contributors are to receive back a part of their own contributions, the complete identity between the contributors and recipients negatives the idea of any profit, for no man can make profit out of himself. Therefore, a mutual concern can carry on an activity with its members, though the surplus arising from such activity is not taxable income or profit. The principle of mutuality has also been accepted in the case of a voluntary organization, which receives contributions from its members. The assessee’s contention that Section 44AB of the Act is not applicable to a club being a mutual concern is supported by several judgements
An identical question regarding Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was considered by the Calcutta High Court in S. K. Tekriwal  361ITR 432 (Cal) and the findings given by the Calcutta High Court has been followed by the Tribunal. Similarly, as regards the binding nature of the CBDT, the Tribunal has followed the Judgment of the Apex Court in HAL (supra). In view of both the decisions cited supra, no substantial questions of law arises for our determination in this appeal
Section 2 of the Act contemplates ‘charitable purpose’. ‘Charitable purpose’ includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. The phrase ‘any other object of general public utility’ if, examined in the light of the Judgment in the case of AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION [supra], it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit of the whole of mankind or of persons in a Country or State. If it is distinguished from a specified individual and if it is to the benefit of section of the public, it has to be construed as charitable purpose
It is clear that the notice is issued proposing to levy penalty under Section 271(1)(b) of the Act whereas the order is passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act which clearly indicates that there was no application of mind by the Assessing Officer while issuing the notice under Section 274 of the Act. As regards Section 271(1-B) of the Act, it clearly indicates that the assessment order should contain a direction for initiation of proceedings. Merely saying that the penalty proceedings have been initiated would not satisfy the requirement, a direction to initiate proceeding shall be clear and not be ambiguous
The concept of tax deduction at source (TDS) and depositing the same with the Revenue is where payment is made by cash, cheque, demand draft or any other similar mode. When such payment in terms of money is made, the deduction is to be made by the person responsible to pay, and is to deposit the same with the Income Tax Department, which would be adjusted and credited to the account of the person on whose behalf such amount is paid to the Income Tax Department, and in such a case, such person, who would then be an assessee before the Department, would be entitled to adjustment of the amount so deducted as TDS on behalf of the said assessee. When no payment is made by BBMP to the land owner in terms of money, such deduction is neither possible nor is conceived under Section 194LA