Search Results For: Karnataka High Court


ACIT vs. Epson India Pvt. Ltd (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: January 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Stay of demand: Pr CIT & ACIT directed to pay personal costs for filing frivolous writ petition to challenge ITAT stay order. Raising unsustainable, illegal and high pitched demands and enforcing coercive recovery and challenging stay orders shows utterly irresponsible and unfair behaviour. Thereafter, seeking adjournments by the Dept of the hearing in the ITAT adds insult to the injury. Irresponsible and uncoordinated manner of the Dept strongly deprecated

It is the unnecessary dogged approach of the Revenue to multiply the litigations in the Constitutional Courts, in turn wasting the precious public hours of time and unholy desire to become a litigant in the Constitutional Courts at Government costs, though there may be absolutely no justification for doing so. The efforts of the Revenue to prove their point that they had a good case on merits before the Constitutional Courts rather than respecting the orders passed by the statutorily created Tribunals not only shows lack of judicial discipline and hierarchical discipline which they should maintain, but treating the constitutional remedies as a vested right with them. The public functionaries and public officials cannot be allowed to spend Government money and public time much less public time of the Constitutional Courts just for the sake of proving their such fictional desires. First raising unsustainable, illegal and high pitched demands and then seeking to coercively recover the same even showing scant regard to the orders passed by highest Tribunal under the Act and for that invoking the writ jurisdiction to seek support to their such effort is nothing but an utterly irresponsible and unfair behaviour. It is the lack of such discipline with the Government Officials which turns Government Departments as a major litigant in the Constitutional Courts, in turn depriving the Constitutional Courts to devote their time for looking into the causes of poor people, which deserve their time and attention of the court more than such Government Departments

CIT vs. Hewlett Packard Global Soft Ltd (Karnataka High Court) (Full Bench)

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DATE: October 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 10A/ 10B: Entire law on the concept of "derived from" the undertaking and "purposive interpretation" of statutes explained. The incidental activity of parking surplus funds with banks or advancing of staff loans by assessees covered u/s 10-A or 10-B is an integral part of their export business activity and a business decision taken in view of the commercial expediency. Such incidental income cannot be delinked from the profits and gains derived by the undertaking engaged from the export of specified goods and cannot be taxed separately u/s 56 of the Act

Sections 10-A and 10-B of the Act are special provisions and complete code in themselves and deal with profits and gains derived by the assessee of a special nature and character like 100% Export Oriented Units (EOUs.) situated in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), STPI, etc., where the entire profits and gains of the entire Undertaking making 100% exports of articles including software as is the fact in the present case, the assessee is given 100% deduction of profit and gains of such export business and therefore incidental income of such undertaking by way of interest on the temporarily parked funds in Banks or even interest on staff loans would constitute part of profits and gains of such special Undertakings and these cases cannot be compared with deductions under Sections 80-HH or 80-IB in Chapter VI-A of the Act where an assessee dealing with several activities or commodities may inter alia earn profits and gains from the specified activity and therefore in those cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the interest income would not be the income “derived from” such Undertakings doing such special business activity

H. Naginchand Kincha vs. Superintendent of Police (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: September 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
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A Chartered Accountant who is accused of offering a bribe to an Income-tax Officer for performing an official act can be tried under sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 120-B of the IPC. The fact that the CA is not a “public servant” is irrelevant

The third fold of argument that the accused No.2 is not a public servant and is beyond the contemplation of the statute. The words occurring at Section 8 of the Act “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification…………” covers the persons other than the public servants contemplated by definition clause (c) of section 2 of the Act and that does not require much elaboration. Regarding the contention that section 7 of the P.C.Act cannot be invoked against accused No.1 is not within the competency of the petitioner to urge before this court. Even otherwise the charge sheet material contains voice recording of the accused Nos.1 and 2 and the complainant and also there is material that this petitioner made demand for bribe on behalf of the 1st accused

Karnataka Power Transmission Corp Ltd vs. M. Rajashekar (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: December 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
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NOC from Advocate to appoint new advocate: A litigant has the absolute right to appoint an advocate of his choice and to terminate his services any time and for whatever reason. There is no concept of an "irrevocable vakalatnama". A party has the absolute freedom to change his advocate. Fairness demands that the party should inform his advocate already on record though this is not a condition precedent to appoint a new advocate. The Registry cannot insist on a NOC from the old advocate and refuse to take the new vakalatnama on record

There is nothing known as irrevocable vakalatnama. The right of a party to withdraw vakalatnama or authorization given to an advocate is absolute. Hence, a party may discharge his advocate any time, with or without cause by withdrawing his vakalatnama or authorization. On discharging the advocate, the party has the right to have the case file returned to him from the advocate, and any refusal by the advocate to return the file amounts to misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. In any proceeding, including civil and criminal, a party has an absolute right to appoint a new Advocate. Under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. Therefore, it follows that any rule or law imposing restriction on the said right can’t be construed as mandatory. Accordingly, Courts, Tribunals or other authorities shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new advocate

Flipkart India Private Limited vs. ACIT (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: February 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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S. 220(6) stay of demand: CBDT Circular dated 29.2.2016 does not supersede Instruction No.1914 but modifies it. Both have to be read together. The AO and CIT cannot straightaway demand payment of 15% of the dues but have to grant complete stay if the assessment is “unreasonably high pitched” or the demand for depositing 15% of the disputed demand leads to "genuine hardship" to the assessee”

It is true that Instruction No.4 (B)(b) of the Circular dated 29.2.2016, gives two instances where less than 15% can be asked to be deposited. However, it is equally true that the factors, which were directed to be kept in mind both by the Assessing Officer, and by the higher superior authority, contained in Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, still continue to exist. For, as noted above, the said part of Circular No.1914 has been left untouched by the Circular dated 29.2.2016. Therefore, while dealing with an application filed by an assessee, both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to see if the assessee’s case would fall under Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, or not? Both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to examine whether the assessment is “unreasonably high pitched”, or whether the demand for depositing 15% of the disputed demand amount “would lead to a genuine hardship being caused to the assessee” or not?

CIT vs. India Advantage Fund-VII (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: February 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 164: The explanation to s. 164 cannot be read for determinability of the shares of the beneficiary with the quantum on the date when the Trust deed is executed. The real test is whether shares are determinable even when even or after the Trust is formed or may be in future when the Trust is in existence

By no interpretative process the explanation to Section 164 of the Act, which is pressed in service can be read for determinability of the shares of the beneficiary with the quantum on the date when the Trust deed is executed and the second reason is that the real test is the determinability of the shares of the beneficiary and is not dependent upon the date on which the trust deed was executed if one is to connect the same with the quantum. The real test is whether shares are determinable even when even or after the Trust is formed or may be in future when the Trust is in existence

Fatheraj Singhvi vs. UOI (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 200A/234E: As the amendment to s. 200A has come into effect on 1.6.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee u/s 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices u/s 200A for payment of fee u/s 234E is without authority of law

It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

United Breweries Limited vs. DCIT (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: May 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 14A is applicable even where the motive of the assessee in acquiring the shares is to obtain controlling interest in a company and not to earn dividends

The question arose whether s. 14A applies to a case where the motive of the assessee is to acquire controlling interest in a company and not to earn dividends. The Tribunal followed the judgement of the Special Bench in ITO v. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd (2009) 312 ITR (AT) 1 and held that section 14A is applicable even where the motive in acquiring the shares was to obtain controlling interest in the companies. The Tribunal upheld in principle the applicability of section 14A but remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to ascertain from the facts of the case as to how much interest bearing borrowings was utilized to acquire shares in the companies

C M Mahadeva vs. CIT (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: August 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 147: An assessment cannot be reopened for the purpose of making a fishing and roving enquiry

Section 147/148 of the Act is not meant for reopening an already concluded assessment by first issuing notice and then proceeding to investigate and find out if there was any lacuna in the accounts. If such further investigation, by reopening a concluded assessment, is permitted, it, would give rise to fishing and rowing enquiries, because, in every case, the Assessing Officer can then issue notice for the purpose of investigation, and thus reopen any concluded assessment

Koramangala Club vs. ITO (Karnataka High Court)

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DATE: February 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 44AB/ 271B: Belief that a mutual association like a club is not liable for tax audit is a bona fide one and constitutes reasonable cause u/s 273B

Under the general law relating to mutual concerns, the surplus accruing to a mutual concern cannot be regarded as income, profits or gains for the purpose of the Act (s.4), and where the contributors are to receive back a part of their own contributions, the complete identity between the contributors and recipients negatives the idea of any profit, for no man can make profit out of himself. Therefore, a mutual concern can carry on an activity with its members, though the surplus arising from such activity is not taxable income or profit. The principle of mutuality has also been accepted in the case of a voluntary organization, which receives contributions from its members. The assessee’s contention that Section 44AB of the Act is not applicable to a club being a mutual concern is supported by several judgements

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