Search Results For: Article 226


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DATE: March 4, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 220(6) Recovery of demand: A Petitioner invoking the discretionary extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court is expected to approach with clean hands. Instead, there is gross suppression and misstatement, which led to a false projection of the outstanding liability due from the petitioner. Also, the Petitioner ought not to have sought adjournment before the CIT(A) on the ground that the earlier year is pending without seeking modification of the Court's order. Writ Petition dismissed with costs of Rs. 5 lakh. (Note: The Supreme Court has stayed recovery of the demand)

Considering the fact that the petitioner has invoked the discretionary extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, the petitioner was expected to approach this Court with clean hands, which, unfortunately, we find is completely lacking in the present case. We are, therefore, not inclined to exercise our discretionary writ jurisdiction in favour of such a petitioner. Accordingly, we dismiss this petition with costs quantified at Rs. 5 lakhs to be paid to the Delhi High Court Advocates’ Welfare Trust

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DATE: January 31, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The Writ Petition to challenge the ITAT's order dismissing the MA does not appear to be bonafide. In the garb of the MA, the Petitioner sought review of the final order passed by the Tribunal and for rehearing of the appeal which is not permissible in law. Costs of Rs. 10,000 imposed on the Petitioner

In the instant case, what we notice is that not only was there no mistake apparent from the record but in the garb of the Misc. Application, petitioner had sought for review of the final order passed by the Tribunal and for rehearing of the appeal which is not permissible in law. In our view, Writ Petition does not appear to be bonafide

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DATE: October 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Writ Petition for non-grant of refund: Though an order refusing to issue refund is not an appeallable order u/s 246A, it is subject to revision u/s 264. As the alternate remedy of revision is available, the Writ is not maintainable (Larsen & Toubro 326 ITR 514 (Bom) referred)

If one contrasts section 264 of the Act with section 246A of the Act which provides for appeal, it would be noticed that unlike section 246A of the Act which specifies sections of the Act from which an appeal would lie, section 264 of the Act provides for revision from `any order’ under the Act. This is another indication that the Commissioner of Income Tax has very wide powers to correct any order passed by an officer subordinate to him

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DATE: September 17, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Art 226: If an assessee obtains an order from the Court that the Dept should refund the seized amount but does not take steps to enforce the order beyond the period of limitation, he is guilty of laches and negligence. He is not entitled to file another Writ for enforcement of the earlier order. Such a litigant does not deserve any relief in the discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of the High Court

This Court is not obliged to entertain belated and stale claims. The writ jurisdiction is not meant to confer benefit or enable litigants who sleep over their rights to derive an advantage for themselves. The writ jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary and if people like the petitioner, who is a businessman and prudent enough to know as to how monies, allegedly retained illegally, have to be recovered promptly and expeditiously. He does nothing despite a favourable order from this Court for more than a decade. Such a litigant does not deserve any relief in our discretionary and equitable jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is extraordinary as well. It is not meant to get over the bar prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963 for bringing a suit either. This indirect and oblique way of seeking a discretionary relief has to be discouraged

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DATE: July 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Time limit for filing MA: Though the Tribunal has no power u/s 254(2) to condone delay in filing the MA, the High Court has power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to do substantial justice by condoning the delay. Injustice was done to the assessee because the Tribunal did not follow the binding judgement in Manjunatha Cotton and Ginning Factory 359 ITR 565 on the issue of levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c). Accordingly, the delay in fling the MA deserves to be condoned

Though under the provisions of Section 254 the Tribunal cannot go beyond the provisions of the said Section, the fact remains that the petitioner has substantiated that injustice is being done by not following the Division Bench decision of this Court. Therefore, in order to do substantial justice, this Court exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can condone the delay as held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Practice Strategic Communications India Private Limited .vs. C.S.T., Domlur, reported in 2016(45) S.T.R. 47(Kar.)

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DATE: March 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 31, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strike by Advocates: Giving a call to protest when the Bill is still at a draft stage is premature. Wisdom has to prevail on the Advocates in the light of the law laid down in Harish Uppal AIR 2003 SC 739. The law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on the Advocates as well under Article 141 of the Constitution. The lawyers' community has to appreciate their responsibility in discharging the duties of their profession

If one has to understand the implication or consequences of abstaining from work in general terms, the strike would mean abstaining from work apart form other meanings. It is nothing but demonstration of protest against the suggestions or resolution denying in line with the demand. It can also mean temporary stoppage of activities in protest against any act or a condition imposed. Petitioners’ counsel also rely upon the order dated 5th December 2016 passed in Contempt Petition (C) No.19/2016 in Writ Petition (C) No.132/1988 (Prem Prakash Panigrahi v. Md.Shabbir Ahmed and others) on the file of the Apex Court so also the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 27th October 2014 passed in PIL No.75/2014 (Adv.Manoj Laxman Shirsat v. Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa). The observations in the case of Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (supra) indicate that the proceedings inside the Court are always expected to be held which commands confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the Courts. In the said decision, the Apex Court has also referred to the duties, obligations, responsibilities and the divine work of the community of the lawyers while discharging their professional duties

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DATE: July 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Writ Petition: A Writ Petition filed little after four months of receipt of impugned order suffers from “delay”. If the Writ Petition does not explain the reasons for the “delay”, it is liable to be dismissed

We find that the impugned order of the Tribunal was passed on 4th December, 2015, received by the petitioner on 28th December, 2015. This petition has been filed on 29th April, 2016. The petition states that according to the petitioner, there is no delay in filing the petition. However, if this Court is of the view that there is a delay and delay may be condoned. However, no reasons with particulars are specified in the petition. In view of the fact that the petition itself does not explain the reason for the delay, the petition is liable to be dismissed