(143.2 KiB, 610 DLs)

S. 50C is a deeming provision which does not apply to “rights in land & building”

The assessee booked a flat in a building which was under construction for which he had paid Rs. 16.12 lakhs. The builder had not handed over possession of the flat to the assessee nor had he executed any registered sale deed in favour of the assessee. The assessee entered into an agreement pursuant to which he transferred his rights, title and interest in the said flat in consideration of the amount paid by him to the builder. The AO took the view that as the flat was valued at Rs. 57.57 lakhs for stamp duty purposes, capital gains had to be computed on that basis u/s 50C. This was reversed by the CIT (A). On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

S.50C applies “where the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer by an assessee of a capital asset, being land or building or both, is less than the value adopted or assessed by any authority of a State Government for the purpose of payment of stamp duty …” S. 50C is a deeming provision and extends to only to land or building or both. A deeming provision can be applied only in respect of the situation specifically given and cannot go beyond the explicit mandate of the section. If the capital asset under transfer cannot be described as “land or building or both”, s. 50C will cease to apply. As the assessee had transferred booking rights and received back the booking advance, the booking advance cannot be equated with the capital asset and therefore s. 50C cannot be invoked (Tejinder Singh followed).

(258.5 KiB, 442 DLs)

S. 255(4): Bench cannot refuse to give effect to Third Member’s opinion

The Tribunal had to consider whether certain amounts could be assessed as cash credits u/s 68 and whether certain expenditure incurred by the assessee could be allowed as a deduction. The Judicial Member decided both issues in favour of the assessee while the Accountant Member decided both issues in favour of the department. The Third Member agreed with the opinion of the JM and decided both issues in favour of the assessee. At the stage of giving effect to the opinion of the Third Member, the JM passed an order in conformity with that of the Third Member. However, the AM observed that it is not possible to give effect to the order of the Third Member on the ground that the order of the Third Member was contrary to his own expressed opinion and that he had not considered various points of differences arising from the dissenting orders. He accordingly framed certain new questions on the merits of the dispute and directed that the matter be referred back to the President. The JM did not agree and raised the issue whether the Members of a Bench could comment on the order of the Third Member instead of merely passing a confirmatory order in terms of s. 255(4). This was referred to the Special Bench. HELD by the Special Bench:

After the Accountant Member passed the order formulating the questions for reference to the Third Member, he became functus officio. The opinion expressed by the Third Member was very much binding on the AM and he was bound to follow the opinion of the Third Member in its true letter and spirit. It was necessary for judicial propriety and discipline that the Member who is in minority must accept as binding opinion of the Third Member. The AM had no power to formulate new questions at the stage of giving effect to the opinion of the majority and his action was not sustainable in law.

(146.8 KiB, 712 DLs)

S. 40(a)(ia): Amendment by FA 2010 w.e.f 1.4.2010 is retrospective

For AY 2005-06, the AO made a disallowance of expenditure incurred by the assessee on the ground that the assessee had made the TDS payments u/s 194C after the end of the year. Before the Tribunal, the assessee claimed that as the TDS had been paid before the due date of filing the ROI, no disallowance could be made as per s. 40(a)(ia) amended by the FA 2010 w.e.f. 1.4.2010. The assessee relied on Virgin Creations and claimed that it had to be followed in preference to the contrary ruling of the Special Bench in Bharati Shipyard Ltd 132 ITD 53 (Mum). HELD by the Tribunal:

In Bharati Shipyard Ltd the Special Bench held that the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the FA 2010 w.e.f. 1.4.2010 could not be held to be retrospective from AY 2005-2006 on the ground that the amendment was not remedial and curative in nature. However, the Kolkata Bench had taken a contrary view in Virgin Creations vs. ITO and held that amendment by the FA 2010 was retrospective w.e.f. 1.4.2005. The view of the Kolkata Bench has been approved by the Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Virgin Creations. The question as to whether a verdict of the Special Bench should be followed or that of a non-jurisdictional High Court should be followed is answered in Tej International (P) Ltd 69 TTJ (Del) 650 wherein it was held that in the hierarchical judicial system that we have in India, the wisdom of the court below has to yield to the higher wisdom of the Court above, and therefore, once an authority higher than this Tribunal has expressed its esteemed views on a an issue, normally, the decision of the higher judicial authority is to be followed. It was also held that the fact that the judgment of the higher judicial forum is from a non-jurisdictional High court does not alter this position. Consequently, Virgin Creations is followed and it is held that the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) is retrospective from 1.4.2005 and any payment of TDS on or before the due date for filing the ROI is sufficient.

(78.2 KiB, 615 DLs)

S. 40(a)(ia): Non-jurisdictional High Court prevails over Special Bench

For AY 2005-06, the AO disallowed Rs. 47.26 lakhs u/s 40(a)(ia) on the ground that the TDS had not been paid in time. The assessee claimed that the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act 2010 w.e.f. 1.4.2010 to provide that no disallowance could be made if the TDS was paid on or before the due date specified in s. 139(1) was retrospective in nature as held in CIT vs. Virgin Creations and that the contrary ruling of the Special Bench in Bharti Shipyard Ltd vs. DCIT 132 ITD 53 (Mum) could not be followed. HELD by the Tribunal:

In Virgin Creations the Calcutta High Court has passed a reasoned order and held that the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) is retrospective in nature. The binding nature of the decision of the Special Bench when a lone decision of non-jurisdictional High Court is available on the very same issue was examined in the Third Member decision in Kanel Oil & Export Ltd 121 ITD 596 where it was held that where there is only a judgement of the non-jurisdictional High Court prevails over an order of the Special Bench even though it is from the jurisdictional Bench (of the Tribunal). As the Calcutta High Court’s decision is the lone one on the issue whether s. 40(a)(ia) is retrospective, it has to be followed in preference to the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Bharti Shipyard Ltd. Consequently, amounts in respect of which TDS is paid on or before the due date of filing the ROI is eligible for deduction.

(118.5 KiB, 426 DLs)

S. 10B: Extension of relief period available for existing units

The assessee, a 100 % EOU, commenced commercial production in AY 1992-93 and was entitled to claim exemption u/s 10B(3) in any 5 consecutive assessment years falling within the period of 8 years. The assessee did not claim a deduction in the first 3 assessment years as there was a loss and claimed it for the first time in AY 1995-96. The eligibility period was upto AY 1999-2000. With effect from 1.4.1999, the period of exemption prescribed u/s 10B(3) of 5 years was substituted by 10 years. The assessee claimed that it was entitled for exemption u/s 10-B for a further period of two years i.e. AY 2000-01 and 2001-02. Thereafter, w.e.f. 1.4.2001, s. 10B was substituted by the Finance Act, 2000. The assessee’s claim was resisted by the AO & CIT (A) on the ground that the benefit applied only to “new undertakings” set up after that date and not to existing units. HELD by the Special Bench:

(i) In AY 1999-2000, before expiry of the original time limit of five consecutive assessment years for which deduction was available as per then applicable law, the amended law became applicable and the assessee was accordingly eligible for deduction for the extended period of 10 years, as against 5 years allowed under the preamended law (DSL Software Ltd followed);

(ii) If there is only one decision of a non-jurisdictional Hon’ble High Court on the issue, it is binding on the Special Bench in view of the settled principle of judicial proprietary;

(iii) The department’s argument that the new units set up by the assessee was a mere “capacity extension” and not a separate industrial undertaking on the basis that the certificates granted by the EOU authorities was for enhanced capacity and not for setting up a new industrial undertaking is not acceptable because S. 10B does not stipulate the issue of a separate approval for each unit from the competent authority. The only requirement is that the undertaking should be approved (Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries 260 ITR 181 (SC) distinguished)

(iv) On the question whether export incentives are “derived” from the undertaking and are eligible for deduction u/s 10B, s. 10B(4) stipulates a formula by apportioning the profits of the business of the undertaking in the ratio of turnover to the total turnover. Thus, though s. 10B(1) refers to profits “derived” by the EOU, the manner of determining such eligible profits has to be done as per the formula. S. 10B(4) does not require an assessee to establish a direct nexus with the business of the undertaking and once an income forms part of the business of the undertaking, the same would be included in the profits of the business of the undertaking and be eligible for deduction.

(138.6 KiB, 391 DLs)

Failure To Obtain JCIT’s Approval Renders s. 153C Assessment Order Void

Pursuant to search & seizure action u/s 132 on the premises of Mr. Shriram Soni, certain documents belonging to the assessee were found and seized pursuant to which a notice u/s 153C was issued to the assessee and assessment u/s 153C r.w.s. 144 were framed. In passing the assessment orders, the AO (ITO) omitted to obtain the consent of the JCIT as mandated by s. 153D. Before the Tribunal, the assessee argued that the failure to obtain the JCIT’s consent rendered the assessment a nullity. HELD by the Tribunal upholding the plea:

S. 153C authorises the AO to exercise jurisdiction over any person in whose case incriminating material has been found during the course of search conducted on another person. S. 153D provides that no order of assessment shall be passed by an AO below the rank of Joint Commissioner except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner. The fact that the heading to s. 153D refers to a “prior approval” and that it uses negative wording and the word “shall” makes the intention of the Legislature clear that compliance of s. 153D is mandatory. As the provision is mandatory, an act done in breach thereof will be invalid. Also, as the condition has been imposed in public interest, it cannot be waived by the assessee. Clause 9 of the Manual of Office Procedure also makes it clear that an assessment order under Chapter XIV-B can be passed only with the previous approval of the JCIT and that the approval must be in writing and stated to have been obtained in the body of the assessment order. Accordingly, in the absence of the JCIT’s approval, the AO had no jurisdiction to pass the s. 153C order and it was null and void (Ratnabai Dubhash 230 ITR 495 (Bom) & SPL’s Siddharth followed)

(118.9 KiB, 454 DLs)

S. 50C does not apply to land & building held as ‘stock-in-trade’

The assessee sold a plot of land for Rs. 79 lakhs. The AO held that the said plot was a capital asset and that the gains had to be computed in accordance with s. 50C. The CIT (A) & Tribunal upheld the assessee’s claim that as the said plot was held as stock-in-trade, s. 50C did not apply. On appeal by the department to the High Court, HELD dismissing the appeal:

For applicability of s. 50C, it is essential that an asset should be a “capital asset”. The question whether an asset is a “capital asset” or “stock-in-trade” is one of fact and has to be determined as per the guidelines laid down. On facts, the assessee was a builder and the investment in purchase and sale of plots was ancillary and incidental to the business activity. The assessee had treated the land as stock in trade in the balance sheet. Consequently, s. 50C had no application.

(1.8 MiB, 1,796 DLs)

S. 40(a)(ia) TDS Disallowance applies only to amounts “payable” as at 31st March and not to amounts already “paid” during the year

The assessee incurred brokerage expenses of Rs.38.75 lakhs and commission of Rs.2.43 lakhs without deducting TDS. Of this only Rs. 1.78 lakhs was payable and the rest was paid. The AO disallowed the entire expenditure u/s 40(a)(ia). Before the CIT (A), it was argued that disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) could be made only of the amount “payable” and not of that which had already been “paid” though it was rejected. On appeal to the Tribunal, the matter was referred to the Special Bench. HELD by the Special Bench:

Per the majority (S. V. Mehrotra, AM, dissenting):

When s. 40(a)(ia) was proposed to be inserted by the Finance Bill 2004, it applied to any “amount credited or paid”. However, when enacted by the Finance Act 2004, it applied only to “amount payable”. The words “credited/ paid” and “payable” have different connotations and the latter refers to an amount which is unpaid. The change in language between the Bill and the Act is conscious and with a purpose. The legislative intent is clear that only the outstanding amount or the provision for expense (and not the amount already paid) is liable for disallowance if TDS is not deducted. Also, s. 40(a)(ia) creates a legal fiction by virtue of which even genuine and admissible expenses can be disallowed for want of TDS. A legal fiction has to be limited to the area for which it is created. Consequently, s. 40(a)(ia) can apply only to expenditure which is “payable” as of 31st March and does not apply to expenditure which has been already paid during the year.

Per S. V. Mehrotra, AM:

The object of s. 40(a)(ia) is to ensure that the TDS provisions are scrupulously implemented without any default. If a narrow interpretation is assigned to the term ‘payable’, the object with which s. 40(a)(ia) was inserted would be frustrated. The Legislature could have never intended that only amounts payable at the end of the year should be disallowed but not the amounts paid during the year. The reason the words “credited” or “paid” were dropped was because they came within the ambit of the term “payable” and would have been superfluous. As s. 40(a) is applicable irrespective of the method of accounting followed by an assessee, the term ‘payable’ covered the entire accrued liability. Also s. 40(a)(ia) is to be interpreted harmoniously with the TDS provisions as its operation depends solely on the provisions contained under Chapter XVII-B & it provides for one of the consequences of non-deduction of tax. In the backdrop of the TDS provisions, the term “payable” means the amount “payable” “on which tax was deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B”. Consequently, s. 40(a)(ia) applies to all expenditure which is actually paid and which is payable as at the end of the year.

(96.5 KiB, 744 DLs)

S. 54EC limit of Rs. 50L does not apply to the transaction but financial year. Delay in investing within 6 M owing to non-availability of bonds to be excused

The assessee sold property on 22.10.2007 and computed long-term capital gains. The s. 54EC investment was required to be made within 6 months i.e. on or before 21.04.2008. The assessee invested Rs. 50 lakhs in REC bonds on 31.12.2007 (FY 2007-08, within the 6 M time limit) and Rs. 50 lakhs in NHAI bonds on 26.5.2008 (FY 2008-08, beyond the 6 M time limit) and claimed a deduction of Rs. 1 crore. The assessee claimed that no eligible scheme was available for subscription from 1.4.2008 to 28.5.2008 and that he applied in the NHAI bonds as soon as it opened and that he was prevented by sufficient cause from investing within the time period of 6 months. The AO & CIT (A) rejected the claim for exemption of Rs. 50 lakhs in respect of the NHAI bonds on the ground that (i) it exceeded the monetary limit of Rs. 50 lakhs prescribed in s. 54EC and (ii) it was made beyond the time limit of 6 months. On appeal to the Tribunal, HELD allowing the appeal:

(i) The Proviso to s. 54EC provides that the investment made in a long term specified asset by an assessee “during any financial year” should not exceed Rs. 50 lakhs. It is clear that if the assessee transfers his capital asset after 30th September of the financial year he gets an opportunity to make an investment of Rs.50 lakhs each in two different financial years and is able to claim exemption upto Rs.1 crore u/s 54EC. The language of the proviso is clear and unambiguous and so the assessee is entitled to get exemption upto Rs.1 crore in this case;

(ii) Though the time limit of 6 months for making the investment u/s 54EC expired on 21.4.2008, no bonds were available for subscription between 1.4.2008 to 28.5.2008. The investment was made as soon as the subscription opened on 26.5.2008. The assessee was accordingly prevented by sufficient cause which was beyond his control in making investment in these Bonds within the time prescribed. Exemption should be granted in cases where there is a delay in making investment due to non-availability of the bonds (Ram Agarwal 81 ITD 163 (Mum) followed)

(341.0 KiB, 472 DLs)

While interest paid by PE of foreign bank to H.O. is deductible in hands of PE, same interest is not taxable in hands of H.O.

The assessee, a Japanese bank, carrying on business through a PE in India, paid interest of Rs. 5 crores to its H.O. & other branches. The assessee, in computing the profits assessable to tax in India, claimed that while the interest received by the H.O. & other branches from the PE was not chargeable to tax in India on the principle that the PE & H.O. were one & the same entity, the PE was entitled to claim a deduction under Article 7 of the DTAA. The AO held that the PE & the H.O. were deemed to be separate entities and that while the interest received by the H.O. from the PE was taxable under Article 11, deduction for that interest could not be allowed to the PE u/s 40(a)(i) as it had failed to deduct TDS. The CIT (A) followed the verdict of the Special Bench in ABN Amro Bank 98 TTJ 295 (Kol) (partly affirmed in ABN AMRO 198 TM 376) and held that the interest was neither chargeable to tax nor allowable as a deduction. On appeal to the Tribunal, the matter was referred to a 5 Member Special Bench. HELD by the Special Bench:

(i) On the question whether the interest paid by the PE to the H.O. is deductible, while such interest is not deductible under the Act because the payer & payee are the same person, Article 7(2) and 7(3) of the DTAA & its Protocol makes it clear that for the purpose of computing the profits attributable to the PE in India, the PE is to be treated as a distinct and separate entity which is dealing wholly independently with the general enterprise of which it is a part and deduction has to be allowed for, inter alia, interest on moneys lent by the PE of a bank to its H.O.

(ii) On the question of taxability of the interest received by the H.O. from the PE, such interest is not taxable under the Act as both are, under the Act, the same person and not separate entities & one cannot make profit out of himself. The fiction created in Article 7(2) of the DTAA treating the PE as separate and independent entity does not extend to Article 11. Also, the interest paid by the PE is not interest paid in respect of debt claims forming part of the assets of the PE so as to attract Article 11(6). The DTAA, even assuming that it does create a liability, cannot be applied u/s 90(2) as it is contrary to the Act and less favourable to the assessee (Q whether the interest paid by the PE should be netted off against the interest received left open).