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DATE: June 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 139AA (inserted by the Finance Act 2017) which mandates quoting of Aadhaar number with the PAN is constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). The proviso to s. 139AA(2) (which deems the PAN void ab initio if the Aadhaar number is not quoted) is also valid. However, as the challenge under Article 21 is pending before the Constitution Bench, a partial stay is granted. Those who are already enrolled under the Aadhaar scheme should comply with s. 139AA (2). Those who are not enrolled need not do so for the time being and their PAN will not be treated as invalid. The said proviso to s. 139AA(2) cannot be read retrospectively as it takes away vested rights. It will only have prospective effect

Having said so, it becomes clear from the aforesaid discussion that those who are not PAN holders, while applying for PAN, they are required to give Aadhaar number. This is the stipulation of sub-section (1) of Section 139AA, which we have already upheld. At the same time, as far as existing PAN holders are concerned, since the impugned provisions are yet to be considered on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution, including on the debate around Right to Privacy and human dignity, etc. as limbs of Article 21, we are of the opinion that till the aforesaid aspect of Article 21 is decided by the Constitution Bench a partial stay of the aforesaid proviso is necessary. Those who have already enrolled themselves under Aadhaar scheme would comply with the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act. Those who still want to enrol are free to do so. However, those assessees who are not Aadhaar card holders and do not comply with the provision of Section 139(2), their PAN cards be not treated as invalid for the time being. It is only to facilitate other transactions which are mentioned in Rule 114B of the Rules. We are adopting this course of action for more than one reason. We are saying so because of very severe consequences that entail in not adhering to the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 139AA of the Act. A person who is holder of PAN and if his PAN is invalidated, he is bound to suffer immensely in his day to day dealings, which situation should be avoided till the Constitution Bench authoritatively determines the argument of Article 21 of the Constitution. Since we are adopting this course of action, in the interregnum, it would be permissible for the Parliament to consider as to whether there is a need to tone down the effect of the said proviso by limiting the consequences

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DATE: May 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01
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CITATION:
Law on tests to be applied to determine whether income from property is chargeable as “Income from house property” or as “Profits and gains of business” explained. The objects clause is not determinative. Income earned from a shopping center is required to be taxed under the head “Income from House Property” (Chennai Properties 373 ITR 673 (SC) and Rayala Corporation distinguished)

Wherever there is an income from leasing out of premises and collecting rent, normally such an income is to be treated as income from house property, in case provisions of Section 22 of the Act are satisfied with primary ingredient that the assessee is the owner of the said building or lands appurtenant thereto. Section 22 of the Act makes ‘annual value’ of such a property as income chargeable to tax under this head. How annual value is to be determined is provided in Section 23 of the Act. ‘Owner of the house property’ is defined in Section 27 of the Act which includes certain situations where a person not actually the owner shall be treated as deemed owner of a building or part thereof. In the present case, the appellant is held to be “deemed owner” of the property in question by virtue of Section 27(iiib) of the Act. On the other hand, under certain circumstances, where the income may have been derived from letting out of the premises, it can still be treated as business income if letting out of the premises itself is the business of the assessee

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DATE: May 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): S. 194C read with s. 200 are mandatory provisions. The disallowance stipulated in s. 40(a)(ia) for failure to deduct TDS u/s 194C is one of the consequences for the default. Accordingly, though there is a difference between “paid” and “payable”, s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only those cases where the amount is payable but also when it is paid. The contrary interpretation that s. 40(a)(ia) applies only to cases where amounts are “payable” will result in defaulters going scot free

It is clear that Section 40(a)(ia) deals with the nature of default and the consequences thereof. Default is relatable to Chapter XVIIB (in the instant case Sections 194C and 200, which provisions are in the aforesaid Chapter). When the entire scheme of obligation to deduct the tax at source and paying it over to the Central Government is read holistically, it cannot be held that the word ‘payable’ occurring in Section 40(a)(ia) refers to only those cases where the amount is yet to be paid and does not cover the cases where the amount is actually paid. If the provision is interpreted in the manner suggested by the appellant herein, then even when it is found that a person, like the appellant, has violated the provisions of Chapter XVIIB (or specifically Sections 194C and 200 in the instant case), he would still go scot free, without suffering the consequences of such monetary default in spite of specific provisions laying down these consequences

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DATE: April 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Article 5 India-UK DTAA: Entire law on what constitutes a "permanent establishment" in the context of the 'Formula One Grand Prix of India' event explained after extensive reference to case laws, OECD Model Convention and commentary by Philip Baker, Klaus Vogel and other experts

The term “place of business” is explained as covering any premises, facilities or installations used for carrying on the business of the enterprise whether or not they are used exclusively for that purpose. It is clarified that a place of business may also exist where no premises are available or required for carrying on the business of the enterprise and it simply has a certain amount of space at its disposal. Further, it is immaterial whether the premises, facilities or installations are owned or rented by or are otherwise at the disposal of the enterprise. A certain amount of space at the disposal of the enterprise which is used for business activities is sufficient to constitute a place of business. No formal legal right to use that place is required. Thus, where an enterprise illegally occupies a certain location where it carries on its business, that would also constitute a PE. Some of the examples where premises are treated at the disposal of the enterprise and, therefore, constitute PE are: a place of business may thus be constituted by a pitch in a market place, or by a certain permanently used area in a customs depot (e.g. for the storage of dutiable goods). Again the place of business may be situated in the business facilities of another enterprise. This may be the case for instance where the foreign enterprise has at its constant disposal certain premises or a part thereof owned by the other enterprise. At the same time, it is also clarified that the mere presence of an enterprise at a particular location does not necessarily mean that the location is at the disposal of that enterprise

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DATE: March 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1992-93
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CITATION:
S. 32: Title to immovable property cannot pass when its value is more than Rs.100/- unless it is executed on a proper stamp paper and is also duly registered with the sub-Registrar. Accordingly, a lessee cannot be said to be the "owner" for purposes of claiming depreciation. Under Explanation 1 to s. 32, the lessee is entitled to depreciation on the cost of construction incurred by him but not on the cost incurred by the owner and reimbursed by the lessee

We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Building which was constructed by the firm belonged to the firm. Admittedly it is an immovable property. The title in the said immovable property cannot pass when its value is more than Rs.100/- unless it is executed on a proper stamp paper and is also duly registered with the sub-Registrar. Nothing of the sort took place. In the absence thereof, it could not be said that the assessee had become the owner of the property. As is clear from the plain language of the Explanation, it is only when the assessee holds a lease right or other right of occupancy and any capital expenditure is incurred by the assesee on the construction of any structure or doing of any work in or in relation to and by way of renovation or extension of or improvement to the building and the expenditure on construction is incurred by the assessee, that assessee would be entitled to depreciation to the extent of any such expenditure incurred. In the instant case, records show that the construction was made by the firm. It is a different thing that the assessee had reimbursed the amount. The construction was not carried out by the assessee himself. Therefore, the explanation also would not come to the aid of the assessee

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DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vii)/ Article 12: In order to constitute “technical services”, services catering to the special needs of the person using them must be rendered. The provision of a common facility is not “technical services”. Amount paid towards reimbursement of a common technical computer facility is not “fees for technical services”. Amount received by way of reimbursement of expenses does not have the character of income

It is clearly held that no technical services are provided by the assessee to the agents. Once these are accepted, by no stretch of imagination, payments made by the agents can be treated as fee for technical service. It is in the nature of reimbursement of cost whereby the three agents paid their proportionate share of the expenses incurred on these said systems and for maintaining those systems. It is reemphasised that neither the AO nor the CIT (A) has stated that there was any profit element embedded in the payments received by the assessee from its agents in India. Record shows that the assessee had given the calculations of the total costs and pro-rata division thereof among the agents for reimbursement. Not only that, the assessee have even submitted before the Transfer Pricing Officer that these payments were reimbursement in the hands of the assessee and the reimbursement was accepted as such at arm’s length. Once the character of the payment is found to be in the nature of reimbursement of the expenses, it cannot be income chargeable to tax

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 10(37) Capital Gains: Meaning of "compulsory acquisition" under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 explained. The fact that the assessee entered into a settlement with the Collector regarding the compensation amount does not mean that the acquisition was not "compulsory" if the prescribed procedure was followed. Info Park Kerala vs. ACIT (2008) 4 KLT 782 overruled

It goes without saying that had steps not been taken by the Government under Sections 4 & 6 followed by award under Section 9 of the LA Act, the appellant would not have agreed to divest the land belonging to him to Techno Park. He was compelled to do so because of the compulsory acquisition and to avoid litigation entered into negotiations and settled the final compensation. Merely because the compensation amount is agreed upon would not change the character of acquisition from that of compulsory acquisition to the voluntary sale. It may be mentioned that this is now the procedure which is laid down even under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 as per which the Collector can pass rehabilitation and resettlement award with the consent of the parties/land owners. Nonetheless, the character of acquisition remains compulsory

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(2) Deemed Dividend: The argument that as the shares are issued in the name of the Karta, the HUF is not the “registered shareholder” and so s. 2(22)(e) will not apply to loans paid to the HUF is not correct because in the annual returns filed with the ROC, the HUF is shown as the registered and beneficial shareholder. In any case, the HUF is the beneficial shareholder. Even if it is assumed that the Karta is the registered shareholder and not the HUF, as per Explanation 3 to s. 2(22), any payment to a concern (i.e. the HUF) in which the shareholder (i.e. the Karta) has a substantial interest is also covered

Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction, thereby bringing any amount paid otherwise than as a dividend into the net of dividend under certain circumstances. It gives an artificial definition of ‘dividend’. It does not take into account that dividend which is actually declared or received. The dividend taken note of by this provision is a deemed dividend and not a real dividend. Loan or payment made by the company to its shareholder is actually not a dividend. In fact, such a loan to a shareholder has to be returned by the shareholder to the company. It does not become income of the shareholder. Notwithstanding the same, for certain purposes, the Legislature has deemed such a loan or payment as ‘dividend’ and made it taxable at the hands of the said shareholder. It is, therefore, not in dispute that such a provision which is a deemed provision and fictionally creates certain kinds of receipts as dividends, is to be given strict interpretation. It follows that unless all the conditions contained in the said provision are fulfilled, the receipt cannot be deemed as dividends. Further, in case of doubt or where two views are possible, benefit shall accrue in favour of the assessee

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DATE: December 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: A Writ Petition to challenge the issue of a reopening notice u/s 148 is maintainable as per the law laid down in Calcutta Discount 41 ITR 191 (SC). The law laid down in Chhabil Dass Agarwal 357 ITR 357 (SC) deals with the maintainability of a Writ to challenge the reassessment order and does not apply to a challenge to the reassessment notice

The High Courts dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the assessee challenging the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the reasons which were recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Courts as not maintainable. The aforesaid view taken is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Calcutta Discount Limited Company vs. Incom Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta & Anr. [(1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC)]

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DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 50B: Important law explained on what constitutes a "slump sale" and whether capital gains on liquidation of a firm are chargeable to tax

The assessees, however, are attempting the wriggle out from payment of capital gain tax on the ground that it was a “slump sale” within the meaning of Section 2(42C) of the Act and there was no mechanism at that time as to how the capital gain is to be computed in such circumstances, which was provided for the first time by Section 50B of the Act with effect from April 01, 2000. However, this argument fails in view of the fact that the assets were put to sale after their valuation. There was a specific and separate valuation for land as well as building and also machinery. Such valuation has to be treated as that of a partnership firm which had already stood dissolved

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