Home ›

Search Results For: Ajay Vohra

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements


Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: , , , ,
DATE: April 6, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2A) Stay by ITAT: Since the object of the 3rd proviso to s. 254(2A) is the automatic vacation of a stay that has been granted on the completion of 365 days, whether or not the assessee is responsible for the delay caused in hearing the appeal, such object being itself discriminatory, is liable to be struck down as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Also, the said proviso would result in the automatic vacation of a stay upon the expiry of 365 days even if the Appellate Tribunal could not take up the appeal in time for no fault of the assessee. Further, vacation of stay in favour of the revenue would ensue even if the revenue is itself responsible for the delay in hearing the appeal. In this sense, the said proviso is also manifestly arbitrary being a provision which is capricious, irrational and disproportionate so far as the assessee is concerned. Consequently, the third proviso to s. 254(2A) will now be read without the word “even” and the words “is not” after the words “delay in disposing of the appeal”. Any order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of the period or periods mentioned in the Section only if the delay in disposing of the appeal is attributable to the assessee.

Judged by both these parameters, there can be no doubt that the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2008, would be both arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, liable to be struck down as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. First and foremost, as has correctly been held in the impugned judgment, unequals are treated equally in that no differentiation is made by the third proviso between the assessees who 23 https://itatonline.org are responsible for delaying the proceedings and assessees who are not so responsible. This is a little peculiar in that the legislature itself has made the aforesaid differentiation in the second proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, making it clear that a stay order may be extended upto a period of 365 days upon satisfaction that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee. We have already seen as to how, as correctly held by Narang Overseas (supra), the second proviso was introduced by the Finance Act, 2007 to mitigate the rigour of the first proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act in its previous avatar. Ordinarily, the Appellate Tribunal, where possible, is to hear and decide appeals within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed. It is only when a stay of the impugned order before the Appellate Tribunal is granted, that the appeal is required to be disposed of within 365 days. So far as the disposal of an appeal by the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, this is a directory provision. However, so far as vacation of stay on expiry of the said period is concerned, this condition becomes mandatory so far as the assessee is concerned. The object sought to be achieved by the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act is without doubt the speedy disposal of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal in cases in which a stay has been granted in favour of the assessee.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Taxability of sums received for supply of software as "royalty": Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs, the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/ distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases

Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs mentioned in paragraph 41 of this judgment, it is clear that there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases. Our answer to the question posed before us, is that the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The answer to this question will apply to all four categories of cases enumerated by us in paragraph 4 of this judgment

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: July 22, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 23, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 28(v-a): There is a dichotomy between receipt of compensation by an assessee for the loss of agency and receipt of compensation attributable to the negative/restrictive covenant. The compensation received for the loss of agency is a revenue receipt whereas the compensation attributable to a negative/ restrictive covenant is a capital receipt. Payment received as non-competition fee under a negative covenant was always treated as a capital receipt till AY 2003-2004. It is only w.e.f. 1-4-2003 that the said capital receipt is now made taxable u/s 28(v-a). It is well settled that a liability cannot be created retrospectively (All imp judgements referred)

The revenue has no business to second guess commercial or business expediency of what parties at arms-length decide for each other. For example, stating that there was no rationale behind the payment of INR 6.6 crores and that the assessee was not a probable or perceptible threat or competitor to the SWC group is the perception of the Assessing Officer, which cannot take the place of business reality from the point of view of the assessee, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove. The fact that M/s Maltings Ltd. had incurred a loss in the previous year is again neither here nor there. It may in future be a direct threat to the SWC group and may turn around and make profits in future years. Besides, M/s Maltings Ltd. is only one concern of the assessee – it is the assessee’s expertise in this field on all counts that was the threat perception of the SWC group which cannot be second guessed by the revenue

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 199/205: In a case where the deductor has deducted tax at source but has not deposited the tax with the Govt, the assessee cannot be made to suffer. U/s 205, the assessee/ deductee cannot be called upon to pay the tax. Credit for the tax deducted at source has to be allowed in the hands of the deductee irrespective of whether the same has been deposited by the deductor to the credit of the Central Government or not (Yashpal Sahani 165 TM 144 (Bom), Sumit Devendra Rajani 49 TM.com 31 (Guj) & Pushkar Jain 103 TM.com 106 (Bom) followed)

In terms of section 205 of the Act, the assessee/deductee cannot be called upon to pay tax, to the extent to which tax had been deducted from the payments due. Consequently, it follows that credit for such tax deducted at source, which is deducted from the account of the deductee, by the deductor, is to be allowed as taxes paid in the hands of the deductee, irrespective of the fact whether the same has been deposited by the deductor to the credit of the Central Government or not. The deductee in such circumstances cannot be denied credit of tax deducted at source on its behalf. Under the Act, the provisions are enshrined under which recovery of tax from the account of the person, who had deducted the such tax, are provided

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 13, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 147 Reopening for Bogus Share Capital u/s 68: The parent co does not have sufficient funds to invest such huge amounts in Indian subsidiaries. The funds are routed through a web of entities spread across various jurisdictions, mostly in tax havens. The investments so made, are required to be investigated and the credit worthiness of the investing company is in jeopardy, in view of the information received from the investigation wing. This exercise can be undertaken during the re-reassessment proceedings to finally determine if the amounts represent undisclosed income of the assessee which is required to be taxed in its hands. At the stage of re-opening, only a reason to believe should exist with regard to escapement of income. Definite conclusion would be drawn after raising queries upon the assessee in the light of s. 68 of the Act (All imp verdicts referred)

Whilst it is the settled position in law that the sanctioning authority is required to apply his mind and the grant of approval must not be made in a mechanical manner, however, as noted by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Prem Chand Shaw (Jaiswal) v Assistant Commissioner, Circle-38, Kolkata [2016] 67 taxmann.com 339 (Calcutta), the mere fact that the sanctioning authority did not record his satisfaction in so many words would not render invalid the sanction granted under section 151(2) when the reasons on the basis on the basis of which sanction was sought could not be assailed and even an appellate authority is not required to give reasons when it agrees with the finding unless statute or rules so requires

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Undisclosed income/ expenditure: A letter written in refutal of allegations contained in a news items with a without-prejudice offer cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure or as an unconditional offer to pay tax. Also, the disclosure is by the USA Co and not by the assessee. It is not the case of the Dept that the amount has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the assessee so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee

In our opinion, such communication(s) cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure as such. What is significant to note is that in the present case, the disclosure is attributed to Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., USA, filed by it in the proceedings in USA; and not by the assessee as such. It is not the case of the Department that the amount referred to in the said disclosure has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the appellant – assessee under instruction, so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the appellant.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 2(15)/11: Though the assessee is activity contributing towards the promotion and popularity of cricket, its activities are also concentrated for generation of revenue by exploiting the popularity of the game and towards monopolization and dominant control over cricket to the exclusion of others. The commercial exploitation of the popularity of the game and the property/infrastructure held by the assessee is not incidental to the main object but is one of the primary motives of the assessee (All imp judgements on 'charitable purpose' referred)

The assessee is regularly following commercial activity by commercially exploiting its property and rights to hold matches and thereby earning huge income, hence the said activity can not be said to be incidental activity rather the commercial exploitation of the match is one of the main activity of the assessee, hence, the case of the assessee ,in our view, for the year under consideration will not fall within the definition and scope of section 2(15) of the Act and thus the assessee is not entitled to exemption u/s 11 of the Act. While holding so, we do not mean that the assessee’s activity is not at all for promotion of the game of cricket. No doubt, the assessee is also activity contributing towards the promotion and popularity of the cricket but at the same time its activities are also concentrated for generation and augmentation of the revenue by exploiting the popularity of the game and towards monopolisation and having dominant control over the cricket to the exclusion of others. What we want to convey is that the commercial exploitation of the popularity of the game and the property/infrastructure held by the assessee is not incidental to the main object but is apparently and inter alia one of the primary motives of the assessee

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 27, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 170/ 292BB: A notice issued in the name of the amalgamating entity after amalgamation is void because the amalgamating entity ceases to exist. Participation in the proceedings by the assessee cannot operate as an estoppel against law. This is a substantive illegality and not a procedural violation of the nature adverted to in s. 292BB. There is a value which the court must abide by in promoting the interest of certainty in tax litigation. Not doing so will only result in uncertainty and displacement of settled expectations. There is a significant value which must attach to observing the requirement of consistency and certainty. Individual affairs are conducted and business decisions are made in the expectation of consistency, uniformity and certainty. To detract from those principles is neither expedient nor desirable.

In the present case, despite the fact that the assessing officer was informed of the amalgamating company having ceased to exist as a result of the approved scheme of amalgamation, the jurisdictional notice was issued only in its name. The basis on which jurisdiction was invoked was fundamentally at odds with the legal principle that the amalgamating entity ceases to exist upon the approved scheme of amalgamation. Participation in the proceedings by the appellant in the circumstances cannot operate as an estoppel against law. This position now holds the field in view of the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of two learned judges which dismissed the appeal of the Revenue in Spice Enfotainment

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 31, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Entire law on whether the computation provisions of Rule 8D is retrospective explained in the light of established principles of interpretation of statutes read with verdicts in Vatika Townships 367 ITR 466 (SC), Gold Coin Health 304 ITR 308 (SC) and other verdicts

There is no indication in Rule 8D to the effect that Rule 8D intended to apply retrospectively. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation for interpreting retrospectivity of a fiscal statute and looking into the nature and purpose of subsection (2) and subsection (3) of Section 14A as well as purpose and intent of Rule 8D coupled with the explanatory notes in the Finance Bill, 2006 and the departmental understanding as reflected by Circular dated 28.12.2006, we are of the considered opinion that Rule 8D was intended to operate prospectively.

Read more ›

Posted on by editor — No Comments ↓
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips Ltd which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

Read more ›